ISS Today, 8 Feb 2010: Noel Stott, Senior Research Fellow, Arms Management Programme, ISS Pretoria, Nuclear weapons are the most inhumane weapons ever conceived, inherently indiscriminate in those they kill and maim, and with an impact deadly for decades. They are the only weapons ever invented that have the capacity to wholly destroy life on this planet, and the arsenals we now possess are able to do so many times over. The problem of nuclear weapons is at least equal to that of climate change in terms of gravity – and much more immediate in its potential impact.

In late December 2009, the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament headed up by two former Foreign Ministers, Australia’s Gareth Evans and Japan’s Yoriko Kawaguchi released their long awaited report aimed at reinvigorating, at a high political level, the global debate on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

Prime Minister Rudd and then Prime Minister Taro launched the independent Commission in September 2008 as a joint initiative of the Australian and Japanese Governments. Thirteen eminent individuals from around the world, including South Africa’s Speaker of the National Assembly (from 1994 to 2004), Frene Ginwala, acted as Commissioners.

The release of the report is important given that in May 2010, the five-yearly Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Review Conference will take place. The NPT is regarded as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Based on a bargain of three pillars, the NPT was designed to: prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology; further the goal of nuclear disarmament; and, promote co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

However, the NPT is regarded as being in crisis. India and Pakistan, both of whom are known to possess nuclear weapons, have never signed or ratified the NPT. Israel has also not signed or ratified the NPT. While North Korea joined the treaty as a Non-Nuclear Weapon State (NNWS) in 1985, detonated a nuclear device in 2006 and regards itself as having withdrawn from the treaty. India, for example has made it clear that it will never sign the “flawed and discriminatory” NPT. In addition, the previous Review Conference in 2005, failed to reach any substantive agreement and the divide between the non-proliferation first and disarmament first camps - between those accused of non-compliance with their obligation to disarm (the permanent members of the Security Council who have nuclear weapons) and those accused of non-compliance with their commitment to not develop or acquire nuclear weapons (the NNWS in general but Iran and North Korea in particular).

The International Commission’s report will not please those who argue that the only credible guarantee against the use or threat of use of such weapons is their total elimination and for an immediate world free of nuclear weapons. The report, while conceding that ‘nuclear weapons are the most inhumane weapons ever conceived…’ instead calls for the global stockpile of nuclear weapons to be cut to 2,000 from 23,000 by 2025.

On the positive side, the report does emphasise the de-ligitimisation of nuclear weapons and calls on the eight nuclear armed states to adopt a non-first-use policy and to remove their nuclear arms from high-alert status so that they can not be launched speedily.

In what the report calls “a Comprehensive Action Agenda” a time-table for the total elimination of nuclear weapons is presented:

Short Term Action Agenda (to 2012) includes:

• All nuclear-armed states declaring that the sole purpose of retaining the nuclear weapons they have is to deter others from using such weapons against them;
• A commitment by all nuclear-armed states not to increase their nuclear arsenals.
• Satisfactory negotiated resolution of the North Korea and Iran nuclear program problems.

Medium Term Action Agenda (to 2025) includes:

• Building support for a comprehensive Nuclear Weapons Convention to legally underpin the ultimate transition to a nuclear weapon free world.
• Implementation of a Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and a further agreement negotiated to put all fissile material not in weapons under international safeguards.
• Implementation of measures to reduce the proliferation risks associated with the expansion of civil nuclear energy.

Longer Term Action Agenda (beyond 2025) includes:

• The creation of political conditions for the prospect of major war or aggression to be so remote that nuclear weapons are seen as having no remaining deterrent utility.
• The creation of the military conditions in which conventional arms imbalances, missile defence systems or any other national or intergovernmental-organisation capability is not seen as so inherently destabilizing as to justify the retention of a nuclear deterrent capability.
• The creation of international legal regime and enforcement conditions that will ensure that any state breaching its prohibition obligations not to retain, acquire or develop nuclear weapons will be effectively penalized.

It is unfortunate that the Commission was unable to set a firm date by which time we should get to zero (no nuclear weapons). Whether the NPT Review Conference in May can do this is another question!

[for a copy of the full report see www.icnnd.org)

Open video-sharing on the world wide web potentially provides a breeding ground for havoc, where nefarious do-it-yourself websites are concerned, says Andrews Atta-Asamoah

The internet is one of the important landmarks of globalisation. The far-reaching and enduring impact of the internet stems from the extent to which it has succeeded in breaking down centuriesold boundaries established by time and space. The removal of the boundaries has subsequently enhanced quality information sharing among people and across different sectors, thus pushing the world into what has become known as the global village. In this village, anybody (with access to the internet) can be anywhere (where the internet is) with little or no restriction. In recent times, one popular internetbased phenomenon, which is greatly impacting on communication, is usergenerated video-sharing. Since the launch of YouTube in 2005, the phenomenon has become the craze of the cyber world. In any given day, more video materials ranging from music, movie, comedy and TV clips, to homemade do-it-yourself videos, are uploaded to video-hosting websites than are aired on all major networks combined.

