2 September 2010, ISS Today article written by Henri Boshoff, Head Peace Missions Programme, ISS Pretoria

The new UN mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) was shocked when it received news on 12 August this year of the rape and assault of at least 154 Congolese civilians during an attack by two armed groups on the town of Luvungi in North Kivu province. The new mission, with a strong mandate to protect civilians and use force if needed, raised the hopes that the actions of the renamed United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) will change for the better as to the Protection of Civilians.

It is alleged that Rwandan Hutu Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) insurgents and Mai Mai militia executed the attacks. This all happened with a mobile operational base of 80 UN soldiers deployed 16 kilometers away in Kibua. The UN peacekeepers report that although they knew of the movement of the Mai Mai militia and FDLR insurgents in the area since the end of July, the incidents of rape was only reported to them on 12 August.

The number of people treated for rape stands now on 242. Aid agencies say that the UN and the Congolese army FARDC were warned of the activities of the rebels and militia and did not act. Exchange of gunfire between MONUSCO, and the FDLR and Mai Mai was however reported. This was not a coordinated effort and MONUSCO did not have detail on the operations of the FARDC.

The incident sparked reaction from the United Nations Security Council and on 25 August the Council held an emergency session to discuss and condemn widespread rape in eastern Congo. "We are horrified, and we are outraged.  This led us, in conjunction with the French, to request this detailed briefing this morning," said Susan Rice, the US ambassador to the UN, on Thursday. "It was a disturbing briefing, both for what we learned and what we still don’t know." The Secretary General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon in the meantime dispatched his Assistant for peacekeeping operations Mr. Atul Khare to DRC to work with Roger Meece, his Special Representative in the country. Mr Khare has already arrived in the country and is currently visiting the Eastern part of the DRC.

This incident must be seen against a history of attacks against the population in DRC ranging from assault, kidnapping and rape by the FARDC, FDLR and militia groups and accusations that the previous UN Mission (MONUC) and now the new mission MONUSCO do not implement the mandate to protect civilians.

This must be seen against the fact that the Security Sector Reform and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration process has not been completed leaving the government with an ineffective police, military and judicial system.

The FARDC is one of the biggest perpetrators of attacks against civilians. This makes it very difficult to execute its constitutional task to protect its citizens, but placing a burden on the UN mission MONUSCO to do it. To complicate things, the Government of the DRC wants the UN to withdraw its mission on the perception that its security forces will be able to ensure peace and stability, an assumption that seems wrong.

Where does it leave MONUSCO? The mission has a mandate to protect civilians and it is expected from the population and the international community to implement its mandate. Because of criticism, the previous mission, MONUC and the new mission MONUSCO has established an practical handbook for the protection of civilians as well as protection of civilian teams consisting of military, police and civilian personnel to be deployed in volatile areas to gather information in an effort to prevent such attacks or to mitigate it from happening.

The question raised in the Security Council of why the UN peacekeepers did not protect the civilians in Luvungi has been raised many times before in Goma, Bukavu etc. Can this situation be changed? Many lessons learned were noted over the last 10 years in the DRC, including leadership on all levels, clear guidelines on all levels on the implementation of the mandate and the rules of engagements, as well as the deployment of troops that are willing to use force in terms of the existing chapter 7 mandate. It is maybe time for the new mission to implement them.

Charles Goredema, Programme Head, Organised Crime & Money Laundering, ISS Cape Town

The influx of counterfeit goods in formal and informal Southern African markets came under the spotlight again at a recent workshop held in Harare, Zimbabwe. The Interpol Regional Bureau provided an appropriate setting for the discussion, which brought together representatives of some of the affected industries and police officials from twelve countries in the region. Of particular concern was the impact being encountered at present, and what can be expected in the future.

Counterfeiting means “unauthorized representation of a registered trademark, with a view to deceiving purchasers into believing they are buying the original goods.” Counterfeit goods may be defined as goods that imitate other goods, while being different (and usually inferior) in quality or value. Imitation is through the use of markings that are either false or misleading or both. Trading in counterfeit goods has a long history. In Southern Africa today, the variety of what is traded is endless, including consumable substances, such as pharmaceutical drugs. Money, clothing, cigarettes, toothpaste, soap, matches, spare parts for machinery and cosmetics have also been counterfeited. Four countries in the region, namely South Africa, Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana have had recent experience of counterfeit currency notes. It has therefore become common to use the term commodities in preference to goods.

Worsening economic positions and declining health being experienced in many parts of the region have worsened the exposure to counterfeit goods. The workshop noted that there has been an increase in crimes that utilise a combination of theft, forgery and counterfeiting. In all countries this applies to the use of falsified passports, falsified academic certificates, as well as credit and debit cards. Because not all instances of counterfeiting are reported, and even where reports are made, losses have not been quantified, no accurate figures on the value of the counterfeit commodity industry could be given. It was however agreed that the trade in counterfeit commodities in the region is a multi-billion dollar industry. Case studies show that a fair amount of professionalism is involved in the production, distribution and marketing of the commodities.

As financial gain motivates trafficking in counterfeit commodities, it is inevitably accompanied by money laundering. Opportunistic organised crime networks have taken an interest either in producing and marketing counterfeit commodities or in reaping some benefit from them.

