ISS Today, 10 March 2010: Mongi Henda, Intern, Organised Crime and Money Laundering, ISS Cape Town

The 15th Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (Cites) is set to be held in Doha, Qatar from the 13th to the 25th of March. One contentious issue, which shall take up part of the proceedings, concerns the legitimate selling of ivory as a means of undercutting the illicit trade. Countries such as Tanzania and Zambia are keen to sell off their stockpiled ivory. These legitimate sales are expected to raise tens of millions of dollars to help countries to better protect vulnerable elephants. In addition, the controlled sale of ivory might dampen prices. There is some opposition to the proposal to offload stockpiles onto the market. Many environmentalists have expressed concern that the controlled sales will inevitably stimulate demand and create more opportunities for poachers. They cite the views of countries such as Kenya and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) that previous sales of ivory stockpiles in 2008 were responsible for the significant increase in poaching in recent years. It should therefore be quite interesting to see what concrete decisions will be taken at this year’s Cites convention given the divergent views surrounding the ivory trade.

One thing that can be almost unanimously agreed upon is the sharp increase in elephant poaching across Africa recently. For instance, the organisation Space for Elephants (SEF) has remarked on the illicit ivory trade, which they believe to have gradually increased since 2004, and to have escalated quite sharply in 2009. Research undertaken by the Elephant Trade Information System - managed by the international wildlife trade-monitoring network TRAFFIC has found that the volume of illegal ivory seized doubled between 2008 and 2009. Kenya and the DRC have been particularly hard hit by poachers belonging to well organized crime syndicates that supply the growing demand, particularly in Asia. According to the Kenyan government, in 2009, poachers killed 232 elephants - up from 145 in 2008 and 47 in 2007. In the DRC persistent conflict during 2009 has also contributed to elephant poaching. Anita Gossman’s article “Tusks and Trinkets: An overview of illicit ivory trafficking in Africa”, published in the ISS’s African Security Review last year, highlights how the Congolese military have been struggling to cope with poaching activity in the DRC’s Garamba National Park. In Garamba, rebels belonging to the Lord Resistance Army (LRA) are believed to be heavily involved in poaching and selling ivory for profit, more than 180 elephant tusks passed through Ariwara in 2009 alone.
Poaching in Africa is therefore reaching higher levels of severity than during the 1990’s. Scientists have even estimated that between 8 to 10% of Africa’s elephants are being killed per year to supply the growing demand for ivory. Such high levels of poaching have not been seen since the 1980’s before the implementation of the world ivory trading ban on the 18th January 1990.

What has not yet been properly established is whether or not the legitimate selling of ivory stockpiles is driving the illicit trade in ivory. During the 14th Cites conference in 2007, South Africa, Botswana, Zimbabwe and Namibia were given the go-ahead for a once-off sale of their ivory stocks of more than 100 tonnes which took place in 2008. This consignment was reportedly sold at a price of more than $20 million to Japan and China. As noted earlier, the years following the once-off sales in 2008 have seen an increase instead of a decrease in poaching activities. This however does not necessarily point to a causal relationship between legitimate and illicit ivory trade. To assume this would be to ignore other salient variables such as an increasing demand for ivory amongst China’s burgeoning affluent classes. As renowned expert on the ivory trade Daniel Stiles points out, “Ivory is a high prestige and auspicious material in Asia, used often for display, religious and gift-giving purposes”. This suggests deeper cultural reasons for ivory demand in Asia beyond the legitimate sale of ivory stockpiles by certain African countries. On the other hand poor law enforcement in countries such as Kenya and the DRC have left their respective conservation security structures quite vulnerable. Anita Gossmann notes the link between conflict and elephant poaching in Africa. In both the DRC and Kenya elephant poaching has been committed quite often by armed groups who use the proceeds of the illicit ivory to fund their war efforts. This leads to a vicious cycle whereby armed conflicts permit poaching and poaching in turn facilitates the continuation of armed conflict.

