Muna Abdalla, Senior Researcher, Conflict Prevention Programme, ISS Addis Ababa

Since Mauritania attained its independence from France in 1960, it has experienced a series of military coups. The first of these was in 1978 when former president Moktar Ould Dadda was ousted in a bloodless coup and the latest one was carried out in August 2008 when President Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdullahi, the first freely elected president, was ousted by a coup led by General Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz.

The gut-reaction by the international community after the 2008 coup was condemnation and then sanctions. The coup leaders proceeded with the usual invalidation of the old regime through extra-legal means and attempted to rally public support. A “transitional� government of national unity was formed in June 26, 2009 and then the presidential election was held in July 18, 2009. To contest the elections as a “civilian� candidate, the coup leader, General Abdel Aziz had given up power as president in April 2009.

Many international observers were monitoring the process, including those from the African Union and Frenchspeaking countries. General Abdel Aziz won the elections with a substantive lead of 52.47 % of the votes. Next was parliamentary speaker Messaoud Ould Boulkheir with 16 percent, followed by the opposition leader Ahmed Ould Daddah with 14% of the vote. These results have meant that there was no need for a run-off, and indicates clearly that there was no significant challenge to General Abdel Aziz. Whether the election was free and fair is still a matter of a heated debate.

The head of Mauritania’s electoral commission, Mr. Sid’Ahmed Ould Deye, indicated that he had doubts and legitimate concerns over the reliability of last month’s election results. Based on these concerns, he resigned. The opposition parties too raised their concerns that the polls were rigged, called it an “electoral coup� and lodged complaints with the court. However, the court ruled that the vote was valid and that no proof of fraud was found. The international community, including the African Union, has enthusiastically welcomed the Mauritanian election results. The European Union, the main aid donor to Mauritania, asked the authorities to carry out a full investigation into the allegations of electoral fraud. The likelihood at this point is that General Abdel Aziz and his administration will remain in power for years to come. But will General Abdel Aziz be able to tackle the root causes of the vicious circle of coups and political instability in the country or will he be deposed in a military coup like all of his predecessors? Military interventionism has been historically a prominent feature of Mauritanian political life, and the military has generally been perceived as the most powerful institution in the country.

Political stability in Mauritania has always been a product of wider concerns including poverty and inequality, social exclusion and lack of means to participate in the country’s politics. Although Mauritania is a resource-rich country, it nonetheless imports almost 70 % of its food supplies from Europe, China and the US. It remains one of the world poorest countries and the majority of the population lives on less than $ 2 a day. This situation was recently aggravated by the global hikes in prices of basic commodities including staple food, sugar and milk. For the poorest section of the population who became even more impoverished, their basic concern is to secure their daily livelihood. Previous governments were seen to have done very little to ease their suffering and this has fuelled a popular mood of frustration and bitterness. President Abdel Aziz is capitalizing on this mood. He is portraying himself as the “president of the poor,� cutting down the prices of electricity, water, sugar and gas, and spending generously on development projects in the rural and urban areas. For the ordinary Mauritanians, these steps are very much welcomed, but one should also question their sustainability. Mauritania’s economy is weak and depends primarily on fishing, mining and agriculture. These in turn are very vulnerable to exogenous factors including rainfall patterns, changes in global commodity prices and the overuse of natural resources. The recurrent drought has always resulted in a devastated impact because of the heavy dependence on rain-fed agriculture. Furthermore, although the coastal waters offer very rich fishing grounds, overfishing has nonetheless become a real problem. Moreover, the drop in oil production dashed hopes of producing a surplus to allocate for social sector spending.

Though the recent offshore oil exploration may improve the wellbeing of some individuals, there will always be a group of Mauritanians who will remain excluded from such wealth. Due to its historical background and geographical location, Mauritania’s society has amalgamations of distinct and essentially stratified ethnic groups that embrace little social cohesion and national identity. Centuries of immigration of different groups who fought for power and wealth, have left its residues in the deep economic and social cleavage between white Moor, Black Moor, and Black Africans. Any steps towards political stability should first of all address the issue of social cohesion and national unity. Yet, the issue of racial discrimination has always been a sensitive one that leaders have always tried to avoid. Those who attempt to bring it to the forefront were doomed. Former President Abdallahi’s concerns over the discrimination against Black Africans in the society were believed to be one of the reasons that angered the military institution and led to the last coup. This could be taken to indicate the stand of the new government from the issue of oppressed Blacks in the society.

Gender is also a sensitive issue despite the strong and active role played by Mauritanian women in today’s society. In the 1997 presidential election women constituted the majority of voters. General Ould Abdel Aziz is playing his cards right on this front by appointing – for the first time in Mauritania’s history – a woman to the post of Foreign Minister. While there is no guarantee that a genuine steps to increase women’s leadership will be taken in the future, appointing a prominent woman in the new cabinet could nonetheless be valuable for women’s efforts to attain equal rights. On the other hand, her appointment has generated dissatisfaction from the Islamist movements who denounced the decision on the basis of Quran scripture and hadith. In general, the new government has no intention to satisfy Islamic movements or the Mauritanian Salafists. It was widely believed that one of the reasons that led to the coup was related to former President Abdallahi’s growing closeness to Islamists. During his last few months in power Mr. Abdallahi’s government had began a dialogue with the Islamists and had released Islamic extremists from prisons. Although the US had previously shown dislike for General Ould Abdel Aziz, it seems to have endorsed his victory and to be willing to work with him.

The new government now needs to build a professional military to prevent its continued intervention in politics. Future political stability of the country will also be determined by the genuine steps towards recognizing and addressing inequalities and previous grievances.

Muna Abdalla, Senior Researcher, Conflict Prevention Programme, ISS Addis Ababa

Since Mauritania attained its independence from France in 1960, it has experienced a series of military coups. The first of these was in 1978 when former president Moktar Ould Dadda was ousted in a bloodless coup and the latest one was carried out in August 2008 when President Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdullahi, the first freely elected president, was ousted by a coup led by General Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz.