There is very little appreciation in the region of the harm attributable to counterfeit commodity trafficking. Unstructured surveys conducted in various countries ahead of the workshop showed that some influential officials who should know better even regard counterfeit commodities on informal markets as useful to poor people, on account of affordability. This is certainly so in respect of counterfeit sports clothing apparel and related paraphernalia that were so much in abundance during the FIFA World Cup in June and July 2010. A similar argument is raised regarding counterfeit DVDs and CDs. It is contended that if the producers of genuine commodities would only charge affordable prices, this would reduce the market for counterfeit commodities. In response to the ‘competition’ from counterfeit goods, prices should be adjusted downwards. The argument overlooks the factors that influence the cost of genuine commodities – which include tax, research, cost of labour, cost of other inputs, transportation and marketing. Counterfeit commodity barons are able to circumvent some of these costs and to charge a ‘competitive’ price as a result.

The workshop attempted to clarify where these barons operate from. Raids and interceptions in Zambia, Mozambique and South Africa show that some of the most enterprising counterfeit commodity barons in the region live amongst us. They include some that immigrated from China and from south–East Asia. The circulation of spare parts for luxury vehicles has been attributed to their activities. Innovative locals have partnered with these ‘foreign’ barons, and in some cases, set up in competition with them to produce counterfeit DVDs and fake branded clothing. Most of the counterfeit pharmaceuticals appear to emanate from beyond Southern Africa. The trade in them has ensnared reputable professionals, initially in east Africa but gradually in Southern Africa as well.

The last decade has been characterised by an escalation in the volume of counterfeit pharmaceuticals sold out of registered outlets in Zimbabwe to take advantage of the demand exerted by communicable diseases on poor communities. Dar es Salaam and other cities in east Africa have witnessed significant increases in counterfeit medication, prompting three major police operations co-ordinated by the Interpol bureau for East Africa. In Zimbabwe, the Medicines Control Authority teamed up with the police and customs authorities in November 2009 to mount Operation Zambezi in a handful of Harare suburbs.

In Operation Zambezi: ‘36 premises were found selling unregistered medicines, 6 of them being licensed pharmacies, 13 of them run by medical practitioners who were not licensed to dispense medicines, 3 were unlicensed nurses and 1 was a wholesale dealer. The remaining 13 were either running hair salons, or working from flea markets, selling mostly skin lighteners (which contained corticosteroids) and anti-histamines (which are used as appetite stimulants).’ (Rukwata, 2010)

The operations in east Africa led to the seizure of 100 types of pharmaceutical products from 236 establishments. They included anti-malarial, cardiac, anti-fungal, multi-vitamin, hormonal and skin medicines. More than 40 successful prosecutions ensued. (Interpol media release, 29 October 2008)

These successes notwithstanding, discussions at the workshop highlighted the absence of harmonised legal frameworks to prevent, detect and reduce the proliferation of counterfeit commodities. Only three countries appear to have relatively modern laws that could assist in evaluating the quality of traded commodities. In between ad hoc inter-departmental policing ‘operations’ there are no frameworks to guide collaboration among departments located in different areas of the state, or between them and private sector institutions. 

There is no shortage of enthusiasm from the private sector to clamp down on counterfeit commodities, which is understandable. A few associations are active in this sphere, such as the Anti-Piracy Organisation of Zimbabwe and the Consumer Goods Council of South Africa. Apart from the challenge of funding, non-state institutions are constrained by the absence of statutory authority to gather intelligence and act on it without involving government institutions. As was pointed out at the workshop, quite often time and valuable information get lost while consultation is going on to decide what to do. It was not surprising that the adoption of harmonised, co-ordinated laws was one of the priorities identified. The ISS committed itself to play a facilitative and consultative role in that process.

Siphokazi Magadla, consultant, Security Sector Governance Programme, ISS Pretoria,

The announcement by the leader of the Democratic Alliance (DA) and Premier of the Western Cape, Helen Zille and the leader of the Independent Democrats (ID), Patricia de Lille, on the 15 August 2010, that the ID will merge with the DA highlights the precarious nature of opposition politics in South Africa. The DA is the official opposition party but its support was limited to 17% of the national electorate, predominantly based in the Western Cape.  The ID has struggled to retain its once promising rise in the Northern and Western Cape, garnering only four parliamentary seats in the 2009 election. The Congress of the People (COPE), a breakaway from the ANC in 2008, had a meteoritic rise and fall as factionalism continues to tear the party apart. The United Democratic Movement (UDM) an earlier breakaway from the African National Congress (ANC) and New National Party has not made significant inroads into the South African electoral landscape.

The ANC continues to enjoy overwhelming support, despite concerns about internal dissent, corruption and lack of service delivery. This we argue is because of a continued pattern of voter behaviour largely influenced by the politics of race and ethnicity and the legacy of the ANC as the bearer of liberation. Even opposition politics, though negated in rhetoric, utilizes the politics of race and ethnicity, taking us into a cul de sac that inhibits our ability to move beyond this narrative of identity based politics.

Analysis of the first three democratic elections in South Africa 1994, 1999 and 2004 predominantly viewed voting behavior in terms of race and ethnicity. The dominance of the ANC was therefore attributed to the fact that the majority of voters in South Africa are black.  Opposition parties also structured their manifestos on racially defined interests, as stated by Taylor & Hoeane in a 1999 article in Politikon. Well-known political analyst Steven Friedman explains that the key to identity politics is the belief by the voter that identity is used to “denote a social self definition based on criteria other than socioeconomic interest”. Identity then lessens the focus on issues of policy that parties uphold and are accountable for,  an argument that seems to hold given that the differences in policy between the parties appeared to be minute.

In 2009 the emergence of COPE presented an opportunity to move away from this discourse as COPE held the possibility of attracting support from all sectors of the population.  All analysis pointed to the fact that a viable opposition party could only come from the loins of the ruling ANC. However, the current internal dissension within COPE as South Africans proceed to the local government elections in 2011 make it timely to ask: what can be expected from a DA and ID merger? How and will this union escape race and ethnicity as a determiner for voter behavior in the 2011 local elections?

