Despite major strides African governments have taken in holding scheduled elections in the last two decades, there are still those who regard the exercise as a favour to their people and foreign governments, says Keto Segwai

Africa never ceases to amaze. Just the other day, President François Bozize of the Central African Republic (CAR) threatened to call off the elections scheduled for March 2010 if somebody else did not fund the process.

Fortunately, some donors that included the European Union and the United States stepped in to avert this unwarranted affront on democracy, by offering to fund the CAR poll. Admittedly, CAR could be one of the poorest countries in Africa, but it is also true that the country is endowed with considerable resources that include virgin rain forests, minerals such as diamonds, exotic wildlife such as lowland gorillas and forest elephants, and a great agricultural potential – and of course, the country’s critical human resource that stands at 4.4 million people.

The major letdown in this equation has undoubtedly been the country’s political leadership over the years, specifi cally its reluctance to allow the citizens to freely choose their true leaders. The country has had four coups since independence. It has been lead by one of the continent’s more bizarre men – the self-styled Emperor Jean-Bédel Bokassa, whose reign was not only the embodiment of brutality, but also that of absurdity.

The CAR soldiers have blurred lines between the barracks and the corridors of elective offi ce. Bozize has a chequered history himself. In 2003, he staged a coup against Ange-Félix Patassé, the victor of the 1993 poll. But with military takeovers becoming increasingly out of vogue and being punitively censured by the AU’s Peace and Security Council, Bozize instituted an election in 2005, which he won. When an election is a right, Despite major strides African governments have taken in holding scheduled elections in the last two decades, there are still those who regard the exercise as a favour to their people and foreign governments, says Keto Segwai It is the impunity with which most African leaders try to thwart the electoral process that amazes. Ironically, the determination to cling on to power by frustrating a fair and free poll is met by an equal resolve from rivals to crowbar the incumbent out of power. Hence the never-ending cycle of coups and counter-coups.

Notwithstanding the shenanigans by Bozize, the majority of African countries that were scheduled to conduct their elections in 2009 did so, though with mixed results.

Algeria set the ball rolling in April by holding their presidential elections that were won expectedly by incumbent Abdul-Aziz Boutefl ika. These were followed by the highly charged South African elections that saw former vice-president Jacob Zuma ascending to power.

In May, Malawi went to the polls, the fourth since the fall of the long-reigning life president, Kamuzu Banda. Bingu wa Mutharika parried with John Tembo (of the Banda era) and won, after the two-term president Bakili Muluzi was technically shut out from the race. In early July, Republic of the Congo took its turn at the poll, culminating in the long-serving Denis Sassou- Nguesso retaining the presidency. The main opposition candidate, Pascal Lissouba, was excluded from that election and opposition had boycotted the poll. Still in July, Guinea-Bissau also held an election amid a tense political atmosphere following the assassinations of both the president, João Viera and the army chief, General Tagme Na Wai. Malam Bacai Sanha defeated Kumba Yala (Mohamed Yala Embalo).

In August, Gabon called an ad hoc election following the death of the long-reigning Omar Bongo. The late president’s son, Ali Bongo won the subsequent election against the opposition’s Pierre Mamboundou and Mba Obame. Africa’s oldest multi-party democracy, Botswana went to the poll in October and Ian Khama’s party, which has been in power since independence in 1966, won against the opposition’s Otsweletse Moupo and Gilson Saleshando.

The month of October also saw the incumbent Tunisian president, Ben Ali winning by 89.62% against Mohamed Bouchiha and others. Towards the close of October, the Mozambican president, Armando Guebuza once again defeated former rebel leader Alphonso Dlakhama. As we were going to print, Namibia was in the throes of pitched electioneering slated for 28 November, with Hifi kepunye Pohamba paring-off brickbats from his erstwhile comrades, Hidipo Hamutenya and Ben Ulenga .

In Equatorial Guinea, Obiang Nguema had on 16 October caught his political opponents off guard by bringing the dates of the poll initially scheduled for 2010, to 29 November. Obiang, who has been in power since 1979, was expected to spar with opposition leader, Plácido Micó Abogo. However, other scheduled African elections failed to take off in Angola, Senegal, Niger, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Madagascar and the autonomous region of Somaliland.

While acknowledging that the road to democratisation is a perilous one for many an African government, the least they could do is to respect the right of their people to elect their leaders.