The gut-reaction by the international community after the 2008 coup was condemnation and then sanctions. The coup leaders proceeded with the usual invalidation of the old regime through extra-legal means and attempted to rally public support. A “transitional� government of national unity was formed in June 26, 2009 and then the presidential election was held in July 18, 2009. To contest the elections as a “civilian� candidate, the coup leader, General Abdel Aziz had given up power as president in April 2009.

Many international observers were monitoring the process, including those from the African Union and Frenchspeaking countries. General Abdel Aziz won the elections with a substantive lead of 52.47 % of the votes. Next was parliamentary speaker Messaoud Ould Boulkheir with 16 percent, followed by the opposition leader Ahmed Ould Daddah with 14% of the vote. These results have meant that there was no need for a run-off, and indicates clearly that there was no significant challenge to General Abdel Aziz. Whether the election was free and fair is still a matter of a heated debate.

The head of Mauritania’s electoral commission, Mr. Sid’Ahmed Ould Deye, indicated that he had doubts and legitimate concerns over the reliability of last month’s election results. Based on these concerns, he resigned. The opposition parties too raised their concerns that the polls were rigged, called it an “electoral coup� and lodged complaints with the court. However, the court ruled that the vote was valid and that no proof of fraud was found. The international community, including the African Union, has enthusiastically welcomed the Mauritanian election results. The European Union, the main aid donor to Mauritania, asked the authorities to carry out a full investigation into the allegations of electoral fraud. The likelihood at this point is that General Abdel Aziz and his administration will remain in power for years to come. But will General Abdel Aziz be able to tackle the root causes of the vicious circle of coups and political instability in the country or will he be deposed in a military coup like all of his predecessors? Military interventionism has been historically a prominent feature of Mauritanian political life, and the military has generally been perceived as the most powerful institution in the country.

Political stability in Mauritania has always been a product of wider concerns including poverty and inequality, social exclusion and lack of means to participate in the country’s politics. Although Mauritania is a resource-rich country, it nonetheless imports almost 70 % of its food supplies from Europe, China and the US. It remains one of the world poorest countries and the majority of the population lives on less than $ 2 a day. This situation was recently aggravated by the global hikes in prices of basic commodities including staple food, sugar and milk. For the poorest section of the population who became even more impoverished, their basic concern is to secure their daily livelihood. Previous governments were seen to have done very little to ease their suffering and this has fuelled a popular mood of frustration and bitterness. President Abdel Aziz is capitalizing on this mood. He is portraying himself as the “president of the poor,� cutting down the prices of electricity, water, sugar and gas, and spending generously on development projects in the rural and urban areas. For the ordinary Mauritanians, these steps are very much welcomed, but one should also question their sustainability. Mauritania’s economy is weak and depends primarily on fishing, mining and agriculture. These in turn are very vulnerable to exogenous factors including rainfall patterns, changes in global commodity prices and the overuse of natural resources. The recurrent drought has always resulted in a devastated impact because of the heavy dependence on rain-fed agriculture. Furthermore, although the coastal waters offer very rich fishing grounds, overfishing has nonetheless become a real problem. Moreover, the drop in oil production dashed hopes of producing a surplus to allocate for social sector spending.

Though the recent offshore oil exploration may improve the wellbeing of some individuals, there will always be a group of Mauritanians who will remain excluded from such wealth. Due to its historical background and geographical location, Mauritania’s society has amalgamations of distinct and essentially stratified ethnic groups that embrace little social cohesion and national identity. Centuries of immigration of different groups who fought for power and wealth, have left its residues in the deep economic and social cleavage between white Moor, Black Moor, and Black Africans. Any steps towards political stability should first of all address the issue of social cohesion and national unity. Yet, the issue of racial discrimination has always been a sensitive one that leaders have always tried to avoid. Those who attempt to bring it to the forefront were doomed. Former President Abdallahi’s concerns over the discrimination against Black Africans in the society were believed to be one of the reasons that angered the military institution and led to the last coup. This could be taken to indicate the stand of the new government from the issue of oppressed Blacks in the society.

Gender is also a sensitive issue despite the strong and active role played by Mauritanian women in today’s society. In the 1997 presidential election women constituted the majority of voters. General Ould Abdel Aziz is playing his cards right on this front by appointing – for the first time in Mauritania’s history – a woman to the post of Foreign Minister. While there is no guarantee that a genuine steps to increase women’s leadership will be taken in the future, appointing a prominent woman in the new cabinet could nonetheless be valuable for women’s efforts to attain equal rights. On the other hand, her appointment has generated dissatisfaction from the Islamist movements who denounced the decision on the basis of Quran scripture and hadith. In general, the new government has no intention to satisfy Islamic movements or the Mauritanian Salafists. It was widely believed that one of the reasons that led to the coup was related to former President Abdallahi’s growing closeness to Islamists. During his last few months in power Mr. Abdallahi’s government had began a dialogue with the Islamists and had released Islamic extremists from prisons. Although the US had previously shown dislike for General Ould Abdel Aziz, it seems to have endorsed his victory and to be willing to work with him.

The new government now needs to build a professional military to prevent its continued intervention in politics. Future political stability of the country will also be determined by the genuine steps towards recognizing and addressing inequalities and previous grievances.

Muna Abdalla, Senior Researcher, Conflict Prevention Programme, ISS Addis Ababa

Since Mauritania attained its independence from France in 1960, it has experienced a series of military coups. The first of these was in 1978 when former president Moktar Ould Dadda was ousted in a bloodless coup and the latest one was carried out in August 2008 when President Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdullahi, the first freely elected president, was ousted by a coup led by General Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz.

The gut-reaction by the international community after the 2008 coup was condemnation and then sanctions. The coup leaders proceeded with the usual invalidation of the old regime through extra-legal means and attempted to rally public support. A “transitional� government of national unity was formed in June 26, 2009 and then the presidential election was held in July 18, 2009. To contest the elections as a “civilian� candidate, the coup leader, General Abdel Aziz had given up power as president in April 2009.