What can be observed from the current situation regarding the growing illicit trade in ivory is that history seems to be repeating itself. During the 1980’s demand for ivory was being led primarily by Japan’s emerging well-off citizens. Today it is China’s growing upper class that is driving the demand. During the 1980’s poaching in Africa was permitted by widespread conflict and poor governance. Today it is the continuation of these conditions that has allowed for such an increase in poaching. In addition organized crime groups have now taken advantage of these favorable conditions and established themselves as important suppliers. Disappointingly this point is being overlooked. As the Cites conference approaches, the debate seems to be centered on confirming an elusive link between legitimate sales of ivory stocks and the growing illicit trade. This unfortunately detracts from the important supply/demand factors that drive the illicit trade in ivory. It is these factors that need to be properly identified and understood in order to stem the growing illicit ivory trade. To this end more security is needed.

Countries enmeshed in conflict and corruption are in no position to enforce laws that can control the illicit trade in ivory. Secondly, cultural and economic factors particularly in Asia are likely to continue to feed high demand for ivory products. Customers should rather be sensitized of the risks inherent to the contemporary ivory trade, in the same way that the Kimberly Process informs customers about illicit diamonds. Lastly, all parties concerned with the preservation of elephants need to appreciate the trans-national nature of the problem, and adequately inform themselves of trends and routes. Poaching syndicates seem to operate across borders, creating complex routes that stretch across a number of countries. Role players from many sectors have to cooperate to find solutions. This is not too much to expect from this year’s Cites conference. 

ISS Today ariticle written by Donald Anthony Mwiturubani, Senior Researcher, Environmental Security Programme, Nairobi. A report published in November 2009 by the Tanzania Traditional Energy Development and Environmental Organization (TaTeDO) revealed that over 1600 tonnes of charcoal are consumed daily in Dar es Salaam, which is over 400 tonnes more than in 2002. This means that the residents of Dar es Salaam consume about 590,000 tonnes of charcoal annually. Factors related to issues of availability, affordability and lack of alternative sources of energy could be cited as the causes of overdependence on charcoal as a main source of energy. Hiked electricity tariffs coupled with unreliable supply have led to increased number of households and institutions that resort to charcoal as the main source of energy, particularly in the urban centres. In Tanzania, for example, it is estimated that about 70 percent of charcoal users use it as the only source of energy while the remaining 30 percent uses charcoal alongside other sources of energy such as electricity and solar.

Unchecked high electricity tariffs are partly attributed to the monopoly enjoyed by the electricity generation and Supply Company, which is the supplier of this important commodity. Tanzania Electricity Supply Company (TANESCO) has been the only electricity supply company in Tanzania since independence in 1961. A similar situation exists in Kenya where the Kenya Power and Lightning Company (KPLC) is the sole supplier of electricity in the country. In the recent times, a power generation company known as “Kenya Generation (KENGEN)” in Kenya was incorporated to generate and supply electricity for distribution by the KPLC. Lack of competition in the electricity generation and supply sector is blamed for inefficiency and high costs of energy in the two countries. As a result of this, many individuals and institutions such as the prisons, hospitals and schools have opted to use charcoal as the main source of energy and a substitute for electricity.

The cost of electricity generation and supply is made worse by the overdependence on Hydroelectric Power (HEP) as the main source of energy. HEP is weather dependent and the unpredictable weather, due to climate change has made the use of HEP unreliable. Power rationing, sometimes extending up to fifteen hours a day is a common phenomenon in a number of Sub-Saharan Africa countries during the dry seasons.