The ease with which users are able to watch, upload, or download videos hosted by the numerous video-hosting websites has enhanced the popularity and use of the technology among internet users to the extent that video-sharing is now not just a technology, but a phenomenon.

Within the few years of its existence, this phenomenon is rapidly tearing down boundaries, re-ordering social spaces and infl uencing identities, knowledge, attitudes and beliefs in unprecedented ways. Most importantly, video-sharing has become a way of communication, a phenomenon which can otherwise be referred to as ‘YouTubism’.

Within this phenomenon, there is a proliferation of do-it-yourself videos that is greatly impacting on the already existing global do-it-yourself culture, in which people seek to learn how to do things by themselves from online materials. According to a survey by the Pew Research Centre, a US-based research organisation, for example, about 55% of adult internet users in the US had by 2005 ever looked for online do-it-yourself information. By this pattern, the chasm between knowledge and ignorance, in recent times, is simply reduced to the human will as knowledge acquisition is now an issue of one’s readiness to know. Such an environment provides a platform for rapid development for emerging societies, since development is a product of know-how. However, human vulnerability becomes eminent since the phenomenon is an open tool for all, including entities such as the group behind the Dirty Kuffar, a controversial 2004 Jihad-style Islamist extremist rap video posted on the internet and intended for radicalisation.

Already the existence of nefarious do-it-yourself videos that border on bomb-making, gun-assembling, suicide, crime and religious extremism, and the ease with which they can be accessed and shared via the internet, calls for urgent attention for two major reasons. Firstly, the effectiveness with which religious extremists can exploit videosharing platforms to convey messages aimed at radicalising, recruiting, training and transferring technology for terrorist activities. Secondly, if do-it-yourself seekers with criminal intentions are allowed to feed on nefarious videos that border on security, the result can be devastating, since they could acquire simple technologies capable of mass destruction.

This calls for strategic monitoring and censoring beyond the usual ‘terms of use’ spelt out by such websites and the dependence of such websites on other users’ reports about some video postings. This is because if the sharing of nefarious do-it-yourself videos is permitted to thrive and begins to feed evil minds, the human will to cause or not to cause havoc will become the only line separating security and insecurity of the masses. On the global stage, dangerous entities might then not only be those possessing weapons of mass destruction, but also those with the ability to convince the masses to carry out an act of insecurity, or entities possessing and willing to share a technology capable of mass destruction across the world by means of an internet video. The occurrence of such a situation could then simply perpetuate and accentuate, on the world stage, the ongoing battle for hearts and minds in some parts of the world. It will also propel the human will to cause or not to cause insecurity at the centre-stage of global security contention.

Editor, Liesl Louw-Vaudran asks whether powersharing deals and collusion amongst political elites have left many Africans feel let down by their leaders.

ISS Today written by Abeba B. Amene, Civil Society and Community Outreach, Mifugo Project, ISS Nairobi 

The African continent has had very few transformational leaders who have inspired hope, went beyond the ordinary and felt it necessary to transform lives. On the particular issue of cattle rustling and insecurity, the question to pose perhaps is what kind of leadership exists in pastoralist areas and what role does this leadership play within this context?

It is a common assertion that the root of many of Africa’s numerous ills could be traced to poor leadership. At the minimum, leadership at various levels has been thought to be purely superintending.  Key elements would include a leadership that is compromised and quite comfortable with the status quo. The extreme version is the kind of predatory leadership that ignores the people it serves, is quite unapologetic in its non-delivery of the aspirations of the citizenry and takes pride in the destruction of any growth.

The practice of cattle rustling is that of theft of livestock amongst pastoralist groups whose main livelihood is dependent on livestock. Pastoralists in Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda have been engaged in cattle rusting - a practice that many describe to be a mechanism for restocking livestock decimated by drought and other factors. Depleted livestock, limited pasture and water from the cumulative effect of cyclic drought, as well as the availability of small arms are currently forcing aggressive and violent restocking measures. In the process of these negative measures that include cattle rustling, the conflicts have been violent with evidence of pastoralists losing their lives from increased in-country, inter-community and cross-border raids.

Recently, some media houses in Kenyan reported fatalities of over 30 pastoralists as a result of one single case of cattle rustling in the Samburu district. There is an absence of systematic monitoring mechanisms, thus there is very little record of mortality rates. The information one gets would vary considerably depending on the source. Regardless, one would expect a general outrage following reports of thirty people dead in one village, but that is hardly the case. Pastoralists occupy marginal areas in most of these countries and issues affecting them also tend to be marginal in the national conscience.

Just like leadership in other settings, leadership in pastoralist communities in the Eastern and Horn of Africa falls within the formal and informal/traditional categories.

If a simple measure of the success of the leadership within formal government is in its delivery of basic services and policy making that is sensitive to the people’s needs, then a critical assertion is that most of the governments where pastoralists exists have failed. There is widespread weakness in the provision of security for pastoralists and their livelihoods, which is exacerbated by lack of provision of social amenities and services such as schools or medical facilities. Infrastructure is at a bare minimum and systems of public accountability are unheard of in most of these pastoralist areas. This does not quite mean that there is no government effort to deal with problems in pastoralist areas. There have been numerous conflict prevention and peace-building interventions over time. Also, disarmament exercises have been attempted producing mixed results.