Many international observers were monitoring the process, including those from the African Union and Frenchspeaking countries. General Abdel Aziz won the elections with a substantive lead of 52.47 % of the votes. Next was parliamentary speaker Messaoud Ould Boulkheir with 16 percent, followed by the opposition leader Ahmed Ould Daddah with 14% of the vote. These results have meant that there was no need for a run-off, and indicates clearly that there was no significant challenge to General Abdel Aziz. Whether the election was free and fair is still a matter of a heated debate.

The head of Mauritania’s electoral commission, Mr. Sid’Ahmed Ould Deye, indicated that he had doubts and legitimate concerns over the reliability of last month’s election results. Based on these concerns, he resigned. The opposition parties too raised their concerns that the polls were rigged, called it an “electoral coup� and lodged complaints with the court. However, the court ruled that the vote was valid and that no proof of fraud was found. The international community, including the African Union, has enthusiastically welcomed the Mauritanian election results. The European Union, the main aid donor to Mauritania, asked the authorities to carry out a full investigation into the allegations of electoral fraud. The likelihood at this point is that General Abdel Aziz and his administration will remain in power for years to come. But will General Abdel Aziz be able to tackle the root causes of the vicious circle of coups and political instability in the country or will he be deposed in a military coup like all of his predecessors? Military interventionism has been historically a prominent feature of Mauritanian political life, and the military has generally been perceived as the most powerful institution in the country.

Political stability in Mauritania has always been a product of wider concerns including poverty and inequality, social exclusion and lack of means to participate in the country’s politics. Although Mauritania is a resource-rich country, it nonetheless imports almost 70 % of its food supplies from Europe, China and the US. It remains one of the world poorest countries and the majority of the population lives on less than $ 2 a day. This situation was recently aggravated by the global hikes in prices of basic commodities including staple food, sugar and milk. For the poorest section of the population who became even more impoverished, their basic concern is to secure their daily livelihood. Previous governments were seen to have done very little to ease their suffering and this has fuelled a popular mood of frustration and bitterness. President Abdel Aziz is capitalizing on this mood. He is portraying himself as the “president of the poor,� cutting down the prices of electricity, water, sugar and gas, and spending generously on development projects in the rural and urban areas. For the ordinary Mauritanians, these steps are very much welcomed, but one should also question their sustainability. Mauritania’s economy is weak and depends primarily on fishing, mining and agriculture. These in turn are very vulnerable to exogenous factors including rainfall patterns, changes in global commodity prices and the overuse of natural resources. The recurrent drought has always resulted in a devastated impact because of the heavy dependence on rain-fed agriculture. Furthermore, although the coastal waters offer very rich fishing grounds, overfishing has nonetheless become a real problem. Moreover, the drop in oil production dashed hopes of producing a surplus to allocate for social sector spending.

Though the recent offshore oil exploration may improve the wellbeing of some individuals, there will always be a group of Mauritanians who will remain excluded from such wealth. Due to its historical background and geographical location, Mauritania’s society has amalgamations of distinct and essentially stratified ethnic groups that embrace little social cohesion and national identity. Centuries of immigration of different groups who fought for power and wealth, have left its residues in the deep economic and social cleavage between white Moor, Black Moor, and Black Africans. Any steps towards political stability should first of all address the issue of social cohesion and national unity. Yet, the issue of racial discrimination has always been a sensitive one that leaders have always tried to avoid. Those who attempt to bring it to the forefront were doomed. Former President Abdallahi’s concerns over the discrimination against Black Africans in the society were believed to be one of the reasons that angered the military institution and led to the last coup. This could be taken to indicate the stand of the new government from the issue of oppressed Blacks in the society.

Gender is also a sensitive issue despite the strong and active role played by Mauritanian women in today’s society. In the 1997 presidential election women constituted the majority of voters. General Ould Abdel Aziz is playing his cards right on this front by appointing – for the first time in Mauritania’s history – a woman to the post of Foreign Minister. While there is no guarantee that a genuine steps to increase women’s leadership will be taken in the future, appointing a prominent woman in the new cabinet could nonetheless be valuable for women’s efforts to attain equal rights. On the other hand, her appointment has generated dissatisfaction from the Islamist movements who denounced the decision on the basis of Quran scripture and hadith. In general, the new government has no intention to satisfy Islamic movements or the Mauritanian Salafists. It was widely believed that one of the reasons that led to the coup was related to former President Abdallahi’s growing closeness to Islamists. During his last few months in power Mr. Abdallahi’s government had began a dialogue with the Islamists and had released Islamic extremists from prisons. Although the US had previously shown dislike for General Ould Abdel Aziz, it seems to have endorsed his victory and to be willing to work with him.

The new government now needs to build a professional military to prevent its continued intervention in politics. Future political stability of the country will also be determined by the genuine steps towards recognizing and addressing inequalities and previous grievances.

Paula Roque, senior researcher, African Security Analysis Programme, ISS Tshwane (Pretoria)

In a highly strategic move, President Jacob Zuma paid a high-profile state visit to Angola, the first since his inauguration as South Africa’s head of state, with the aim of securing economic and political cooperation with Africa’s second largest oil exporter and an emerging diplomatic heavyweight. This visit was significant for two reasons: it was a revival of a historical alliance that had since 1994 deteriorated into mutual antagonism and an opportunity to bring together two important hegemons in Sub-Saharan Africa. Zuma’s delegation walked away with a joint project between oil-giant Sonangol and PetroSA; memorandums of understanding on diverse sectors (trade, air services, diplomatic relations etc.) and guarantees of reconstruction contracts in low-income housing, telecommunications, roads and dams. However, engaging Luanda economically is always a political affair and apart from the highly beneficial economic deals, what remains to be determined are the political trade-offs that Pretoria had to make. 