One should start by asking why after 16 years of supposed non-racial democratic rule have voters and political parties not been able to transcend the racial divides? Black voters vote overwhelmingly for the ANC, continuing to view it as the protector of their interests and as having given them back their dignity.  This is regardless that under its leadership South Africa continues to be a highly unequal society in which the African majority bear the burden of poverty. The DA’s support is largely White and Coloured. The ID’s support is Coloured. The UDM support is Xhosa. The United Christian Democratic Party support is Tswana speaking, whilst the Inkatha Freedom Party has not been able to move beyond Zulu based support in KwaZulu Natal. It is the failure of these parties to appeal to the national vote that gives credence to the belief that race and ethnicity are the key galvanising factors.  

When analyzing the nature of the ID and the DA then it appears that the ID is in greater need of a partnership with the DA. The DA has been increasing its support base in the Western Cape while the ID has been on the decline. But, the DA is limited in extending its support base to other sections of the population, most notably African, largely because it is deemed to be a White party. Though it has attracted substantial Coloured support, the face of the party, notwithstanding its inclusion of other groups, remains White. Adding De Lille and her supporters to their support base does not essentially change the DNA of the party though it slightly increases the numbers.  There have been overtures made to COPE and the UDM to join forces, but their reluctance yet again speaks to the politics of race: they do not want to be subsumed by a party still viewed as representing minority interests.

The DA can only grow into a party able to govern, if it can make in roads into the African constituency and go beyond the Western Cape. But what will it take to do this? Simply put, South Africa’s realities are still steeped in its apartheid past. Race is still the dominant criteria for life chances. Race still pre-occupies the political landscape where it was used to oppress people in the apartheid era and used as the lens through which power was to be acquired and distributed. In the post-apartheid era it is used as the basis for affirming the previously disadvantaged and continues to be the source of reference for leadership.  This means that in the foreseeable future there will be no White president in South Africa.  Helen Zille, no matter how strong her credentials as a politician will not be elected into the presidential office.

If she steps down as party leader will the party stand a better chance?  With de Lille probably not. But, then even if the whole leadership of the party was to darken its hue it still does not have the liberation credentials that the ANC can still use as its draw card. The DA will have to be content with the position of official opposition for a long time to come. The merger with the ID is unlikely to substantially change their position in the next election.

As long as inequity in South Africa continues to be reflected along the divide of race and ethnicity these variables will be used to determine political interest and therefore party support. Whites and Coloureds will see their interest more protected by the DA for as long as they remain in their enclave (the Western Cape) feeling threatened by the unknown in the other provinces. Blacks will not be able to look past the colour of the incumbents for their experience of racialised oppression is far too recent.

23 August 2010: ISS Today article written by Kenneth Sinei, Intern, Environmental Security Programme, Nairobi Office, Worldwide, just fewer than 900 million people play the water lottery everyday, not knowing whether the water they drink will nourish their bodies or infect them with potentially deadly diseases. Cholera, dengue fever, giardia, Hepatitis A virus, river blindness, besides the danger of heavy metal toxicity as a result of mercury, lead, and arsenic  poisoning, swirls in the cups, cooking pots, and sinks of one in six people worldwide.

Approximately forty percent of the world population (about 2.5 billion people) lack access to adequate sanitation. One result is that human stool in open sewers sometimes cross open water lines or empty into water sources such as rivers, lakes, and streams that people depend on for drinking water. Industrial pollution and agricultural runoff exacerbate the problem, dumping dangerous chemicals into the water supply leading to the contamination of fresh water and coastal ecosystems.

In many developing nations, the existing under-dimensioned and aged wastewater infrastructure is already overwhelmed, and with predicted population increases and changes in the climate the situation is only going to get worse. Without better infrastructure and management, many millions of people will continue to die each year and there will be further losses in biodiversity and ecosystem resilience undermining prosperity and efforts towards a more sustainable future.

According to a UNEP-HABITAT interagency report up to 90 per cent of wastewater flows untreated into the densely populated coastal zone contributing to growing marine dead zones, which already cover an area of 245 000 km2, approximately the same area as all the world’s coral reefs. This situation poses a threat to food security, access to clean drinking water and providing major health and environmental management challenges.

The toll exacted on human health is staggering. Up to 4,500 people die everyday due to waterborne illness–more than deaths from HIV-AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis combined.  Not surprisingly, diarrhoea is the second leading contributor to the global burden of disease with two and a half billion cases occurring in children under five years of age every year and an estimated 1.5 million of them dying from it annually.

Throughout Africa, the World Health Organization estimates that 40 billion working hours are lost annually in the search for water. People spend hours daily walking to fetch clean water, taking time away from more productive work and education. In regions where collecting water is time-consuming and dangerous, women and children bear the burden of the daily search for water. Often walking miles per day, they expose themselves to robbery, rape, and physical harm from carrying jerry cans on their backs or heads.

In Ethiopia for example, fetching water is both a daily ritual and a daily danger for women. In the countryside, only 24% of the people have access to clean water, and women walk an average of four miles for water everyday. Often contaminated with disease, the water they fetch causes sickness and death. The government has promised help, but it never arrives. The consequences are serious. Spending their hours in a day fetching water, women and children miss out on school and more productive work.

Water is also a constant struggle in Kenya, both in the cities and in the countryside. In Kakuma, the location of a refugee camp and the homeland of the Turkana people, residents not only have to walk for miles looking for water, but also dig for it despite there being a mechanical pump nearby. The Turkana people simply cannot afford the prices charged by its owner.