Local political leadership in the formal government structure in most pastoralist zones might seem to know the cause and solution to the problems affecting pastoralists but this usually is from a theoretical perspective. In most cases, they tend to blame the government for failing to provide security and development. Essentially, this comes down to a leadership vacuum because most politicians are current or former members of parliament. As parliamentarians, they form part of the government in representing their constituencies. They also tend to blame neighbouring political leaders whom they accuse of incitement whenever their own communities are affected by cattle rustling. In addition, some politicians have also been blamed of capitalizing on the ignorance of their communities in view to perpetuate poverty and promote their personal political agendas.

Some of the solutions ascribed include budgetary allocation to pastoralist areas as well as deliberate efforts to improve infrastructure, development and security. In most cases, there is buck passing and no one seems to provide leadership out of the quagmire that pastoralist face.

The traditional leadership made up of various categories such as elders as well as seers who are believed to have the capabilities of ‘seeing’ into the future have played various roles in pastoralist conflicts. It is quite difficult to generalise but it is a common perception that these traditional leaders have played the role of both war and peacemakers. They have been variously charged with aiding and abetting cattle rustling by sanctioning raids or even performing blessing ceremonies on youths before a cattle raid exercise.

There is also evidence of many elders engaged in dispute settlement or those who curse youths in order to deter cattle raids. Hence, it is a challenge to categorise this kind of leadership as one that is either good or bad. What is clear is that pastoralists are entitled to their rights just like any other set of people and while their tenacity to survive under these harsh conditions is widely admired, this does not give anyone the right to severely test their will to live.

It is perhaps not all gloom and doom. A younger generation of traditional and local leaders could make a difference. Recently in the Karamoja region of Uganda, an elaborate ceremony to pass the mantle of leadership over to another set of leaders was held. Historically it takes at least forty years to transfer power from one generation to another. However the highest leadership age, commonly known as ngimoru (mountain) overstayed its tenure. It has now passed the leadership structure to the next age set known as the gazelles.

This current leadership in Karamoja has a rare opportunity to capitalise on these changes and usher in a new era of transformational leaders who would turn around the lives of pastoralists and lay to rest the practice that is cattle rustling once and for all. If such a model works well in Karamoja, it is worthwhile to replicate to other pastoralist zones in Eastern Africa as the search for sustainable solutions continues.

by Godfrey M Musila, Senior Researcher, International Crime in Africa Programme, ISS Pretoria

On 14 August 2009, Pre-Trial Chamber II (PTC II) of the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an unprecedented decision granting interim or conditional release to the former Congolese vice-president Jean-Pierre Bemba, who is facing charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The charges were confirmed in June 2009. Following the August 14 decision, the Court contacted Belgium, Portugal, France, Germany, Italy and South Africa to discuss the possibility of hosting Bemba until the case against him is concluded.

The decision to release Bemba has raised some controversy. Some have suggested that in some sense the ICC ‘has failed’ by deciding to release Bemba. Referring to a South African official who reportedly stated that South Africa would not host Bemba, one commentator intimated that the request ‘present[ed] the South African government with a diplomatic conundrum’. In this regard, the commentator alluded to the African Union’s decision of July 3 requesting African states not to cooperate with the ICC in the case against Sudanese president Omar Al Bashir. (See ‘SA decides not to host warlord Bemba’ 16 August Sunday Independent.) Some organizations that work with victims of human rights abuses are said to be ‘in shock’ and ‘disappointed’ over the decision.

It is necessary to address some of these concerns and place the PTC II’s decision within its proper context.

First, the AU’s decision requesting African States Parties to the ICC not to cooperate with the Court is specifically limited to the case against President Al-Bashir. Linking that decision to any of the two other cases in Darfur, let alone the Bemba case (which relates to crimes allegedly committed in Central African Republic) to explain South Africa’s reported refusal to host Bemba, distorts the facts and is patently absurd.

Second, conditional release has no bearing on Bemba’s guilt. Furthermore, it cannot be suggested that ‘release’ means that the case against Bemba is weak, or somehow unfounded, as the release decision does not go into the merits of the case. Neither can one argue that by ordering Bemba’s release, the Court (judge) has failed in its duties. Bemba’s release is a matter of law and procedure.

The Rome Statute guarantees fair trial, including the presumption of innocence. The right of an accused to be released pending determination of his/her case is protected in human rights treaties (article 9 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) and the Rome Statute itself (article 60). The same provision provides for periodic review of the Court’s decision on the interim release of a detained person. Bemba succeeded on his fourth attempt, the first application to be released having failed in October 2008. Article 58 of the Rome Statute outlines the conditions to be met for a detained person to be granted interim release pending trial. The judges must satisfy themselves that: 1) continued detention is necessary for his/her appearance at trial; 2) the accused does not obstruct or endanger the investigation or the court proceedings; and 3) the accused does not continue to commit an ICC crime arising from the same circumstances as the charges against him/her. PTC II considered that Bemba was not a flight risk and that there was a change of circumstances to warrant the release order.