Angola is a highly complex country to engage diplomatically. It does not succumb to external pressures, given that it is not a major recipient of foreign aid and has the diplomatic clout of its mineral wealth. It does not react well to impositions of any sort and its pragmatism allows it to engage with divergent global powers, even those like the US and China that had previously supported the ruling party’s arch –enemy UNITA. The tendency to operate in isolation is also a characteristic of its ‘exceptionalism’ where Luanda prefers to take a ‘statist’ approach rather than a multi-lateral consensual approach. Furthermore, the need to be ‘a big fish in a small pond’, to determine the rules of engagement, in having impenetrable influence in certain capitals, and not placing itself in a position of weakness politically, economically or militarily, are additional elements of Luanda’s petro-capitalist power. All these will prove significant challenges to Pretoria.

Given the diverse investment opportunities, the great reconstruction needs of Angola and the wealth of resources (oil, diamonds, arable land, natural water) any economic venture into the country is attractive, however difficult doing business with Luanda may be. Impediments include bureaucratic hurdles, lack of transparency, corruption and patronalism, different legal frameworks, an incomprehensible financial system, language, and political culture. However, the potential for complementarity between the two is significant and desirable by ensuring prosperity through combining the strengths of each economy, while promoting regional integration. One area where SA companies could venture into, which would also promote regional trade, are trans-national links like roads and railway systems.

Another area where both South Africa and Angola could cooperate regionally and continentally is in the area of peace and security. Luanda currently boasts the best-resourced battle –trained armed forces in the region that, together with the airlift capacity of Angola, could provide precious military assistance in peacekeeping missions. This area of cooperation could also become the greatest point of contention, with both Luanda and Pretoria taking two very distinct diplomatic and political strategies to conflict mediation, as seen in Zimbabwe and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Luanda has tended to prioritize relations with Harare and Kinshasa on a narrow basis, by offering military assistance and troops, while remaining uncommitted to political solutions. It is worth noting that several peace negotiation rounds and agreements in Angola failed to bring a political settlement to one of Africa’s deadliest conflicts and that it was only through Dos Santos’ openly-belligerent tactics that “peace through war� was achieved in 2002, with Savimbi’s death. One of the contributing factors to the frosty relations between Luanda and Pretoria for the last 15 years was the fact that South Africa pushed for consensus and political accommodation between dos Santos and the late Unita leader Jonas Savimbi, rather than showing “loyalty� to the ruling MPLA as an old ally fighting ‘imperialism’.

One area South Africa will need to approach with caution is the proximity with regimes that are autocratic, unaccountable and corrupt, while carefully balancing the costs of engaging with a reformed autocracy like Angola, where democratic processes are all but emblematic. Pretoria will also need to consider the impact that prioritizing a policy that considers economic imperatives over ethical responsibilities could have on its international image and what message this is sending out to other undemocratic regimes on the continent. Giving greater legitimacy to a country like Angola where elections and legislation are ornamental and part of the trappings of democracy without the substance, will establish a dangerous precedent. With the rise of hybrid regimes throughout the continent, where they are neither autocracies nor democracies but somewhere in between, it will be easier to follow the policy of “not visiting dictatorships�. Furthermore, South-South cooperation, in particular with initiatives like IBSA (heralding cooperation between India, Brazil and South Africa) and strengthening ties with China, has already begun to take precedence over ties with the West and the conditionalities on democratization dropped.

In what could turn out to be a brilliant strategic move for the Zuma Administration, or a cursed blessing that will cause Pretoria greater long-term difficulties, renewed South Africa-Angola relations have the propensity of providing a new era for the Southern Africa region with two regional powers cooperating diplomatically and promoting regional trade. However, Angola will only commit to a regional initiative, be it in economic or peace and security spheres, if it can play a leading role and not live in Pretoria’s shadow, in the tradition of engaging on the basis of dominance rather than equality. Whatever the challenges in reviving this relationship may be, both Pretoria and Luanda have more to benefit than lose from a strategic rapprochement.

Paula Roque, senior researcher, African Security Analysis Programme, ISS Tshwane (Pretoria)

In a highly strategic move, President Jacob Zuma paid a high-profile state visit to Angola, the first since his inauguration as South Africa’s head of state, with the aim of securing economic and political cooperation with Africa’s second largest oil exporter and an emerging diplomatic heavyweight. This visit was significant for two reasons: it was a revival of a historical alliance that had since 1994 deteriorated into mutual antagonism and an opportunity to bring together two important hegemons in Sub-Saharan Africa. Zuma’s delegation walked away with a joint project between oil-giant Sonangol and PetroSA; memorandums of understanding on diverse sectors (trade, air services, diplomatic relations etc.) and guarantees of reconstruction contracts in low-income housing, telecommunications, roads and dams. However, engaging Luanda economically is always a political affair and apart from the highly beneficial economic deals, what remains to be determined are the political trade-offs that Pretoria had to make. 

Angola is a highly complex country to engage diplomatically. It does not succumb to external pressures, given that it is not a major recipient of foreign aid and has the diplomatic clout of its mineral wealth. It does not react well to impositions of any sort and its pragmatism allows it to engage with divergent global powers, even those like the US and China that had previously supported the ruling party’s arch –enemy UNITA. The tendency to operate in isolation is also a characteristic of its ‘exceptionalism’ where Luanda prefers to take a ‘statist’ approach rather than a multi-lateral consensual approach. Furthermore, the need to be ‘a big fish in a small pond’, to determine the rules of engagement, in having impenetrable influence in certain capitals, and not placing itself in a position of weakness politically, economically or militarily, are additional elements of Luanda’s petro-capitalist power. All these will prove significant challenges to Pretoria.

Given the diverse investment opportunities, the great reconstruction needs of Angola and the wealth of resources (oil, diamonds, arable land, natural water) any economic venture into the country is attractive, however difficult doing business with Luanda may be. Impediments include bureaucratic hurdles, lack of transparency, corruption and patronalism, different legal frameworks, an incomprehensible financial system, language, and political culture. However, the potential for complementarity between the two is significant and desirable by ensuring prosperity through combining the strengths of each economy, while promoting regional integration. One area where SA companies could venture into, which would also promote regional trade, are trans-national links like roads and railway systems.