In the slums of Nairobi, the setting is different, but the challenges are the same. Government water lines do not penetrate the slums due to concerns about acknowledging the right of squatters to the land. As a result, private contractors deliver water at prices about 100 times its cost. Left without a choice, the poor drink water from pipes that leak and cross open sewers. Sanitation is non-existent—people prefer the flying toilet, also known as a plastic bag. To address the water quality problem, residents are adopting sunlight purification techniques using ordinary plastic bottles. It has reduced diarrhoea cases by 20% since the project started in March 2004. Still, water remains their greatest challenge.

The irony is that unlike many systemic crises around the world, clean water and sanitation are achievable goals. Water purification and sanitation technology exist at affordable prices, and returns on investment are impressive: A $1 investment in sanitation leads to up to $34 in return. The only thing in short supply is the political will for change. Governments in Africa should formulate and implement people centred policies in different sectors including the water sector.

20 August 2010: ISS Today article written by Nompumelelo Sibalukhulu, Junior Researcher, International Crime in Africa Programme and Antoinette Louw, Senior Research Fellow, International Crime in Africa Programme, ISS Pretoria

The recently concluded 15th African Union (AU) summit which took place in Kampala from 25-27 July 2010 made it clear that the International Criminal Court (ICC) has not yet succeeded in winning the hearts and minds of African leaders. The summit reiterated its previous decision that AU member states should not cooperate with the ICC in the arrest and surrender of President Omar Hassan Al-Bashir of Sudan. The summit also delayed the opening of an ICC liaison office in Addis, censured the ICC prosecutor, and urged African states not to forget their obligations to the AU when considering cooperation with the court.

The AU has had a frosty relationship with the ICC ever since it issued the arrest warrant for Bashir on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity in March 2009. The relationship grew colder when the court added the charge of genocide in July this year.

The most significant aspect of the recent AU summit decision is that it restates the agreement reached at the AU’s 13th summit in Sirte, Libya, in July 2009 in which member states decided that because the AU’s request to the UN Security Council (UNSC) for the deferral of ICC proceedings against Bashir had not been acted upon, member states would not cooperate in the arrest and surrender of the Sudanese president.

The 13th summit decision was widely attributed to the influence of the AU chairperson at the time, Libyan leader Muamar Ghadafi. With Malawi’s president, Bingu Wa Mutharika, now in the chair, the 15th summit decision was an unanticipated turn of events. But the main reason for the initial optimism about the course of Africa-ICC relations was the markedly more positive position taken towards the ICC at the AU’s 14th summit in January 2010 in Addis Ababa: member states were silent on the call for non-cooperation with the ICC in the Bashir matter, and encouraged constructive engagement by African states at the ICC review conference.

The outcomes of the review conference provided further reasons for optimism: the conference was successfully held in Kampala, on African soil, and the majority of African ICC states parties sent high level delegations who pledged their commitment to the Rome Statute system. Indeed, it was on the sidelines of the review conference that African states parties prepared a letter to the chairperson of the AU Commission supporting the opening of the ICC-AU liaison office in Addis Ababa. In further efforts to establish this office, ICC president Judge Sang-Hyun Song met in Addis Ababa with Dr Jean Ping, chairperson of the AU Commission on 9 July 2010 to discuss AU-ICC relations and the establishment of the liaison office. Taken together, all these events were surely a sign of better things to come for the ICC in Africa.

Against this backdrop, the 15th AU summit decision is disappointing for those who support the Rome Statute system as a central mechanism for tackling impunity for grave crimes. Nevertheless the decision confirms that AU concerns with the ICC are deep-seated and largely revolve around the Bashir indictment. It is this indictment that sparked AU concerns about the role of the UN Security Council in the work of the ICC; brought debates about the timing of peace and justice to the fore; and raised the thorny issue of prosecuting a sitting head of state.

These concerns motivated the AU to request the UN Security Council, in 2009, to defer the proceedings against Bashir for a year under Article 16 of the Rome Statute. When the UNSC failed to issue a formal response, the AU not only withdrew cooperation with the ICC in the arrest of Bashir, but also proposed that Article 16 be amended to transfer the power of deferral to the UN General Assembly should the Security Council fail to respond to a request for deferral within a period of six months. This proposed amendment is up for discussion at the 9th ICC Assembly of States Parties meeting in New York in December 2010.

How far African states parties will go in supporting the AU on the amendment of Article 16, or indeed the organisation’s other decisions on the ICC, remains to be seen however. When the amendment proposal was tabled at the 8th ASP in November 2009 by South Africa, only two other African states parties supported it. And since the AU first decided not to cooperate with the ICC on the Bashir matter, several African governments have confirmed their intention to fulfil their treaty (and in the case of South Africa, domestic) legal obligations to arrest the Sudanese president should he arrive on their territory.

The fact that individual African states parties do not clearly support AU decisions on the ICC has not escaped the intergovernmental organisation. The recent 15th summit decision called on member states ‘to speak with one voice to ensure that the proposed amendment to Article 16 of the Rome Statute [is acted upon],’ and more significantly, the decision ‘Requests Member States to balance, where applicable, their obligations to the AU with their obligations to the ICC’.

Tensions between states parties and the AU on the matter however persist, with the Sudan Tribune reporting on 17 August 2010 that Botswana Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Minister Phandu Skelemani told reporters, in response to these clauses in the 15th AU summit decision: ‘We have not surrendered the sovereignty of this country to the AU’ adding that ‘the International Criminal Court (ICC) Rome Statute is signed by a Country not AU. Botswana does not fear being isolated by other African countries since they [Botswana] are implementing the international protocols they have signed’.