Third, Belgium and Portugal were nominated by PTC II as potential host states while Italy, South Africa, the DRC and Germany were identified by Bemba himself. In availing themselves to assist the Court in this case, the states are acting in terms of their obligations as States Parties to the Rome Statute. Article 86 of the Rome Statute provides that ‘States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Statute, cooperate fully with the Court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.’ Furthermore, article 87 of the Statute empowers the Court to make requests for cooperation to States Parties respecting various aspects of its work. Regulation 51 of the Regulations of the ICC requires the Court to consult identified potential host states.

However, the obligation to cooperate with and assist the Court does not mean that an identified state has no choice in the matter. The state can make its case for not being able to host the accused or can attach reasonable conditions to hosting him, in addition to those set by the Court. As noted by the PTC II, Bemba’s interim release is conditional. Bemba himself is said to have made a number of undertakings that will be shared with the states in question. Requested states can impose further conditions on the accused before accepting to host him. This is precisely why hearings will be held between the Court, the accused and relevant states. The hearings were initially scheduled to be held on 7 to 11 September and on 14 September, but have been postponed pending determination of the Prosecutor’s appeal to the August 14 decision to release Bemba. Once the Appeals Chamber rules on PTC II’s conditional release, a new hearing will be convened (if the Appeals Chamber agrees with PTC II that Bemba poses no flight risk and can be released).

No matter the eventual outcome of this matter, the decision by PTC II to release Bemba conditionally underscores at least four things:

1. The Rome Statute protects the rights of those accused or suspected of committing crimes and that the ICC is obliged to ensure that these rights are respected.
2. The independence of the judges and the fact that they decide in terms of the Statute, no matter what position the Office of the Prosecutor, victims or the defence assumes on a particular issue. It is noteworthy that the Prosecutor has appealed the PTC II’s decision, and has obtained a decision to suspend the release of Bemba until the Appeals Chamber decision.
3. Although victims and relevant NGOs may take issue with the Court over the release decision, the ruling constitutes a delicate balance between the fundamental rights of defendants and the imperatives of international criminal justice. The rights of victims, which are recognized in the Rome Statute, are subsumed in the latter concept as exemplified in article 58 criteria outlined above.
4. States Parties are crucial to the work of the ICC and will from time to time be called up to assist the Court in various ways, including giving effect to its orders. Without state cooperation, the ICC cannot achieve its mandate.

Henri Boshoff. Head Peace Missions Programme, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria Office and Lindy Heinecken. Professor of Sociology at Stellenbosch University

The scenes of running battles between police and striking soldiers on 26 August 2009 in front of the Union Buildings, Pretoria, came as a shock not only to South Africans, but also to the international community. People immediately asked whether this is a mutiny, how will it influence cooperation between the South African Police Service (SAPS) and the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) and will this incident and a possible backlash influence the 2010 Fifa World Cup? The question, however, must be asked why soldiers felt the need to protest in front of the Union Buildings in order to bring their grievances to the attention of government.

This situation is not unique to South Africa. There has been an increase in military unionism in the post-Cold War era in many places, due to a range of factors. Even in the UK where military unions are considered the “final taboo” we saw the establishment of the British Armed Forces Federation, which has come out strongly in defence of the rights of military personnel.

In South Africa the issue of how to resolve grievances of members of the Security Forces goes back to 1994. After 1994 the police and prisons services were subject to widespread labour unrest, eventually culminating in labour rights being extended to these sectors under the new Labour Relations Act (LRA), 66 of 1995. This left only the SANDF and Intelligence Service outside the scope of the LRA. Following the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention No 87 of 1948, on the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize, the SANDF was granted reprieve to create its own labour relations regulations.

Of interest is that the former South African Defence Force (SADF) anticipated that military personnel may want to belong to trade unions and swiftly ratified Section 126 of the Defence Act, 44 of 1957 in September 1993 to prohibit military personnel from joining or belonging to a trade union and from striking or participating in the activities of the union. 

The SANDF after 1994 realised that they needed to put in place some structure to address their own labour issues internally. In 1996 they established “Forum Structures” for different rank groups to address individual and collective grievances and complaints or suggestions to higher authorities. These Forums made no provision for collective dispute resolution and failed to pre-empt trade unionism. In fact, one could argue that they fuelled support for unions, given the inefficiency of these structures. On 26 August 1994, the South African National Defence Union (SANDU) was established. Nonetheless, the SANDF was resolute not to recognize or negotiate with any union representing military personnel, even threatening to prosecute members for doing so. This was the beginning of a long ongoing legal process that has not yet been concluded.  The legal issues were around the following:

• Joining trade unions or participating in trade union activities.
• Participating in strikes and acts of public protest
• Collective bargaining

On 26 May 1999 the Constitutional Court (CC) confirmed that Section 126B of the Defence Act 44 of 1957, prohibiting military personnel from joining trade unions, participating in strikes and acts of public protest, was indeed unconstitutional. This was a victory for SANDU leaving them with the sticky point of “collective bargaining”. This is one of the points that are still unclear and a bone of contention, despite numerous court cases.