Another area where both South Africa and Angola could cooperate regionally and continentally is in the area of peace and security. Luanda currently boasts the best-resourced battle –trained armed forces in the region that, together with the airlift capacity of Angola, could provide precious military assistance in peacekeeping missions. This area of cooperation could also become the greatest point of contention, with both Luanda and Pretoria taking two very distinct diplomatic and political strategies to conflict mediation, as seen in Zimbabwe and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Luanda has tended to prioritize relations with Harare and Kinshasa on a narrow basis, by offering military assistance and troops, while remaining uncommitted to political solutions. It is worth noting that several peace negotiation rounds and agreements in Angola failed to bring a political settlement to one of Africa’s deadliest conflicts and that it was only through Dos Santos’ openly-belligerent tactics that “peace through war� was achieved in 2002, with Savimbi’s death. One of the contributing factors to the frosty relations between Luanda and Pretoria for the last 15 years was the fact that South Africa pushed for consensus and political accommodation between dos Santos and the late Unita leader Jonas Savimbi, rather than showing “loyalty� to the ruling MPLA as an old ally fighting ‘imperialism’.

One area South Africa will need to approach with caution is the proximity with regimes that are autocratic, unaccountable and corrupt, while carefully balancing the costs of engaging with a reformed autocracy like Angola, where democratic processes are all but emblematic. Pretoria will also need to consider the impact that prioritizing a policy that considers economic imperatives over ethical responsibilities could have on its international image and what message this is sending out to other undemocratic regimes on the continent. Giving greater legitimacy to a country like Angola where elections and legislation are ornamental and part of the trappings of democracy without the substance, will establish a dangerous precedent. With the rise of hybrid regimes throughout the continent, where they are neither autocracies nor democracies but somewhere in between, it will be easier to follow the policy of “not visiting dictatorships�. Furthermore, South-South cooperation, in particular with initiatives like IBSA (heralding cooperation between India, Brazil and South Africa) and strengthening ties with China, has already begun to take precedence over ties with the West and the conditionalities on democratization dropped.

In what could turn out to be a brilliant strategic move for the Zuma Administration, or a cursed blessing that will cause Pretoria greater long-term difficulties, renewed South Africa-Angola relations have the propensity of providing a new era for the Southern Africa region with two regional powers cooperating diplomatically and promoting regional trade. However, Angola will only commit to a regional initiative, be it in economic or peace and security spheres, if it can play a leading role and not live in Pretoria’s shadow, in the tradition of engaging on the basis of dominance rather than equality. Whatever the challenges in reviving this relationship may be, both Pretoria and Luanda have more to benefit than lose from a strategic rapprochement.

Paula Roque, senior researcher, African Security Analysis Programme, ISS Tshwane (Pretoria)

In a highly strategic move, President Jacob Zuma paid a high-profile state visit to Angola, the first since his inauguration as South Africa’s head of state, with the aim of securing economic and political cooperation with Africa’s second largest oil exporter and an emerging diplomatic heavyweight. This visit was significant for two reasons: it was a revival of a historical alliance that had since 1994 deteriorated into mutual antagonism and an opportunity to bring together two important hegemons in Sub-Saharan Africa. Zuma’s delegation walked away with a joint project between oil-giant Sonangol and PetroSA; memorandums of understanding on diverse sectors (trade, air services, diplomatic relations etc.) and guarantees of reconstruction contracts in low-income housing, telecommunications, roads and dams. However, engaging Luanda economically is always a political affair and apart from the highly beneficial economic deals, what remains to be determined are the political trade-offs that Pretoria had to make. 

Angola is a highly complex country to engage diplomatically. It does not succumb to external pressures, given that it is not a major recipient of foreign aid and has the diplomatic clout of its mineral wealth. It does not react well to impositions of any sort and its pragmatism allows it to engage with divergent global powers, even those like the US and China that had previously supported the ruling party’s arch –enemy UNITA. The tendency to operate in isolation is also a characteristic of its ‘exceptionalism’ where Luanda prefers to take a ‘statist’ approach rather than a multi-lateral consensual approach. Furthermore, the need to be ‘a big fish in a small pond’, to determine the rules of engagement, in having impenetrable influence in certain capitals, and not placing itself in a position of weakness politically, economically or militarily, are additional elements of Luanda’s petro-capitalist power. All these will prove significant challenges to Pretoria.

Given the diverse investment opportunities, the great reconstruction needs of Angola and the wealth of resources (oil, diamonds, arable land, natural water) any economic venture into the country is attractive, however difficult doing business with Luanda may be. Impediments include bureaucratic hurdles, lack of transparency, corruption and patronalism, different legal frameworks, an incomprehensible financial system, language, and political culture. However, the potential for complementarity between the two is significant and desirable by ensuring prosperity through combining the strengths of each economy, while promoting regional integration. One area where SA companies could venture into, which would also promote regional trade, are trans-national links like roads and railway systems.

Another area where both South Africa and Angola could cooperate regionally and continentally is in the area of peace and security. Luanda currently boasts the best-resourced battle –trained armed forces in the region that, together with the airlift capacity of Angola, could provide precious military assistance in peacekeeping missions. This area of cooperation could also become the greatest point of contention, with both Luanda and Pretoria taking two very distinct diplomatic and political strategies to conflict mediation, as seen in Zimbabwe and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Luanda has tended to prioritize relations with Harare and Kinshasa on a narrow basis, by offering military assistance and troops, while remaining uncommitted to political solutions. It is worth noting that several peace negotiation rounds and agreements in Angola failed to bring a political settlement to one of Africa’s deadliest conflicts and that it was only through Dos Santos’ openly-belligerent tactics that “peace through war� was achieved in 2002, with Savimbi’s death. One of the contributing factors to the frosty relations between Luanda and Pretoria for the last 15 years was the fact that South Africa pushed for consensus and political accommodation between dos Santos and the late Unita leader Jonas Savimbi, rather than showing “loyalty� to the ruling MPLA as an old ally fighting ‘imperialism’.