Paula Roque, researcher, African Security Analysis Programme, ISS Pretoria

Under the auspices of an African solution to the intractable Darfur conflict, with the African Union (AU) preparing to take on a more robust role in monitoring Sudan’s future, lurks the reality of a half-cast proposition of justice and reconciliation. While the AU Panel on Darfur (AUPD) presents a remarkable roadmap for the stabilization of Darfur and a comprehensive package of transitional justice mechanisms, it prescribes a national political solution and confines justice to only one region of Sudan. If, as the report states, the greater problem of Sudan relates to the State and policies resulting from narrow elite interests, which has catalyzed conflicts all over the country, then justice and peace cannot be negotiated bilaterally as was done in the South, East and Darfur. Pursuing justice, reconciliation and peace is a transformational process that should not be attempted in a piecemeal fashion, but in a holistic manner within a national framework.

The process of political liberalization, the construction of an accountable, equalitarian and democratic society needs to be accompanied by a genuine national and government- endorsed reconciliation and justice process. Only then will it become apparent that political calculations, concerted efforts towards state denial, the sanitization of armed movements as liberation groups, elite bargaining and impunity, distorted institutions, and divisive social engineering projects have been set aside and the nation begins inaugurating an era of transformation. What is needed is a sense of common purpose and a defined future. Even if Sudan becomes two separate countries in 2011, for the purpose of internal stability, cohesion, and security, issues around reconciliation, justice, land and citizenship need to be prioritized.

This is a much needed debate as Sudan’s political storm is growing and will gain further momentum with two major events, perhaps bringing to a climax the political developments since independence. On the horizon are national elections in April 2010 and the self-determination referendum for the South in January 2011. It is in this highly tense context that the AU panel report - mandated to evaluate the Darfur crisis and propose a set of solutions to address the issues of justice, peace and reconciliation in Sudan’s western region – is being received in the country.

Within the current context several are the challenges towards the implementation of the AUDP report recommendations, the most immediate one relating to the issue of timing. If there is an attempt to implement the AUDP before the elections then only 4 months remain; after the elections there will be a new ruling composition to negotiate with and if results are accepted and the process successful all national attention will be turned towards the referendum in January 2011. After the referendum the country could be facing its biggest crisis yet and attempts to stabilize Darfur may fail with other events catalyzing problematic developments in the entire country.

While the establishment of a Global Political Agreement is fundamental for any long-term stability in Darfur, the peace process will face many difficulties, including the fragmentation of the rebel groups and absence of well-formulated negotiating positions. The roadmap proposed by the AUDP towards a framework agreement will mean addressing the needs, values and interests expressed by the rebels, civil society, the IDP and refugee population, and other stakeholders. However, if the GPA results in a power-sharing agreement then this could contradict the process of competitive democratic elections of April next year.

One of the main recommendations of the AUDP report is the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which will prove to be just as problematic as many judicial proceedings given the lack of institutions, leadership, and accepted narratives at a national level. The objective of a truth commission is to get as much as possible a record of people’s perceptions, stories, myths, and experiences throughout the years of conflict aimed at creating a national record of the past to counter any process of state denial or historical distortions. This is especially problematic in identity conflicts, and is especially difficult in a country like Sudan that still faces a national identity crisis and the polarization of identities that has led to contrasting visions of what Sudan should look like. In addition, the commission’s findings could also provide for evidence to be used against potential perpetrators in criminal proceedings.

An important aspect of the integrated justice package are traditional justice mechanisms for Darfur, which could take the form of the Judiyya that is facilitated by elders and reparations are paid through blood money. However, dealing with certain crimes, especially those related to sexual violence, at a local level is not ideal. In addition, many of these traditional structures have been tainted and manipulated by years of brutal conflict, through cooptation and politicization, which would make the impartiality and credibility questionable.

The quest for justice among displaced and destitute communities comes in many forms , but one main requisite is social and economic justice. This recommendation is very important but it would have to be tied to a return and resettlement process, to land security and legislation, and to the disarmament and stabilization of all areas. These are prerequisites for any process that would work towards social improvements and more sustainable livelihoods.

However, the most problematic recommendations relate to the need for Legal Reform and the establishment of a Hybrid Court that would allow non-nationals to participate in the judicial process. However, without the adoption of necessary legislation to allow for foreign judges then the creation of a hybrid tribunal becomes impossible. Equally, without the reform of certain laws and the removal of immunities (as stated in the National Security Forces Act) prosecuting individuals in the armed forces is equally difficult.

While the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005 initiated the transformation of Sudan, with remarkable challenges being overcome by the National Congress Party and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, the country is still facing an uncertain future. Discussions for post-referendum arrangements are only beginning even as attempts to make unity have all but been abandoned. In the remaining 16 months of the CPA, the Sudanese leadership needs to proceed with moderation, and the belief in the possibility of a peaceful, negotiated and consensual outcome in January 2011. However, this will not be enough. Sudan needs more time for the transformation to occur, internally or as two separate sovereign entities, with a second transition being an option. Within this second stage of transformation Sudan’s future will depend not only on lessons from the past but on how it chooses to address and deal with the past.