The legal processes resulted in the enactment of Chapter 20 of the General Regulations for the SANDF published in the Government Gazette of 20 August 1999 (hereafter the General Regulations). The General Regulations provided, amongst others, for the organisational rights of military trade unions (MTUs), the establishment of a Military Bargaining Council (MBC), Military Arbitration Board (MAB) and the procedures to refer matters to the High Court in case of dispute. For the first time in the history of South Africa, military personnel could now legally belong to unions providing they met the 5000-member threshold requirement for registration and 15000 for recognition to serve on the MBC.

This issue is at the core of the current standoff between the SANDF and the two trade unions, SANDU and the South Africa Security Forces Union (SASFU). The SANDF is disputing the fact that the trade unions are reaching the threshold, basically baring them from the MBC.

Remarks by the Minister of Defence, and the MK and APLA Veterans organisations that they do not like trade unions and by Judge William Heath that the labour law is not applicable to the police and soldiers is misconstrued and contrary to the principles enshrined in the Constitution. The fact that the armed forces have continued to manage labour relations from a typically unitarist perspective, while the legal dispensation supports a more pluralist approach has ultimately led to a confrontational approach to employee relations in the SANDF.

Unions do not create grievances. It is the inability of management (or in this case military leadership) to resolve grievances or address the aspirations of members that led to the formation of unions in the first place. Where the grievance procedures are not functioning properly (over 4000 grievances remain unresolved); where the chain of command is dysfunctional and political leadership remains insensitive to the needs of soldiers; what alternatives remain for soldiers but to protest? Unfortunately our history shows that militant action works and this where things have gone horribly wrong. Unlike other employees, we have disgruntled armed soldiers voicing their anger publicly at the State. For the sake of the country it is important to break the impasse between the management of the SANDF and the soldiers and so bring stability to the SANDF. For this, there needs to be a spirit of cooperation, not suppression. Surely the ‘defenders of our democracy’ have the right to be heard?

Muna Abdalla, Senior Researcher, Conflict Prevention Programme, ISS Addis Ababa

Since Mauritania attained its independence from France in 1960, it has experienced a series of military coups. The first of these was in 1978 when former president Moktar Ould Dadda was ousted in a bloodless coup and the latest one was carried out in August 2008 when President Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdullahi, the first freely elected president, was ousted by a coup led by General Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz.

The gut-reaction by the international community after the 2008 coup was condemnation and then sanctions. The coup leaders proceeded with the usual invalidation of the old regime through extra-legal means and attempted to rally public support. A “transitional” government of national unity was formed in June 26, 2009 and then the presidential election was held in July 18, 2009. To contest the elections as a “civilian” candidate, the coup leader, General Abdel Aziz had given up power as president in April 2009.

Many international observers were monitoring the process, including those from the African Union and Frenchspeaking countries. General Abdel Aziz won the elections with a substantive lead of 52.47 % of the votes. Next was parliamentary speaker Messaoud Ould Boulkheir with 16 percent, followed by the opposition leader Ahmed Ould Daddah with 14% of the vote. These results have meant that there was no need for a run-off, and indicates clearly that there was no significant challenge to General Abdel Aziz. Whether the election was free and fair is still a matter of a heated debate.

The head of Mauritania’s electoral commission, Mr. Sid’Ahmed Ould Deye, indicated that he had doubts and legitimate concerns over the reliability of last month’s election results. Based on these concerns, he resigned. The opposition parties too raised their concerns that the polls were rigged, called it an “electoral coup” and lodged complaints with the court. However, the court ruled that the vote was valid and that no proof of fraud was found. The international community, including the African Union, has enthusiastically welcomed the Mauritanian election results. The European Union, the main aid donor to Mauritania, asked the authorities to carry out a full investigation into the allegations of electoral fraud. The likelihood at this point is that General Abdel Aziz and his administration will remain in power for years to come. But will General Abdel Aziz be able to tackle the root causes of the vicious circle of coups and political instability in the country or will he be deposed in a military coup like all of his predecessors? Military interventionism has been historically a prominent feature of Mauritanian political life, and the military has generally been perceived as the most powerful institution in the country.

Political stability in Mauritania has always been a product of wider concerns including poverty and inequality, social exclusion and lack of means to participate in the country’s politics. Although Mauritania is a resource-rich country, it nonetheless imports almost 70 % of its food supplies from Europe, China and the US. It remains one of the world poorest countries and the majority of the population lives on less than $ 2 a day. This situation was recently aggravated by the global hikes in prices of basic commodities including staple food, sugar and milk. For the poorest section of the population who became even more impoverished, their basic concern is to secure their daily livelihood. Previous governments were seen to have done very little to ease their suffering and this has fuelled a popular mood of frustration and bitterness. President Abdel Aziz is capitalizing on this mood. He is portraying himself as the “president of the poor,” cutting down the prices of electricity, water, sugar and gas, and spending generously on development projects in the rural and urban areas. For the ordinary Mauritanians, these steps are very much welcomed, but one should also question their sustainability. Mauritania’s economy is weak and depends primarily on fishing, mining and agriculture. These in turn are very vulnerable to exogenous factors including rainfall patterns, changes in global commodity prices and the overuse of natural resources. The recurrent drought has always resulted in a devastated impact because of the heavy dependence on rain-fed agriculture. Furthermore, although the coastal waters offer very rich fishing grounds, overfishing has nonetheless become a real problem. Moreover, the drop in oil production dashed hopes of producing a surplus to allocate for social sector spending.