One area South Africa will need to approach with caution is the proximity with regimes that are autocratic, unaccountable and corrupt, while carefully balancing the costs of engaging with a reformed autocracy like Angola, where democratic processes are all but emblematic. Pretoria will also need to consider the impact that prioritizing a policy that considers economic imperatives over ethical responsibilities could have on its international image and what message this is sending out to other undemocratic regimes on the continent. Giving greater legitimacy to a country like Angola where elections and legislation are ornamental and part of the trappings of democracy without the substance, will establish a dangerous precedent. With the rise of hybrid regimes throughout the continent, where they are neither autocracies nor democracies but somewhere in between, it will be easier to follow the policy of “not visiting dictatorships�. Furthermore, South-South cooperation, in particular with initiatives like IBSA (heralding cooperation between India, Brazil and South Africa) and strengthening ties with China, has already begun to take precedence over ties with the West and the conditionalities on democratization dropped.

In what could turn out to be a brilliant strategic move for the Zuma Administration, or a cursed blessing that will cause Pretoria greater long-term difficulties, renewed South Africa-Angola relations have the propensity of providing a new era for the Southern Africa region with two regional powers cooperating diplomatically and promoting regional trade. However, Angola will only commit to a regional initiative, be it in economic or peace and security spheres, if it can play a leading role and not live in Pretoria’s shadow, in the tradition of engaging on the basis of dominance rather than equality. Whatever the challenges in reviving this relationship may be, both Pretoria and Luanda have more to benefit than lose from a strategic rapprochement.

Dr Annie Barbara Chikwanha, Senior Research Fellow, African Human Security Initiative, ISS Addis Ababa

Key issues that are clear from the review of crime and criminal justice systems conducted by the Africa Human Security Initiative (AHSI) network revealed that African governments’ priorities regarding securing the lives of their citizens need readjustment.

First of all, crime victimization surveys conducted in three west African countries that are all at very different phases of the democratic transition - Sierra Leone, Benin and Mali - revealed that what the ordinary citizens consider to be debilitating crimes are those that are largely central to their livelihoods. For instance, the act of constantly guarding livestock deters one from reaching his/her maximum development potential yet the focus on fighting crime tends to be concentrated on the urban citizens whose behaviour determines foreign direct investment and tourist inflows.

The same logic used in economic growth appears to appeal to the security architects; that security will trickle down to the poor and to the periphery. Is it a wonder then that justice has remained elusive for the majority of Africans - rural and urban alike? Even though there are variations that exist amongst African nations because of their different backgrounds in terms of cultural values and political ideas, we still find more convergence in terms of justice delivery deficiencies.

How then do we assess the efficacy of Africa’s criminal justice systems? We can fragment this into manageable proportions and look at the forward and backward linkages in the criminal justice process such as policing, prosecution, the judiciary, prison service, customary justice and juvenile justice. But these components share the same institutional weaknesses: poor funding, inaccessible data, and inadequate remuneration for staff, poor training, poor infrastructure, and human rights abuses. It is difficult to gauge the quality of justice that the citizens experience in such circumstances.

All African countries are battling with high and increasing crime but hard data is unfortunately not released to the public in most of the countries. Corruption, pervasive in and outside government, in the electoral process and public service delivery, is the one crime every official talks about. Anti-corruption and oversight institutions like the Anti-Corruption Commission, Parliament, the Auditor-General and the Ombudsman are under-resourced and under-skilled and therefore proved ineffective in combating the national scourge. Equally problematic are criminal activities relating to drug and human trafficking, money laundering, illegal migration but, like other crimes, there is inadequate data on the scale of the problems. Authorities also have inadequate capacities to deal with these pressing problems.

Part of the problem is that there is no diligence in compiling crime statistics. And with the usual cultural interpretations of what constitutes a crime, it is frightening to think of what those with criminal tendencies get away with. There is no justification for crime figures being a state secret. The system and the public can only fight what they know.

AHSI’s findings concur with few other researchers who have observed that most of Africa’s citizens rely on and opt for customary justice for a number of reasons. The most disturbing being the prohibitive costs of the modern formal justice system, which is absent in any case in most of the areas. As has been touted by other scholars, criminal justice agencies are organized sequentially — “output� from one agency is “input� to the next — and this alone is a major deterrent to citizens whose daily life consists of grinding poverty and counting bus-fare for the duration of the month. ‘

Processing security and justice’ is just not an option. The input/output connections are just too costly and often fraught with mystery and mistrust such that it is easier to opt for the familiar and quick customary system. It is against this background that we can read the governments’ response as indifference to the cohabitation of common and customary law across all African countries. This perpetuates the niggling absurdity whereby the constitutionally recognised legal system is known and accessed by the few while the majority mostly rural people know, understand and access customary law.

The criminalisation of political behaviour is also another category of crime that is fluidly defined and heavily punished in all unconstitutional ways possible on the continent. African citizens and the courts lack a clear understanding of the so called ‘seditious’ criminal laws’ requirements and prohibitions as these are not usually explicitly stated. Worst of all, the statutes do not always entail some verifiable standards of guilt.

Substantive criminal laws define crimes and may establish punishments and ‘criminal procedure’ describes the process through which the criminal laws are enforced. Unfortunately, the procedures through which many African governments enforce substantive laws are too often fraught with irregularities infused with innuendo and vilification. This blurring makes it easier to frame any emerging power centre and dialogue as a threat to national security hence all legal procedures need not apply in the prescribed manner.

Africa’s criminal justice systems will remain chronically weak if the customary and formal justice systems are not harmonized in a way that complies with modern constitutions, international standards and protocols that are designed to uphold the rule of law and safeguard human rights. Resolving this legal trifurcation is not an insurmountable challenge and delayed reforms will continue to compromise justice delivery severely.

Dr Annie Barbara Chikwanha, Senior Research Fellow, African Human Security Initiative, ISS Addis Ababa

Key issues that are clear from the review of crime and criminal justice systems conducted by the Africa Human Security Initiative (AHSI) network revealed that African governments’ priorities regarding securing the lives of their citizens need readjustment.