These latest developments suggest that much still needs to be done to foster, let alone build, confidence in the ICC at the level of the AU. Until the Bashir matter is resolved – one way or another – it seems unlikely that relations will improve dramatically. Given this, African states parties must be relied upon to take up the responsibility of ensuring that the Rome Statute system they signed up to works in the interests of African victims of mass atrocities.

19 August 2010: ISS Today article written by Muiruri John Kimani, Senior Researcher, Mifugo Project, ISS Nairobi Office

Cattle rustling in Eastern Africa appear to have become a truly murky business. One can say this of the politics, the money involved, the casualties and in many instances the attempted interventions. One may wonder: but haven’t we heard all this before? Why the apparent impotence of a seemingly sophisticated modern age that is contemplating space-tourism yet cannot find a lasting solution to a problem that should belong to a past era?

Unfortunately, cattle rustling, to the informed, would appear to embody all that is wrong with our systems of governance, politics, economics and sheer ineptitude that appear to be the hallmark in the region.

In the dirty business that is cattle rustling, none of our hands are clean. This is evidenced in a comprehensive study by the ISS, entitled the ‘Political Economy of Cattle Rustling’ that sought to establish the nexus between politics, economics and cattle rustling –referred to as the political economy of cattle rustling.

The study points to ‘emerging political complexes’ that fan cattle rustling and undermine any efforts at ending the menace. The political complexes are intertwined by an economic agenda not only of the actual perpetrators – raiders - but in all manner of subtle ways. All the stakeholders, be they in government, civil society, development agencies, community leaders, and, interestingly, researchers who are engaged and purport to be looking for solutions to the problem, are involved.

The study adopts the terms ‘conflict entrepreneurs’, ‘conflict exploiters’ and ‘conflict dependants’ to categorize the stakeholders benefitting from cattle rustling. The fundamental aspect of cattle rustling is the debilitating state of insecurity that characterise areas where cattle rustling is predominant namely pastoralist areas. Conflict creates barriers, most notably, selective forms of access to livestock and livestock products and their markets.

Limitations experienced by pastoralists facilitate exclusionary and predatory behaviours by those who see and exploit opportunities that are ‘mid-wifed’ by cattle rustling. Here economics - especially politically inclined ones - are significant. The study defines political economy of conflict as “the distribution of power, wealth and destitution during armed conflict, in order to expose the motives and responsibility of those involved within a historical context.”

Conflict entrepreneurs comprise of a category of beneficiaries, particularly young warriors who have graduated from the ‘community-warrior machine’ that socialises them to believe that being a man means having rustled thousands of livestock. These warriors derive their authority and status in society by their exploits on the battlefront and are therefore always the most daring in their raids to an extent where they sometimes send prior warning to their victims about an impending raid. Not only do these warriors want to proove their masculinity but they also near ‘worship’ their livestock - the more they have, the more satisfaction they derive from life.

It is the above category that initiates armed conflicts for the sole purpose of getting or rooting livestock from wherever and whomever they decide to attack. The warriors are heavily armed and believe that the gun was part of their culture and assume that as individuals they bear the primary responsibility to provide security to their communities and to themselves.

In simple words, ‘conflict entrepreneurs’ are basically criminals or outlaws who will sustain cattle rustling for as long as it remains the ‘viable’ option for them to sustain their ‘warrior-rustling-machinery’. To prosecute this, they strive to maintain a stranglehold on every resource necessary to propagate cattle rustling. They almost cannot envisage an environment without cattle rustling.

Unfortunately, elements in the above category are increasingly transforming cattle rustling into a commercial venture. The raided livestock is sold to generate cash income used to finance delinquent engagement and possibly, conspicuous consumption of luxury items.

‘Conflict exploiters’, on the hand, comprises those warriors, and non-warriors alike, who exploit the state of lawlessness, and largely, absence of state institutions, in the pastoralist areas to engage in criminal activities that include cattle rustling. Conflict exploiters take advantage of the lapses or weaknesses of the state in enforcing law and order and use the opportunity to mount opportunistic ‘surprise’ raids on their unsuspecting victims.

Indeed, this predatory group often looks for weaknesses not only of the state machinery but also in the defences of their victims and once found, mount ruthless raids. Lumped together with the raiders are the local administrations that equally take advantage of the general insecurity in their areas to generate benefits from directly or indirectly supporting cattle rustling.

There appears to be an alliance of sorts between the warriors and the politicians - a situation that makes it difficult for the political elite to disassociate itself from the interests of the raiders. For some, the payback is either direct support or condoning the menace by providing political cover and protection or, indirectly offer their sympathy by not supporting any interventions that is likely to end the vice. This partly could explain why the problem persists. For their own survival, conflict exploiters will continue to thrive in situations predisposed of lawlessness where conflict is a perfect bedrock.

The most disheartening aspect of this category is that it also includes some rogue elements in the security machinery that is primarily charged with the task of maintaining law and order and seize the opportunity offered by the insecurity for self enrichment. In some instances, they have been accused of selling recovered and confiscated livestock, selling arms, releasing criminals, offering or ignoring intelligence while they dilly-dally in the pursuit of raiders.

‘Conflict dependants’ are a more benign category of people who engage in cattle rustling and crimes associated with it, for the sole purpose of survival. Cattle rustling, for this category, is an opportunity or mechanism that is necessary to sustain or support livelihoods in an adverse environment. Naturally, this category is equally committing a crime, not any different from the other two categories albeit less frequent and violent.

To this category of people, irrespective of the composition of the related criminal activities involved, they believe that they either engage in livestock raids or suffer the adverse effects of hunger, famine and ultimate destitution. Fortunately, ‘conflict dependants’ are a category of people who are more amenable to dissuasion away from cattle rustling and related crimes. They would be dissuaded if alternative opportunities were provided to them where they can derive sources of livelihood.