Though the recent offshore oil exploration may improve the wellbeing of some individuals, there will always be a group of Mauritanians who will remain excluded from such wealth. Due to its historical background and geographical location, Mauritania’s society has amalgamations of distinct and essentially stratified ethnic groups that embrace little social cohesion and national identity. Centuries of immigration of different groups who fought for power and wealth, have left its residues in the deep economic and social cleavage between white Moor, Black Moor, and Black Africans. Any steps towards political stability should first of all address the issue of social cohesion and national unity. Yet, the issue of racial discrimination has always been a sensitive one that leaders have always tried to avoid. Those who attempt to bring it to the forefront were doomed. Former President Abdallahi’s concerns over the discrimination against Black Africans in the society were believed to be one of the reasons that angered the military institution and led to the last coup. This could be taken to indicate the stand of the new government from the issue of oppressed Blacks in the society.

Gender is also a sensitive issue despite the strong and active role played by Mauritanian women in today’s society. In the 1997 presidential election women constituted the majority of voters. General Ould Abdel Aziz is playing his cards right on this front by appointing – for the first time in Mauritania’s history – a woman to the post of Foreign Minister. While there is no guarantee that a genuine steps to increase women’s leadership will be taken in the future, appointing a prominent woman in the new cabinet could nonetheless be valuable for women’s efforts to attain equal rights. On the other hand, her appointment has generated dissatisfaction from the Islamist movements who denounced the decision on the basis of Quran scripture and hadith. In general, the new government has no intention to satisfy Islamic movements or the Mauritanian Salafists. It was widely believed that one of the reasons that led to the coup was related to former President Abdallahi’s growing closeness to Islamists. During his last few months in power Mr. Abdallahi’s government had began a dialogue with the Islamists and had released Islamic extremists from prisons. Although the US had previously shown dislike for General Ould Abdel Aziz, it seems to have endorsed his victory and to be willing to work with him.

The new government now needs to build a professional military to prevent its continued intervention in politics. Future political stability of the country will also be determined by the genuine steps towards recognizing and addressing inequalities and previous grievances.

Paula Roque, senior researcher, African Security Analysis Programme, ISS Tshwane (Pretoria)

In a highly strategic move, President Jacob Zuma paid a high-profile state visit to Angola, the first since his inauguration as South Africa’s head of state, with the aim of securing economic and political cooperation with Africa’s second largest oil exporter and an emerging diplomatic heavyweight. This visit was significant for two reasons: it was a revival of a historical alliance that had since 1994 deteriorated into mutual antagonism and an opportunity to bring together two important hegemons in Sub-Saharan Africa. Zuma’s delegation walked away with a joint project between oil-giant Sonangol and PetroSA; memorandums of understanding on diverse sectors (trade, air services, diplomatic relations etc.) and guarantees of reconstruction contracts in low-income housing, telecommunications, roads and dams. However, engaging Luanda economically is always a political affair and apart from the highly beneficial economic deals, what remains to be determined are the political trade-offs that Pretoria had to make. 

Angola is a highly complex country to engage diplomatically. It does not succumb to external pressures, given that it is not a major recipient of foreign aid and has the diplomatic clout of its mineral wealth. It does not react well to impositions of any sort and its pragmatism allows it to engage with divergent global powers, even those like the US and China that had previously supported the ruling party’s arch –enemy UNITA. The tendency to operate in isolation is also a characteristic of its ‘exceptionalism’ where Luanda prefers to take a ‘statist’ approach rather than a multi-lateral consensual approach. Furthermore, the need to be ‘a big fish in a small pond’, to determine the rules of engagement, in having impenetrable influence in certain capitals, and not placing itself in a position of weakness politically, economically or militarily, are additional elements of Luanda’s petro-capitalist power. All these will prove significant challenges to Pretoria.

Given the diverse investment opportunities, the great reconstruction needs of Angola and the wealth of resources (oil, diamonds, arable land, natural water) any economic venture into the country is attractive, however difficult doing business with Luanda may be. Impediments include bureaucratic hurdles, lack of transparency, corruption and patronalism, different legal frameworks, an incomprehensible financial system, language, and political culture. However, the potential for complementarity between the two is significant and desirable by ensuring prosperity through combining the strengths of each economy, while promoting regional integration. One area where SA companies could venture into, which would also promote regional trade, are trans-national links like roads and railway systems.