High electricity tariffs and reliability of electricity supply are therefore two important factors that contribute to deforestation due to charcoal production, to meet the growing energy demand. It is reported that over 50 percent of the deforestation witnessed in Africa South of the Sahara is attributed to charcoal burning. The TaTeDo report pointed out that between six and eight cubic meters of wood are required to produce one tonne of charcoal. This means, for instance, that residents of Dar es Salaam alone require more than 70,000 cubic meters of wood to make charcoal they consume annually. Deforestation has several negative consequences to national economies and the environment. Forests are known to protect water catchment areas and hence deforestation may lead to decrease in water supply which is required for social, economic and domestic uses. Deforestation may also expose the land and make an area vulnerable to negative effects of climate change due to alteration of the hydrologic cycle. Forests act as carbon sinks hence deforestation can contribute to increase of carbon dioxide (CO2) in the atmosphere. Furthermore, burning of wood for charcoal releases significant amount of CO2 to the atmosphere. It is reported, for instance, that the trees that make up the Miombo woodlands are the most preferred trees for charcoal making and they are known to contain about 47 percent carbon, which is released to the atmosphere when burning them for charcoal. 

In order to reduce deforestation due to charcoal making, governments could provide subsidies to electricity supply agencies in order to make the cost of electricity affordable particularly for the poor. But this has not been an option after the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) introduced their infamous Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in the mid 1980s. Under SAPs governments in sub-Sahara Africa were required to remove subsidies in the social services delivery and introduce cost sharing policies. While the aim of SAPs was to liberalize the economy by allowing private sectors to participate in social services delivery and hence increase efficiency, this has not been the case in the electricity supply sector. There has been a monopoly in electricity supply for unknown reasons.

Removing monopoly on power generation and supply, by allowing many companies to invest in the power sector and diversifying sources of energy could probably remove unchecked high electricity tariffs and hence increase efficiency. This could make the service reliable, accessible and affordable to many people particularly the poor and hence reduce overdependence on charcoal as the only source of energy. In order to do this, political will and participation and support from different stakeholders are essential.

The other option, as TaTedo report proposes, is to invest in energy saving technology such as the use of improved wood-fuel stoves for both firewood and charcoal; and improved charcoal making kilns. Improved wood-fuel stoves are envisaged to reduce the amount of charcoal used per household/institution by reducing the amount of charcoal lost during use. Similarly, the use of improved charcoal making kilns is expected to reduce the amount of charcoal lost in the process of making them. Although in the short run this option is seen as effective in reducing deforestation, it may not be sustainable in the long run particularly due to human population increase that will require more wood for charcoal making.

Johan Burger, senior researcher, Crime and Justice Programme, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria

In a research report entitled `An investigation into deaths as a result of police action in KwaZulu-Natal, Eastern Cape and Gauteng` in 2007, the Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD) expressed a number of concerns with the high number of deaths in these three provinces. Amongst others, they concluded:

`… that there are compelling factors for the police to shoot or use other types of force, especially given the preponderance of criminals prone to violence and the duty of the police to protect themselves and the public`

but also:

`… that there are circumstances in which the police’s use of force is questionable`.

Since then, deaths as a result of police action or while in police custody in these three provinces have become progressively worse. In KwaZulu-Natal in particular, the situation is serious enough for critical questions to be asked. During 2008/09 just under a third (258) of the national total (912) of deaths in police custody or as a result of police action happened in this province, representing an increase of 47% over the previous year.

Over the last few months, the media has also started to raise questions about the high number of suspects killed by the police in KwaZulu-Natal. For example, the Times Live of Jan 26, 2010, published an article entitled `Funny how suspectskeep dying: KwaZulu-Natal cops unusually prone to killing their quarry`. The article questions the death of three suspects connected to the assassination of `pro-ANC` traditional leader Mbongeleni Zondi in Umlazi ahead of the general elections last year. All three were killed by the police in separate incidents and one of them, Bongani Mkhize, was shot after lodging an application at the Durban High Court `to prevent police from killing him`. According to the article it is also strange that in so-called high profile cases suspects are seldom only wounded and arrested.