During the period of the study, as well as in other engagements in the pastoralist areas, the communities continually ask whether they are also citizens of the various states in the region? This is in light of the sheer magnitude of neglect they suffer while the rest of the country continues to stride towards unparalleled development and improved overall human security.

The communities cry out for help from researchers focusing on this issue, from governments whose primary obligation is to secure their wellbeing and from some of their leaders who relish in continued ‘shackling’ of their communities.  As long as the communities remain ignorant, they guarantee the political survival of their leaders.

Certainly, there are many positive and commendable initiatives being undertaken by governments and a host of stakeholders – private and public. However, considering how inconsistent some of the interventions are and looking at the cross-section of beneficiaries of cattle rustling, one wonders whose hands are still sufficiently clean in this ‘game.’

The governments of Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda would do well by ratifying, domesticating and fully implementing the Protocol on the Prevention, Combating and Eradication of Cattle Rustling.  Benefits accrued by this Protocol would to a large extent address most of the issues affecting pastoralist communities and thus have the governments’ hands really clean.

18 August 2010: ISS Today article written by
Gladys Mirugi-Mukundi, research intern, Organised Crime and Money Laundering, ISS Cape Town

Addressing the AU Summit in Kampala in July 2010, Eric Holder, the US Attorney General reiterated that combating corruption generally and in the United States was his government’s top priority. It is in that vein that he announced that the US Department of Justice is launching a new Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative ‘aimed at combating large-scale foreign official corruption and recovering public funds for their intended – and proper –  use: for the people of our nations.’ He informed the gathering of Heads of State and Governments of the African Union that his office was ‘assembling a team of prosecutors who will focus exclusively on this work and build efforts already underway to deter corruption, hold offenders accountable, and protect public resources.’

The significance of these words was not lost on curious observers across the continent that have become accustomed to rhetoric from political actors on ending corruption and recovery of stolen national coffers. Indeed, if Holder’s words were translated into real action, it will have an impact not only on governance and development in Africa but also on the numerous asset recovery initiatives on the continent. 

The seriousness of recovering assets stolen from public coffers in Africa, most of them stashed away in foreign bank vaults and off shore investments cannot be overemphasised. African policy makers and law enforcement agencies are indeed aware and concede that tracing and retrieving proceeds of crime, tax evasion and corruption is a monumental task. Apart from challenges of limited or total lack of cooperation by suspected culprits – the majority of whom still retain power and political sway in African governments – at a practical level, asset recovery efforts are stifled by money laundering schemes.

Numerous studies have attempted to estimate the sums of money laundered worldwide.  However, because money laundering is not restricted to assets corruptly acquired by state leaders, it is not always possible to have a complete estimate of sums of money laundered from Africa.

According to the U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, at least 25 percent of the GDP of African countries is lost annually to corruption. In such situations, the political and economic elites almost always elude the tax authorities. The joint Stolen Assets Recovery Initiative by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the World Bank summed up the challenges encountered in locating proceeds of corruption by political or economic elites, especially where they have been moved across borders. The challenges include:

• limited legal, investigative and judicial capacity
• inadequate financial resources to pursue complex cases; and
• non-responsive foreign jurisdictions where stolen assets are hidden, often in developed countries, to requests for legal assistance.

Experiences from Nigeria, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Kenya are a clear indication that countries embarking on asset recovery operations encounter legal and practical difficulties as they tread on the thin line between justice and repatriation.

The first challenge they encounter is the immunity from the process of criminal and civil law proceedings vested in sitting heads of states. Heads of states in Africa have a lot of leverage in determining the course that proceedings of such nature take and where political will is absent, recovery efforts amount to nought.

Second, and closely related to the first, is the failure to initiate domestic proceedings or conclude already initiated proceedings by the state. For instance, despite the findings of the Kroll report commissioned to investigate and trace assets obtained by former Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi and his close associates in the infamous Goldenberg scandal, no asset recovery proceedings have been brought to this day.

Third is the role of states to effectively recover assets. Such a role ultimately depends on capacity to support recovery measures, in terms of institutional and legal framework.  Asset recovery initiatives are additionally prone to subjective considerations, which can be used as a basis for refusing reparation of assets.

Fourth is the need to obtain and secure cooperation and collaboration among state agencies that have a bearing on asset recovery. Conflict and competition among agencies, perhaps for want of coherent application of the legal framework and procedures, can be a source of the problem pitting various agencies involved against one another. These include customs and taxation agencies, security intelligence agencies, asset forfeiture units and anti-corruption agencies.

Fifth is the need for bilateral and international cooperation and support to effectively trace and recover looted proceeds.  Such assets are often stashed away in foreign bank accounts and off shore investments. Accordingly effective tracing and recovery demands bilateral and international legal and political cooperation - the kind announced by the US Attorney General in Kampala.

As Daniel Scher puts it ‘recovery attempts are complicated within African countries, because those who are most implicated in public looting usually have the most power and influence. Yet the potential rewards in the form of the repatriation of money into development-starved countries, make asset recovery an attractive undertaking.’

The US message is that it will not be a safe haven for monies emanating from the plunder of African economies. The recent announcement that the British government will repatriate 43 million pounds siphoned by corrupt Nigerian government officials to offshore accounts is a welcome development. It is expected that the signals being relayed by the US and the UK will send a strong message to other countries in the West not to harbour proceeds of corruption from African states and will do something tangible to return the looted proceeds to where they belong for proper use by African peoples.