First of all, crime victimization surveys conducted in three west African countries that are all at very different phases of the democratic transition - Sierra Leone, Benin and Mali - revealed that what the ordinary citizens consider to be debilitating crimes are those that are largely central to their livelihoods. For instance, the act of constantly guarding livestock deters one from reaching his/her maximum development potential yet the focus on fighting crime tends to be concentrated on the urban citizens whose behaviour determines foreign direct investment and tourist inflows.

The same logic used in economic growth appears to appeal to the security architects; that security will trickle down to the poor and to the periphery. Is it a wonder then that justice has remained elusive for the majority of Africans - rural and urban alike? Even though there are variations that exist amongst African nations because of their different backgrounds in terms of cultural values and political ideas, we still find more convergence in terms of justice delivery deficiencies.

How then do we assess the efficacy of Africa’s criminal justice systems? We can fragment this into manageable proportions and look at the forward and backward linkages in the criminal justice process such as policing, prosecution, the judiciary, prison service, customary justice and juvenile justice. But these components share the same institutional weaknesses: poor funding, inaccessible data, and inadequate remuneration for staff, poor training, poor infrastructure, and human rights abuses. It is difficult to gauge the quality of justice that the citizens experience in such circumstances.

All African countries are battling with high and increasing crime but hard data is unfortunately not released to the public in most of the countries. Corruption, pervasive in and outside government, in the electoral process and public service delivery, is the one crime every official talks about. Anti-corruption and oversight institutions like the Anti-Corruption Commission, Parliament, the Auditor-General and the Ombudsman are under-resourced and under-skilled and therefore proved ineffective in combating the national scourge. Equally problematic are criminal activities relating to drug and human trafficking, money laundering, illegal migration but, like other crimes, there is inadequate data on the scale of the problems. Authorities also have inadequate capacities to deal with these pressing problems.

Part of the problem is that there is no diligence in compiling crime statistics. And with the usual cultural interpretations of what constitutes a crime, it is frightening to think of what those with criminal tendencies get away with. There is no justification for crime figures being a state secret. The system and the public can only fight what they know.

AHSI’s findings concur with few other researchers who have observed that most of Africa’s citizens rely on and opt for customary justice for a number of reasons. The most disturbing being the prohibitive costs of the modern formal justice system, which is absent in any case in most of the areas. As has been touted by other scholars, criminal justice agencies are organized sequentially — “output� from one agency is “input� to the next — and this alone is a major deterrent to citizens whose daily life consists of grinding poverty and counting bus-fare for the duration of the month. ‘

Processing security and justice’ is just not an option. The input/output connections are just too costly and often fraught with mystery and mistrust such that it is easier to opt for the familiar and quick customary system. It is against this background that we can read the governments’ response as indifference to the cohabitation of common and customary law across all African countries. This perpetuates the niggling absurdity whereby the constitutionally recognised legal system is known and accessed by the few while the majority mostly rural people know, understand and access customary law.

The criminalisation of political behaviour is also another category of crime that is fluidly defined and heavily punished in all unconstitutional ways possible on the continent. African citizens and the courts lack a clear understanding of the so called ‘seditious’ criminal laws’ requirements and prohibitions as these are not usually explicitly stated. Worst of all, the statutes do not always entail some verifiable standards of guilt.

Substantive criminal laws define crimes and may establish punishments and ‘criminal procedure’ describes the process through which the criminal laws are enforced. Unfortunately, the procedures through which many African governments enforce substantive laws are too often fraught with irregularities infused with innuendo and vilification. This blurring makes it easier to frame any emerging power centre and dialogue as a threat to national security hence all legal procedures need not apply in the prescribed manner.

Africa’s criminal justice systems will remain chronically weak if the customary and formal justice systems are not harmonized in a way that complies with modern constitutions, international standards and protocols that are designed to uphold the rule of law and safeguard human rights. Resolving this legal trifurcation is not an insurmountable challenge and delayed reforms will continue to compromise justice delivery severely.

Dr Annie Barbara Chikwanha, Senior Research Fellow, African Human Security Initiative, ISS Addis Ababa

Key issues that are clear from the review of crime and criminal justice systems conducted by the Africa Human Security Initiative (AHSI) network revealed that African governments’ priorities regarding securing the lives of their citizens need readjustment.

First of all, crime victimization surveys conducted in three west African countries that are all at very different phases of the democratic transition - Sierra Leone, Benin and Mali - revealed that what the ordinary citizens consider to be debilitating crimes are those that are largely central to their livelihoods. For instance, the act of constantly guarding livestock deters one from reaching his/her maximum development potential yet the focus on fighting crime tends to be concentrated on the urban citizens whose behaviour determines foreign direct investment and tourist inflows.

The same logic used in economic growth appears to appeal to the security architects; that security will trickle down to the poor and to the periphery. Is it a wonder then that justice has remained elusive for the majority of Africans - rural and urban alike? Even though there are variations that exist amongst African nations because of their different backgrounds in terms of cultural values and political ideas, we still find more convergence in terms of justice delivery deficiencies.

How then do we assess the efficacy of Africa’s criminal justice systems? We can fragment this into manageable proportions and look at the forward and backward linkages in the criminal justice process such as policing, prosecution, the judiciary, prison service, customary justice and juvenile justice. But these components share the same institutional weaknesses: poor funding, inaccessible data, and inadequate remuneration for staff, poor training, poor infrastructure, and human rights abuses. It is difficult to gauge the quality of justice that the citizens experience in such circumstances.

All African countries are battling with high and increasing crime but hard data is unfortunately not released to the public in most of the countries. Corruption, pervasive in and outside government, in the electoral process and public service delivery, is the one crime every official talks about. Anti-corruption and oversight institutions like the Anti-Corruption Commission, Parliament, the Auditor-General and the Ombudsman are under-resourced and under-skilled and therefore proved ineffective in combating the national scourge. Equally problematic are criminal activities relating to drug and human trafficking, money laundering, illegal migration but, like other crimes, there is inadequate data on the scale of the problems. Authorities also have inadequate capacities to deal with these pressing problems.