This kind of alleged police conduct fits within the definition of police vigilantism, and although it may be too early to claim that what we are seeing in KwaZulu-Natal is sufficient proof of the existence of police vigilantes, these are worrying signs. In a September 2007 article by Kanti Kotecha and James Walker entitled `Police Vigilantes` published in the journal Society, police vigilantism is defined as:
`… acts or threats by police which are intended to protect the established sociopolitical order from subversion but which violate some generally perceived norms for police behaviour.`

Police vigilantism usually occurs in areas where the application of the rule of law is perceived to be inadequate or weak. The situation is aggravated by pressure on the police to show results and the belief amongst frustrated police officials that the law unjustly protects criminals. In addition, police vigilantism can also point to weaknesses in police leadership and civilian oversight that provide police officials the space to act outside the law.

At this stage it is also necessary to consider the conduct of the police within a wider perspective of general violence in KwaZulu-Natal. For example, in three of the most serious violent crime categories the ratio in KwaZulu-Natal is much higher than the national average. For murder the ratio is 47 per 100 00 compared to the national average of 37,3; for attempted murder it is 48,7 compared to 37,6; and for aggravated robbery 255,9 compared to 249,3. These high crime rates add to pressures on the police ‘to do something’ and contribute to their frustration when their efforts appear to be ineffective. The highest number of attacks on and murders of police officials also happen in KwaZulu-Natal. Of the 629 attacks on members of the police during 2008/09, 257 (40%) happened in KwaZulu-Natal and of the 105 members murdered in the same period 28 (26%) were murdered in KwaZulu-Natal. This again strengthens the belief amongst police officials that they are being targeted by criminals and, at least for some, may justify the use of extra-judicial methods.

There are also particular policing challenges in KwaZulu-Natal that seem to support suspicions that control and oversight in the province is far from adequate. For example, during 2008/09 this province experienced the highest number of escapes from police custody (200), which represents 17,5% of the total and is 70 more than the year before. KwaZulu-Natal is also far behind in the implementation of sector policing, a practical form of community policing. Whereas the other provinces have established sector policing in either all or most of their high crime police precincts, this province managed to establish sector policing at only 3 of its 27 high crime precincts. It clearly demonstrates that not only is there a problem with police leadership at both provincial and station level, but also with police-community relations and cooperation - something that is considered essential to a successful fight against crime and lawlessness.

In conclusion, the level of violence in general in KwaZulu-Natal appears to be on the rise and indications are that the police find it increasingly difficult to contain the situation, let alone resolving it. This gives rise to increasing concerns that the police are reacting to the problem by resorting to extra-judicial or vigilante activity. In this regard it is obvious that urgent interventions by the top leadership of the police and of the country are necessary to address the spiralling problem of criminal violence in KwaZulu-Natal and to ensure adherence to the rule of law.

Lauren Hutton, Researcher, Security Sector Governance Programme, Pretoria.

“The security services in our country do not practice torture. They do not endorse torture, they do not encourage others to torture on our behalf; they do not collude in torture, full stop. It’s a free society, and that’s actually what the security services are out there to protect.”

UK Home Secretary Alan Johnson in response to allegations that MI5 colluded with third party states in the illegal detention and torture of terror suspects.

The importance of democratic control of intelligence services has become a topic of international interest as the global war on terror enters its ninth year. The attacks on 9/11 impacted on intelligence in several ways. Firstly, in the aftermath of the attacks serious questions were asked (and continue to be asked) about the efficacy of a closed, state centric, target oriented information system in the era of globalised, diffused governance and geographically unbounded security threats. The effect of the surprise attack was to call into question issues of methodology as well as management of traditionally silo-ed and secret structures. Whether or not state intelligence systems are tailored to fulfil the information requirements of the modern globalised security complex remains a challenge and intelligence agencies the world over are being confronted with the need to remain relevant in a world where information, people and ideas cross oceans and borders with the click of a mouse.