The bottom line of Attorney General Eric Holder’s message to African Heads of State and Governments is that they need to put their houses in order by setting up and strengthening legal and policy frameworks to deal with corruption and money laundering. Credible, effective institutions, including financial intelligence units and asset retrieval units have to be created without further delay. The ratification and domestication of the United Nations Convention against Corruption and the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption would be a useful beginning.

17 August 2010: ISS Today article written by Gareth Newham, Head of the Crime and Justice Programme, ISS, Pretoria

A professional police service can play an important role in reducing violent crime and improving community safety.  Clear evidence of the effectiveness of good policing has emerged from both resource-rich countries such as in New York City, USA and developing countries, such as the Columbian city of Bogota.  Good policing means professional policing.  In other words, the police must do their work in accordance to the law without fear or favour and be seen to do so. This strengthens the social contract that citizens have with the state, in which the state’s role is to act fairly and in the public interest. When the police are perceived to be biased and do not treat everyone equally or fairly, the general public  increasingly loses trust and respect for the police - and their ability to tackle crime becomes severely constrained.

South Africans should therefore pay close attention in instances when the South African Police Service (SAPS) appears to be misused in the interest of the elite.  Much has recently been written about the arrest of Sunday Times journalist, Mzilikazi wa Afrika, at his office on the morning of Wednesday, 4 August. From the information available, this appears to be yet another case where members of the SAPS have acted in a manner that seems to favour the interests of the ruling elite over those of ordinary citizens.

The journalist was arrested a few days after he wrote a story exposing the awarding of a R500 million lease to a politically connected businessman without proper procedures having been followed.  The story was particularly sensational as the newspaper claims that the National Commissioner of Police, Bheki Cele, signed the lease.  This emerged in the same week that the previous National Commissioner, Jackie Selebi received a sentence of 15 years in prison for corruption.

Since the publication of the story it has become increasingly difficult to follow the claims and counter claims about what actually resulted in the awarding of the lucrative deal, and who was responsible. What remains undisputed is that shortly after publication of the story wa Afrika was arrested at his workplace by eight police officers belonging to the Hawks, an elite unit within the SAPS. Following his arrest he was not allowed to contact his lawyer who did not know where he was until much later that evening.

The National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) initially dropped charges against wa Afrika, suggesting that the prosecutor did not believe there to be a case against the journalist. It was reported that the NPA only reinstated the charges after a long meeting with the police officials who arrested him. The journalist was held in police custody until High Court Judge, Johan Kruger, ordered his release stating that detaining the journalist was “not in the interest of the rule of law.”

Wa Afrika claims he was not read his rights until many hours after his arrest and that the police aggressively questioned him in the early hours of the morning about the newspaper articles he was working on. Although he has since been charged with fraud and ‘uttering’ it remains unclear whether the charges pertain to the story about the lease of the new police headquarters, or the much more convoluted story about political assassinations in Mpumalanga in which the provincial premier is alleged to have a role.

Whether or not wa Afrika is ultimately found guilty of the charges brought against him is not the most important fact in this saga. What is important is that the manner in which the arrest was affected. That it was carried out by a large contingent of Hawks at his place of work strongly suggests that the police sought to send a message to the media that stories alleging corruption of powerful politicians and civil servants will not be tolerated. This perception is reinforced by the fact that the Hawks seem to have made no progress in investigating allegations against senior ranking politicians who may be linked to far more serious crimes than ‘uttering’ and fraud.  

When the Hawks replaced the Directorate of Special Operations (DSO) known as the Scorpions, the South African public was told that the location of the new unit within the SAPS would address the problems that had allegedly arisen as a result of the close relationship between the Scorpions investigators and prosecutors. Yet, in several cases, most notably in the case against former police Commissioner, Jackie Selebi, the DSO showed that they could tackle serious corruption at the highest level of office without fear and favour.

The Hawks have yet to conclude an investigation against a senior ranking politician or government official for corruption. This despite the fact that the ruling party acknowledges that corruption by state officials and those holding public office is a serious problem facing the country.

The timing of the arrest, whether intentional or not, has contributed to growing unease that the interests of the ruling elite continue to ride roughshod over the rights of all citizens. In the two weeks preceding the arrest of wa Africa, parliament and civil society had acrimoniously debated two new Bills, that if passed, may stifle access to information and media freedom. This while the ANC announced its intention to establish a media tribunal to act against what it views as malicious reporting. It would be hard to disabuse observers of the notion that these events are not linked.

In addition, if the wa Africa case was the only case if its kind where it appears that the police have been misused for political purposes, it would be sufficient cause for concern. But it is not.  There are a growing number of examples of police acting in the interests of politicians.

• We remember that while on parole, convicted fraudster and ruling party heavy-weight Tony Yengeni was arrested after crashing his car while allegedly under the influence of alcohol. The charges against Yengeni were dropped after a police Station Commissioner interfered with the case docket and evidence. It emerged during Station Commissioner’s trial, that he had interfered with evidence and intimidated junior police officials to make false entries in the docket that resulted in Yengeni being protected from prosecution. 

• There were reports of traffic police officials in Limpopo being threatened by senior provincial politicians after attempting to fine the ANC Youth League President Julius Malema for speeding. More recently, Malema was able to instruct the police to remove delegates from a chaotic Youth League conference, who did not support his preferred candidate.

• Then there was the headline-grabbing case of Chumani Maxwele, the jogger who was who was arrested by the police, locked up for 24 hours and who had his home searched all for a perceived slight at the Presidential cavalcade. This is one of a long list of incidents where members of the SAPS VIP units also known as the “blue light brigade” have undermined the rights and safety of ordinary citizens on our roads.