Part of the problem is that there is no diligence in compiling crime statistics. And with the usual cultural interpretations of what constitutes a crime, it is frightening to think of what those with criminal tendencies get away with. There is no justification for crime figures being a state secret. The system and the public can only fight what they know.

AHSI’s findings concur with few other researchers who have observed that most of Africa’s citizens rely on and opt for customary justice for a number of reasons. The most disturbing being the prohibitive costs of the modern formal justice system, which is absent in any case in most of the areas. As has been touted by other scholars, criminal justice agencies are organized sequentially � “output� from one agency is “input� to the next � and this alone is a major deterrent to citizens whose daily life consists of grinding poverty and counting bus-fare for the duration of the month. ‘

Processing security and justice’ is just not an option. The input/output connections are just too costly and often fraught with mystery and mistrust such that it is easier to opt for the familiar and quick customary system. It is against this background that we can read the governments’ response as indifference to the cohabitation of common and customary law across all African countries. This perpetuates the niggling absurdity whereby the constitutionally recognised legal system is known and accessed by the few while the majority mostly rural people know, understand and access customary law.

The criminalisation of political behaviour is also another category of crime that is fluidly defined and heavily punished in all unconstitutional ways possible on the continent. African citizens and the courts lack a clear understanding of the so called ‘seditious’ criminal laws’ requirements and prohibitions as these are not usually explicitly stated. Worst of all, the statutes do not always entail some verifiable standards of guilt.

Substantive criminal laws define crimes and may establish punishments and ‘criminal procedure’ describes the process through which the criminal laws are enforced. Unfortunately, the procedures through which many African governments enforce substantive laws are too often fraught with irregularities infused with innuendo and vilification. This blurring makes it easier to frame any emerging power centre and dialogue as a threat to national security hence all legal procedures need not apply in the prescribed manner.

Africa’s criminal justice systems will remain chronically weak if the customary and formal justice systems are not harmonized in a way that complies with modern constitutions, international standards and protocols that are designed to uphold the rule of law and safeguard human rights. Resolving this legal trifurcation is not an insurmountable challenge and delayed reforms will continue to compromise justice delivery severely.

Dear reader

The love-hate relationship between France and its former colonies in Africa has played an important role these last few decades in defi ning political and economic events in a large chunk of Africa.

Talking to people in Dakar or Abidjan, one discovers a younger generation of Francophone Africans looking towards France with a mixture of admiration and resentment.

The resentment towards France, exacerbated by the treatment of African immigrants in France, makes many people turn to America as the new Promised Land, probably even more so with Barack Obama at the helm. But because of the real or perceived diffi culty for most to start learning another language, having grown up with French, some prefer going to other French-speaking developed countries, such as Quebec in Canada for higher learning.

Yet I often see the older generation - who grew up with textbooks teaching them of ‘our ancestors, the Gauls…’ - still prefer to watch the evening France 2 news bulletin on television, and follow French elections with more emotion and interest than any election in their neighbouring states.

How else do you explain that the fi rst gesture after every coup d’état is to cut the Radio France International radio signal? It is because the decision-makers in Francophone Africa rely mostly on French media for their information and believe that France’s reaction in every confl ict is paramount.

France’s military presence is still a reality in too many places in Africa. One can’t blame Africans for accusing France of continuing to prop up unpopular leaders like Idriss Déby and the deceased Gabonese leader, Omar Bongo Ondimba.

In his book L’Afrique sans la France - histoire d’un divorce consommé, Jean-Paul Ngoupandé warned his fellow Africans years ago against blaming France for every confl ict in Africa, calling it the Don Quixote-syndrome. He is right, even if his book is also full of that special reverence for France - to be expected from a former prime minister of a small former French colony like the Central African Republic.

What about French public opinion? The starry-eyed, hardworking coopérants in Africa - those with the sandals and beads hosting cultural evenings at the Alliance Française in Niamey or Antananarivo - love Africa. But that relationship can never really escape from being patronising.

Some will recall that for many years, the bi-annual French version of the Commonwealth summits was called Les Sommets France-Afrique (France-Africa Summit). It was a huge event with the French president calling together all the African presidents for a lecture. Until the day someone in the French foreign ministry realised France is only one country and there are more than 20 Francophone African countries. Now it is called Les Sommets des chefs d’état de l’Afrique et de France (The summit of heads of state of Africa and of France). It was and still is something of an aberration and is overtaken by the probably more useful Francophonie with 56 member states.

But perhaps one should not put the blame here on the shoulder of France alone. African leaders - and not just Francophones - contribute to this notion of dealing collectively with one country. This is evidenced by similar events like Africa-China, Africa-Japan and Africa- Turkey summits. Tehran is said to be preparing for its own Africa-Iran summit in the near future.

Many commentators - like our writers in this issue of the-african.org - have recalled how the late Omar Bongo Ondimba personifi ed the incestuous and obsolete link between a certain generation of Africans and France.

Gabon, like Côte d’Ivoire under Félix Houphouët Boigny, or Senegal under Léopold Sédar Senghor, was usually the fi rst port of call for any newly elected French president. Dubious business and political links fl ourished. Who will forget the scandal of the expensive Italian suits fl own to Gabon by the couturier Francesco Smalto and all that was revealed during l’Affaire Elf - a saga involving the French oil company, former foreign minister Roland Dumas, frigates bought in Taiwan and a series of corrupt French business people?

Bongo is now gone, like contemporaries and predecessors Houphouët, Senghor and the more vicious ones like Mobutu Sese Seko, Jean-Bedel Bokassa and Gnassingbe Eyadema. Those French leaders who helped them loot and keep their people in poverty are also on their way out.

Francophone Africans should stop looking towards France as the only role model. Luckily, this is happening with the new generation. The future is a whole new place and Africans will redefi ne themselves, regardless of what language we speak.

Liesl Louw-Vaudran
Editor