Secondly, and rather paradoxically, as the efficacy of intelligence to prevent surprise and act as a tool in conflict prevention was being questioned, the utility of intelligence as information on which to base operational security decisions was brought to the fore. As a force multiplier and strategic enabler, intelligence is central in the fight against enemies that utilise secrecy and covert methods. These targets range from terrorist networks to organised criminal groups, money launderers to weapons and drug smugglers. The commonality is that they operate under cover to avoid detection and covert collection such as the interception of communications is sometimes an essential part of operations to counter such activities. Furthermore, the global security environment has since the end of the Cold War been characterised by increasing complexity and uncertainty. Information becomes essential to define interests and actions, to engage in a complex and interdependent environment and to make sense of a world in a state of constant flux.

The third impact of the war on terror on intelligence has been a longer term questioning of the legitimacy of intelligence activities. This has come to light most pronouncedly in the association of intelligence agencies with illegal detention, extraordinary rendition, human rights abuses and the use (or sanctioning) of torture. According to reports by different national and international human rights organisations, torture is practiced in over half the countries of the world and is present on all continents. Africa is reported to register the highest incidence of torture and ill treatment, followed by Asia. Incidents of torture, ill treatment and illegal detention are indicative of systemic weaknesses – abuse of power by authorities, discrimination and impunity, lack of oversight and democratic controls and lack of respect for judicial procedures of arrest and detention.

The implications for African states of a renewed debate on intelligence in the post-9/11 security environment can be interpreted in several lights. On the one hand, there is the potential that by sacrificing the moral high ground in favour of expediency, states that suffer from democratic intelligence governance deficits cannot be pressured by the international community to pay greater attention to conditions of arrest and detention by intelligence agencies. In some instances questionable regimes and practices in Africa have been overtly or covertly supported by the international counter-terrorism coalition. This presents long-term challenges for securing respect for human rights, democratic governance and open political spaces. Other negative impacts could include more support for global jihad by the relatively power deprived global South; increased incidents of domestic terrorism against oppressive national political-security regimes and the creation of safe havens and underground support for subversive causes.

There could, however, be more positive spin-offs. The attention that the global war on terror has cast on intelligence methods and oversight has reinvigorated the discussion on legal standards and oversight practices for intelligence – most noticeably through the efforts of the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights while countering terrorism. In recasting the role of intelligence as a strategic enabler and reconsidering the role and function of secret information, intelligence could become a sharper tool in the state arsenal. Countering terrorism through criminal justice systems will entail tailored intelligence that can be shared across national borders and can be utilised in a court of law – as was witnessed recently in the Sydney trials. International intelligence cooperation and the sharing of information have become central in combating threats in the modern global security climate. This creates a fundamental shift in the orientation of intelligence from agencies intrinsically concerned with protecting and operating in secret to an orientation focused on collaborative efforts against transnational targets in an information rich environment (in terms of potential sources of information). For African states, moving towards a transnational focus might also overcome the perception - and sometimes practice – of intelligence as political police.

Because counter-terrorism is an issue of global interest, the additional focus on legal standards and oversight for intelligence could bring greater attention to an arena generally in the shadowy sidelines of public discourse and security studies. At a minimum, the role of intelligence agencies should be clearly defined in legislation. This starting point would enable limitations on and consequences for infringements on human rights. However, legislation serves limited purpose in states where the political dispensation does not favour respect for the rule of law or good democratic governance. 

ISS Today: 12 Feb 2010: Isaack Otieno- Programme Head – Corruption and Governance, ISS Cape Town, Politicians from across the political divide recently reached a compromise on contentious issues highlighted in the harmonized draft constitution, with the compromise secured after lengthy political negotiations by the Parliamentary Select Committee (PSC) on the Constitution. Even the most dyed-in-the-wool pessimist might now begin hoping that Kenya could have a new constitution before the end of the year. Op-ed pages in most Kenyan publications indicate a general enthusiasm for what has come our way from the latest Naivasha process, with some hailing it as modern and progressive. The close to over twenty years search for a new constitutional dispensation will be settled through a referendum later this year.