It is not surprising that police officials across the country are hesitant to enforce the law against senior ruling party officials. Their boss, the National Commissioner is not a professional police officer, but until recently was a senior ruling party politician. Many police officials are therefore likely to be concerned that investigating or arresting a senior ruling party official, no mater how justifiably, could be a career-limiting move.  Unfortunately, this makes the ruling party inner circle an attractive place for the criminally inclined who wish to live above the law and contributes the problems corruption that the ANC acknowledges afflicts the party.

Democracy is threatened when the security forces are used, or are even perceived to be used, to achieve political ends and to stifle opposition. Good governance depends on the separation of powers and respect for human rights. The perception created by acts in which the police seem to favour the ruling elite undermines democracy and good governance and paints a bleak picture for the future. The Commissioner of Police has do his Constitutional duty and ensure that the police do act without fear or favour in terms of the law and that no one is perceived to be above it.

13 August 2010: ISS Today article written by David Zounmenou, senior researcher, African Conflict Prevention Programme, ISS Pretoria

Considered for many years to be a testcase for democracy in West Africa, Benin has entered into a socio-political turbulence that could be detrimental to the consolidation of its democratic experiment. The latent conflict between President Yayi Boni since his rise to power in 2006 and key institutions of the country exposes the vulnerability of the democratic process. Various political actors in the country accuse the president of wanting to weaken state institutions to his own benefit. They argue that while Yayi Boni has promised upon his election to fight corruption and promote economic growth, his administration has become mired in scandals that heighten social tensions. It was under his administration that Benin experienced for the first time the phenomenon of electoral violence, though of a minor importance.

Corruption has effectively taken its toll on the country’s resources. Last year, funds destined to prepare for the Community of Sahel‐Saharan States Conference in Benin were embezzled. More recently, it is another financial scam that threatens the survival of the regime. This financial scam was organised at the highest level of the state and involved the Minister of Interior, Armand Zinzindohoue, and Attorney General, Georges Amoussou. These authorities condoned the fraudulent activities of a financial institution known as ICC-Services.

The ICC‐Service was set up as a credit and financial structure that would provide returns of 200% on money deposited by citizens, mainly women who own small or big businesses. From this scheme and at the expenses of its vulnerable clients, the company made an estimated 100 Billion CFA (152 Million Euro). The scam was uncovered when people never received their returns. It appears from preliminary investigations that the money was used for political and religious activities at the behest of President Yayi Boni. Some went through money laundering schemes.

A commission of inquiry hurriedly set up by the government revealed the connection between government officials and the establishment of a fraudulent financial scheme, which bypassed all existing financial regulations. ICC-Services was provided a license by the Minister of Interior who prepared the ground for the financial institution to operate dishonestly with the protection of the government.  Although the President claims he has no knowledge of the scheme and the involvement of his cabinet, and has since dismissed the minister and the Attorney General, many in the country believe it is the responsibility of the government and the state to protect citizens from financial scams of such a scale.

For the main opposition leader, Andrien Houngbeji, the government and the President in particular, are to be held responsible for the scandal. He contends that the president only set up a commission of enquiry to ease popular discontent over a nation-wide financial fraud organised by ICC‐Services with the complicity of members of government; and for the president to possibly cover his own complicity. Houngbeji’s accusations were strongly rejected by Boni Yayi who has now come under increasing pressure to react.

With this scandal, it is the leadership provided by Yayi Boni over the past four years that has come under scrutiny. The president, who in 2006 won an overwhelming 75% of the votes during the presidential elections, has failed to deliver on his promise of good governance. For the majority of citizens, Yayi Boni not only failed on this, but has also contributed significantly to a deterioration of the democratic environment in Benin.

Some MPs have now called for his resignation and for the president to be tried before the High Court of Justice. As many as 50 out the 83 members of parliament issued a petition to the speaker to put the issue to vote. To pass, it will need a simple majority. The political configuration in the National Assembly is not favorable to the President. He has lost significant national support since he came to power. Most of his proposed budgets and other laws have been rejected by the parliament compelling him to resort to special presidential measures to implement them. And if the speaker submits the issue to vote, it is highly unlikely that Yayi Boni survives.

Though the parliament has in the past voted for the trial of former ministers, it would be the first time that it will have to decide on the fate of a sitting president. While waiting for the decision of the speaker, the government is in a state of general panic.  Only a few months ahead of the next presidential elections in March 2011 and with a consolidated opposition movement called “United for the Nation” (Union fait la Nation) that has brought together all major political parties in Benin, President Yayi Boni faces tough times ahead. He is progressively loosing the battle over the voter registration process and his regional support base has seen the emergence of a potential candidate, Abdoulaye Bio Tchane, former Finances Minister and currently President of the West African Development Bank.

If the speaker of the parliament dismisses the petition, President Yayi Boni would have to win the next election to avoid the High Court of Justice, provided that he also obtains the majority in the parliament. But given the current domestic context, it is unlikely that both scenarios will happen. Does it mean that we are likely to see a president held accountable in court? If it happens, it is certainly going to introduce a new variable in the democratisation process in Benin and in Africa.  Even his strongest supporters are concerned.

In a report submitted at the end of July, the Mediator of the Republic, Prof. Albert Tevoedjre, who was instrumental in Yayi Boni’s election in 2006, highlighted the weak leadership of the president and the disintegration of national institutions. According to Tevoedjre,  Benin is in danger and urgently needs a national conference to re‐craft the political scenery, refine the social contract and bring back a sense of national consciousness based on republican values. The report raised concerns over politics, economy, education and other vital sectors of life that are becoming increasingly “informal” and that could lead to state collapse. Issued in these difficult times, the report could only compromise Yayi Boni’s chances of serving a second term in office.