Another area where both South Africa and Angola could cooperate regionally and continentally is in the area of peace and security. Luanda currently boasts the best-resourced battle –trained armed forces in the region that, together with the airlift capacity of Angola, could provide precious military assistance in peacekeeping missions. This area of cooperation could also become the greatest point of contention, with both Luanda and Pretoria taking two very distinct diplomatic and political strategies to conflict mediation, as seen in Zimbabwe and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Luanda has tended to prioritize relations with Harare and Kinshasa on a narrow basis, by offering military assistance and troops, while remaining uncommitted to political solutions. It is worth noting that several peace negotiation rounds and agreements in Angola failed to bring a political settlement to one of Africa’s deadliest conflicts and that it was only through Dos Santos’ openly-belligerent tactics that “peace through war” was achieved in 2002, with Savimbi’s death. One of the contributing factors to the frosty relations between Luanda and Pretoria for the last 15 years was the fact that South Africa pushed for consensus and political accommodation between dos Santos and the late Unita leader Jonas Savimbi, rather than showing “loyalty” to the ruling MPLA as an old ally fighting ‘imperialism’.

One area South Africa will need to approach with caution is the proximity with regimes that are autocratic, unaccountable and corrupt, while carefully balancing the costs of engaging with a reformed autocracy like Angola, where democratic processes are all but emblematic. Pretoria will also need to consider the impact that prioritizing a policy that considers economic imperatives over ethical responsibilities could have on its international image and what message this is sending out to other undemocratic regimes on the continent. Giving greater legitimacy to a country like Angola where elections and legislation are ornamental and part of the trappings of democracy without the substance, will establish a dangerous precedent. With the rise of hybrid regimes throughout the continent, where they are neither autocracies nor democracies but somewhere in between, it will be easier to follow the policy of “not visiting dictatorships”. Furthermore, South-South cooperation, in particular with initiatives like IBSA (heralding cooperation between India, Brazil and South Africa) and strengthening ties with China, has already begun to take precedence over ties with the West and the conditionalities on democratization dropped.

In what could turn out to be a brilliant strategic move for the Zuma Administration, or a cursed blessing that will cause Pretoria greater long-term difficulties, renewed South Africa-Angola relations have the propensity of providing a new era for the Southern Africa region with two regional powers cooperating diplomatically and promoting regional trade. However, Angola will only commit to a regional initiative, be it in economic or peace and security spheres, if it can play a leading role and not live in Pretoria’s shadow, in the tradition of engaging on the basis of dominance rather than equality. Whatever the challenges in reviving this relationship may be, both Pretoria and Luanda have more to benefit than lose from a strategic rapprochement.

Dr Annie Barbara Chikwanha, Senior Research Fellow, African Human Security Initiative, ISS Addis Ababa

Key issues that are clear from the review of crime and criminal justice systems conducted by the Africa Human Security Initiative (AHSI) network revealed that African governments’ priorities regarding securing the lives of their citizens need readjustment.

First of all, crime victimization surveys conducted in three west African countries that are all at very different phases of the democratic transition - Sierra Leone, Benin and Mali - revealed that what the ordinary citizens consider to be debilitating crimes are those that are largely central to their livelihoods. For instance, the act of constantly guarding livestock deters one from reaching his/her maximum development potential yet the focus on fighting crime tends to be concentrated on the urban citizens whose behaviour determines foreign direct investment and tourist inflows.

The same logic used in economic growth appears to appeal to the security architects; that security will trickle down to the poor and to the periphery. Is it a wonder then that justice has remained elusive for the majority of Africans - rural and urban alike? Even though there are variations that exist amongst African nations because of their different backgrounds in terms of cultural values and political ideas, we still find more convergence in terms of justice delivery deficiencies.

How then do we assess the efficacy of Africa’s criminal justice systems? We can fragment this into manageable proportions and look at the forward and backward linkages in the criminal justice process such as policing, prosecution, the judiciary, prison service, customary justice and juvenile justice. But these components share the same institutional weaknesses: poor funding, inaccessible data, and inadequate remuneration for staff, poor training, poor infrastructure, and human rights abuses. It is difficult to gauge the quality of justice that the citizens experience in such circumstances.

All African countries are battling with high and increasing crime but hard data is unfortunately not released to the public in most of the countries. Corruption, pervasive in and outside government, in the electoral process and public service delivery, is the one crime every official talks about. Anti-corruption and oversight institutions like the Anti-Corruption Commission, Parliament, the Auditor-General and the Ombudsman are under-resourced and under-skilled and therefore proved ineffective in combating the national scourge. Equally problematic are criminal activities relating to drug and human trafficking, money laundering, illegal migration but, like other crimes, there is inadequate data on the scale of the problems. Authorities also have inadequate capacities to deal with these pressing problems.

Part of the problem is that there is no diligence in compiling crime statistics. And with the usual cultural interpretations of what constitutes a crime, it is frightening to think of what those with criminal tendencies get away with. There is no justification for crime figures being a state secret. The system and the public can only fight what they know.

AHSI’s findings concur with few other researchers who have observed that most of Africa’s citizens rely on and opt for customary justice for a number of reasons. The most disturbing being the prohibitive costs of the modern formal justice system, which is absent in any case in most of the areas. As has been touted by other scholars, criminal justice agencies are organized sequentially — “output” from one agency is “input” to the next — and this alone is a major deterrent to citizens whose daily life consists of grinding poverty and counting bus-fare for the duration of the month. ‘

Processing security and justice’ is just not an option. The input/output connections are just too costly and often fraught with mystery and mistrust such that it is easier to opt for the familiar and quick customary system. It is against this background that we can read the governments’ response as indifference to the cohabitation of common and customary law across all African countries. This perpetuates the niggling absurdity whereby the constitutionally recognised legal system is known and accessed by the few while the majority mostly rural people know, understand and access customary law.