The PSC team agreed on a pure presidential system in which the President will have the option of picking Cabinet ministers from Parliament or outside. However, those picked from the House will have to relinquish their seats. Just like in the US from where the model is borrowed and adjusted to the demands of the two sides of the Coalition, the President has to be nominated by a political party but should not hold any party office. In addition, an expanded legislature, a devolved system of government, an accountable executive, and an independent judiciary are among the key highlights of this political compromise.

The question that remains unresolved is whether the proposed harmonised draft constitution will be the panacea to Kenya’s political and governance problems. The answer to this question in the interim is negative. A new constitution will not be the answer to the governance problems that continue to cripple the country.

To be sure, even against the tide of the resurgent sense of national optimism, the dangerous triad of corruption, impunity and tribalism continue to threaten the very stability of the country.

First in the triad is the issue of corruption. This problem is as old as Kenya’s post independence history. It is a problem that the country’s political elite has failed to deal with decisively and conclusively. Billions of Kenyan shillings have been lost due to official corruption, traceable to high ranks of government offices. The multi-billion Goldenberg and Anglo Leasing corruption scandals remain unresolved to date. More recently another fresh issue has surfaced over the disbursement of Free Primary Education funds sparking fears of loss of over KES 5.5 billion. The minister in charge and the accounting officer have both refused to resign. No one is ready to take political responsibility for the emerging scandal. This issue is now the subject of yet another routine investigation by the Kenya Anti Corruption Commission. Like in the earlier scandals, Goldenberg and Anglo Leasing, not much can be expected from the ongoing investigations.

The second problem is that of impunity. Like a sword of vengeance, the continued existence of this problem contributes to the public’s low trust in institutions of governance such as the judiciary and the country’s security sector. More critically, there is erosion in the culture of respect for the rule of law. This disrespect and lack of faith in the country’s institutions of governance has led to the mushrooming of gangs such as the outlawed Mungiki, Taliban etc among many others, who operate outside of the ambit of the law. The co-existence of impunity alongside the established constitution is telling of a politically weak government. Furthermore, members of the society are increasingly taking matters of law and justice into their own hands, threatening the very legitimacy and logic of an elected government. However, the present danger lies in the fact that the perpetrators of the 2007/8-post elections violence are yet to face justice. The Kenya government is yet to amass sufficient political will, courage and moral force to take decisive action and bring to book the masterminds of the country’s worst political violence that left over 1500 people dead. Unresolved, this is another example in the long list of impunities that is like a time bomb waiting to explode.

Thirdly, Kenya continues to be plagued by the perennial problem of inter ethnic animosity otherwise known as tribalism. Kenya’s political setup is closely informed by strict ethnic loyalties and divides. Ethnicity has been politicised to the extent that it is the platform from which political negotiations are settled and political goods divided. While the Kenyan Government has created a relevant Commission to address the historic problem of ethnicity, in reality very little is being done to deal with this emotive issue. Key positions in government continue to be dished out on ethnic plates. In today’s Kenya, against the obvious lessons of post election violence that was largely fought along ethnic lines, there are some ministries and departments that remain under the command of members from the same ethnic community. The problem of tribalism is not being attended to decisively. Consequently, it is hard to see how a new constitution will resolve this.

The promise of the new constitution has led the Kenyan leadership to take their foot off the peddle of decisively dealing with the dangerous triad above. Instead of providing leadership and direction and offering solutions with regard to the here and now problems, the leadership is focused on the twin promises of the new constitutional order and the 2012 elections. The sad reality is that they are simply buying time, hoping that the new constitution will fix the problem and that corruption, impunity and tribalism will ebb away. This is politically naïve. The reality is that the new constitution will not be the answer to the existing woes of impunity, corruption and tribalism. These three problems unattended, effectively pose a serious threat to the stability of the country with or without a new constitution. Clearly, the promise of a new constitution is not a panacea to the country’s existing woes.