Jamila El Abdellaoui, Senior Researcher, Conflict Prevention Programme, ISS Addis Ababa Office

This year, 2009 turned out to be the year during which Burundi’s piecemeal peace process finally drew to a close. More than 25 years after its creation, the Palipehutu-FNL – Burundi’s last remaining rebel movement - was registered as the country’s 42nd political party. Many senior members of the movement – now named simply FNL to allow its political birth - took up various positions in the Government of Burundi (GoB) and thousands of its combatants either integrated into the national army or the police force or went through a disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process. Burundi’s peace, a culmination of African efforts that commenced as far back as the mid-1990s, appears to be complete.

This milestone – though obviously welcomed – did not receive the attention it would have if the country had not long since entered into an election mode. Burundi is scheduled to hold its second post-transitional elections in mid-2010 and unofficial electioneering reportedly commenced as early as 2008. This eagerness can partly be explained by a general awareness among political parties that the ruling party may not be guaranteed victory at the polls this time around. The CNDD-FDD, itself a rebel movement until 5 years ago, inherited a country with numerous challenges, the most important of which related to the challenges of state craft and ending the cycle of poverty. It has been tried and tested for almost five years and in some cases found wanting, as could have been expected. In addition to this, numerous new political parties have been established, not least the FNL, which is regarded by many as serious competition for the ruling party. 

Unfortunately, post-conflict reconstruction efforts in Burundi did not succeed in adequately preparing the young democracy for the upcoming competition at the ballot box. Various initiatives have been undertaken to promote and facilitate dialogue between different stakeholders, including the political factions in the country. This is especially important given the fact that lack of dialogue, resulting in heightened misunderstanding and tensions at critical moments in the country’s history, have allowed waves of violence to occur in Burundi in the past. The 2010 elections could arguably be considered as another critical moment for Burundi although a common understanding of the rules and value of the electoral contest among political players appears to be absent. 

As a result, tensions have been running high, further exacerbated by restrictions imposed on both political parties and civil society organisations by the ruling party. Human Rights Watch reported the arrest of more than a hundred political opponents between June 2008 and April 2009. Other reports claim the (re-)arming of militias by several political parties as tools to intimidate the electorate. The fact that the reintegration phase of the country’s recently completed DDR process has largely failed, especially concerning those returning to urban areas, explains the availability of some former combatants to join such groups. Lastly, the ruling party as well as other political parties, including the FNL, appear to suffer from serious internal rifts, something that has plagued Burundi in the past. As is well-known, weak political parties do not augur well for a democratisation process.

It has been argued that country-wide violence in Burundi as a result of the elections is unlikely - an argument that is explained by the conflict trajectory in Burundi. The populace is generally tired of the insecurity that has prevailed in the country for so long. Nevertheless, recent developments are worrisome and in a country as small and densely populated as Burundi, violent clashes between armed supporters of political factions could easily reverse the country’s path towards sustainable peace. Moreover, it should be noted that Burundi is just one of four key countries in the Great Lakes Region – besides Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda – that is scheduled to hold elections in the next two years. The various electoral contests are likely to have an impact on a region already suffering from lingering tension.

Based on this, it can be argued that Burundi is a classroom example of a country at potential risk of election-related violence and the question therefore is how relevant international actors are contributing towards the prevention of such a situation. At present, its engagement at least appears to be coordinated. For instance, towards the end of August when relevant political parties still had not agreed on a draft revised electoral code – an issue that prevented the country’s electoral commission from commencing with basic preparations for the polls – various foreign missions in the country issued a communiqué urging the parties to reach a consensus. However, other efforts could be undertaken at this stage. Promoting dialogue between political factions could still have an effect and provide a possible alternative to a resort to violence. Furthermore, Burundi provides an opportunity for the AU, for instance, to move beyond its conventional approach to elections, which has centred on deploying election observers or facilitating an agreement to end an already existing election-related dispute. The continental body has a long track-record of peacemaking efforts in the country, providing a leverage that could be used to engage political factions more rigorously. It is therefore noteworthy that a recent communiqué of the AU Peace and Security Council urges the deployment of such a mission. This could possibly be coordinated with efforts from relevant countries in the region that successfully facilitated the negotiations between the GoB and FNL. Supporting initiatives aimed at building public trust, especially in the urban areas, is key as well as they could still positively affect the current apprehension that appears to be prevailing. Efforts towards building the mediation capacity of selected community leaders and other influential people should also be encouraged.

Lastly, it should be noted that Burundi’s upcoming election is not only a test for the Barundi, but also for those organisations and structures put in place to deal with the prevention of conflict, especially election-related conflict. This issue has received more attention after experiences of violence triggered by elections in numerous African countries in the recent past. In the case of Burundi, it is impossible to argue that there were no warning signs.