The criminalisation of political behaviour is also another category of crime that is fluidly defined and heavily punished in all unconstitutional ways possible on the continent. African citizens and the courts lack a clear understanding of the so called ‘seditious’ criminal laws’ requirements and prohibitions as these are not usually explicitly stated. Worst of all, the statutes do not always entail some verifiable standards of guilt.

Substantive criminal laws define crimes and may establish punishments and ‘criminal procedure’ describes the process through which the criminal laws are enforced. Unfortunately, the procedures through which many African governments enforce substantive laws are too often fraught with irregularities infused with innuendo and vilification. This blurring makes it easier to frame any emerging power centre and dialogue as a threat to national security hence all legal procedures need not apply in the prescribed manner.

Africa’s criminal justice systems will remain chronically weak if the customary and formal justice systems are not harmonized in a way that complies with modern constitutions, international standards and protocols that are designed to uphold the rule of law and safeguard human rights. Resolving this legal trifurcation is not an insurmountable challenge and delayed reforms will continue to compromise justice delivery severely.

Dear reader

The love-hate relationship between France and its former colonies in Africa has played an important role these last few decades in defi ning political and economic events in a large chunk of Africa.

Talking to people in Dakar or Abidjan, one discovers a younger generation of Francophone Africans looking towards France with a mixture of admiration and resentment.

The resentment towards France, exacerbated by the treatment of African immigrants in France, makes many people turn to America as the new Promised Land, probably even more so with Barack Obama at the helm. But because of the real or perceived diffi culty for most to start learning another language, having grown up with French, some prefer going to other French-speaking developed countries, such as Quebec in Canada for higher learning.

Yet I often see the older generation - who grew up with textbooks teaching them of ‘our ancestors, the Gauls…’ - still prefer to watch the evening France 2 news bulletin on television, and follow French elections with more emotion and interest than any election in their neighbouring states.

How else do you explain that the fi rst gesture after every coup d’état is to cut the Radio France International radio signal? It is because the decision-makers in Francophone Africa rely mostly on French media for their information and believe that France’s reaction in every confl ict is paramount.

France’s military presence is still a reality in too many places in Africa. One can’t blame Africans for accusing France of continuing to prop up unpopular leaders like Idriss Déby and the deceased Gabonese leader, Omar Bongo Ondimba.

In his book L’Afrique sans la France - histoire d’un divorce consommé, Jean-Paul Ngoupandé warned his fellow Africans years ago against blaming France for every confl ict in Africa, calling it the Don Quixote-syndrome. He is right, even if his book is also full of that special reverence for France - to be expected from a former prime minister of a small former French colony like the Central African Republic.

What about French public opinion? The starry-eyed, hardworking coopérants in Africa - those with the sandals and beads hosting cultural evenings at the Alliance Française in Niamey or Antananarivo - love Africa. But that relationship can never really escape from being patronising.

Some will recall that for many years, the bi-annual French version of the Commonwealth summits was called Les Sommets France-Afrique (France-Africa Summit). It was a huge event with the French president calling together all the African presidents for a lecture. Until the day someone in the French foreign ministry realised France is only one country and there are more than 20 Francophone African countries. Now it is called Les Sommets des chefs d’état de l’Afrique et de France (The summit of heads of state of Africa and of France). It was and still is something of an aberration and is overtaken by the probably more useful Francophonie with 56 member states.

But perhaps one should not put the blame here on the shoulder of France alone. African leaders - and not just Francophones - contribute to this notion of dealing collectively with one country. This is evidenced by similar events like Africa-China, Africa-Japan and Africa- Turkey summits. Tehran is said to be preparing for its own Africa-Iran summit in the near future.

Many commentators - like our writers in this issue of the-african.org - have recalled how the late Omar Bongo Ondimba personifi ed the incestuous and obsolete link between a certain generation of Africans and France.

Gabon, like Côte d’Ivoire under Félix Houphouët Boigny, or Senegal under Léopold Sédar Senghor, was usually the fi rst port of call for any newly elected French president. Dubious business and political links fl ourished. Who will forget the scandal of the expensive Italian suits fl own to Gabon by the couturier Francesco Smalto and all that was revealed during l’Affaire Elf - a saga involving the French oil company, former foreign minister Roland Dumas, frigates bought in Taiwan and a series of corrupt French business people?

Bongo is now gone, like contemporaries and predecessors Houphouët, Senghor and the more vicious ones like Mobutu Sese Seko, Jean-Bedel Bokassa and Gnassingbe Eyadema. Those French leaders who helped them loot and keep their people in poverty are also on their way out.

Francophone Africans should stop looking towards France as the only role model. Luckily, this is happening with the new generation. The future is a whole new place and Africans will redefi ne themselves, regardless of what language we speak.

Liesl Louw-Vaudran
Editor