ISS Today, 8 Feb 2010: Noel Stott, Senior Research Fellow, Arms Management Programme, ISS Pretoria, ‘Nuclear weapons are the most inhumane weapons ever conceived, inherently indiscriminate in those they kill and maim, and with an impact deadly for decades. They are the only weapons ever invented that have the capacity to wholly destroy life on this planet, and the arsenals we now possess are able to do so many times over. The problem of nuclear weapons is at least equal to that of climate change in terms of gravity – and much more immediate in its potential impact.’

In late December 2009, the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament headed up by two former Foreign Ministers, Australia’s Gareth Evans and Japan’s Yoriko Kawaguchi released their long awaited report aimed at reinvigorating, at a high political level, the global debate on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

Prime Minister Rudd and then Prime Minister Taro launched the independent Commission in September 2008 as a joint initiative of the Australian and Japanese Governments. Thirteen eminent individuals from around the world, including South Africa’s Speaker of the National Assembly (from 1994 to 2004), Frene Ginwala, acted as Commissioners.

The release of the report is important given that in May 2010, the five-yearly Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Review Conference will take place. The NPT is regarded as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Based on a bargain of three pillars, the NPT was designed to: prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology; further the goal of nuclear disarmament; and, promote co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

However, the NPT is regarded as being in crisis. India and Pakistan, both of whom are known to possess nuclear weapons, have never signed or ratified the NPT. Israel has also not signed or ratified the NPT. While North Korea joined the treaty as a Non-Nuclear Weapon State (NNWS) in 1985, detonated a nuclear device in 2006 and regards itself as having withdrawn from the treaty. India, for example has made it clear that it will never sign the “flawed and discriminatory” NPT. In addition, the previous Review Conference in 2005, failed to reach any substantive agreement and the divide between the non-proliferation first and disarmament first camps - between those accused of non-compliance with their obligation to disarm (the permanent members of the Security Council who have nuclear weapons) and those accused of non-compliance with their commitment to not develop or acquire nuclear weapons (the NNWS in general but Iran and North Korea in particular).

The International Commission’s report will not please those who argue that the only credible guarantee against the use or threat of use of such weapons is their total elimination and for an immediate world free of nuclear weapons. The report, while conceding that ‘nuclear weapons are the most inhumane weapons ever conceived…’ instead calls for the global stockpile of nuclear weapons to be cut to 2,000 from 23,000 by 2025.

On the positive side, the report does emphasise the de-ligitimisation of nuclear weapons and calls on the eight nuclear armed states to adopt a non-first-use policy and to remove their nuclear arms from high-alert status so that they can not be launched speedily.

In what the report calls “a Comprehensive Action Agenda” a time-table for the total elimination of nuclear weapons is presented:

Short Term Action Agenda (to 2012) includes:

All nuclear-armed states declaring that the sole purpose of retaining the nuclear weapons they have is to deter others from using such weapons against them;

A commitment by all nuclear-armed states not to increase their nuclear arsenals.

Satisfactory negotiated resolution of the North Korea and Iran nuclear program problems.

Medium Term Action Agenda (to 2025) includes:

Building support for a comprehensive Nuclear Weapons Convention to legally underpin the ultimate transition to a nuclear weapon free world.

Implementation of a Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and a further agreement negotiated to put all fissile material not in weapons under international safeguards.

Implementation of measures to reduce the proliferation risks associated with the expansion of civil nuclear energy.

Longer Term Action Agenda (beyond 2025) includes:

The creation of political conditions for the prospect of major war or aggression to be so remote that nuclear weapons are seen as having no remaining deterrent utility.

The creation of the military conditions in which conventional arms imbalances, missile defence systems or any other national or intergovernmental-organisation capability is not seen as so inherently destabilizing as to justify the retention of a nuclear deterrent capability.

The creation of international legal regime and enforcement conditions that will ensure that any state breaching its prohibition obligations not to retain, acquire or develop nuclear weapons will be effectively penalized.

It is unfortunate that the Commission was unable to set a firm date by which time we should get to zero (no nuclear weapons). Whether the NPT Review Conference in May can do this is another question!

[for a copy of the full report see www.icnnd.org)