ISS Today, 31 Mar 2010 written by Marcel R.D. Chirwa, Senior Research Fellow, Head of Africa Peace Support Trainers’ Association, APSTA Secretariat , ISS Addis Ababa, Free and fair elections should ideally only take place when there is a stable security environment. Many fear that the upcoming elections in Sudan, from 11 to 13 April, would lead to unrestrained competition and increase conflict in the country. Worries that the 2009 International Criminal Court indictment of President Omar al Bashir on charges relating to Darfur would undermine the comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) and the election schedule, and further destabilize the country, have so far proven to be unfounded.

President Bashir, though politically weakened in the eyes of some observers, has used the indictment to rally national political forces to his cause while simultaneously dismissing the charges as ill-founded and hypocritical. As Simon Tisdall of the Guardian in the United Kingdom wrote: “it’s a remarkable prospect, and one that has been largely overlooked by a western world accustomed to criticizing, not celebrating Africa. Barring a last-minute disaster, the people of Sudan will go to the polls next month to elect a president, a national legislature, regional governors, and the leadership of the semi-autonomous south. The elections are a way-marker on a long, incomplete journey”. The military option failed, on both sides.

Throughout its independent history, Sudan has been characterized by multiple levels of conflict and by tensions between the mostly Arab and Islamic northern part of the country, and the non-Arab and non-Muslim southern part. However, a confluence of interests among previously warring individuals and groups is feeding confidence that the elections will be a success. A key building block was last February’s preliminary peace treaty between the government and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), Darfur’s largest armed group. Government officials signed the deal with the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM), an umbrella group of small factions in Qatar, weeks after Khartoum inked a now faltering accord with Darfur’s powerful insurgent JEM.

The prospects of stability in Sudan are related to the prospects of change. If Sudan is encouraged by the African Union (AU) to change in ways that promote grater cooperation through the adoption of harmonized and coordination of policies in a context of reduced challenges to the elections with greater protection of all the Sudanese people without discrimination, there are good prospects for stability. The keen interest of the government of Southern Sudan, created under the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, (CPA) for moving without delay towards January’s independence referendum, is another reason why the election campaign is proceeding smoothly. President al-Bashir, has a head start in the presidential race due to his access to state media, his opponents say.

There will be spoilers in this process, those who see the benefit in instability and are enemies of peace. Peace negotiations have been taking place for months that deal reached is an important step. Sudan’s Vice President Ali Osman Mohamed Taha said in the Qatari capital Doha, a few weeks ago “We call on all movements and factions including JEM to join in serious and honest negotiations as soon as possible,”.

The UN has not become directly involved but works and supports the AU which has in turn supports the Intergovernmental Agency for Development (IGAD). President Bashir now has bigger issues to attend to, occupied by elections this year and the real prospect of southern secession after the referendum of self-determination scheduled for 2011.

Since 2005, President Bashir’s ruling National Congress Party (NCP) and the Southern People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), led by Salva Kiir, have been locked in an uneasy power-sharing arrangement. Now they have found common purpose: elections. The SPLM and NCP have been negotiating hard on a host of bilateral issues. The imminence of the election has concentrated their minds and a number of deals have been struck in quick succession. This shows that when necessary, they can do business.

The AU can be much more confident that the two parties will be able to negotiate the arrangements for the referendum and what follows without a catastrophic breakdown. But the role played by the AU in Sudan is concentrated in the Darfur Region while little attention is being paid to the bigger picture in the Sudan as a whole.

The NCP, running on a pragmatic, nationalist ticket emphasizing economic growth, is widely expected to emerge after the elections as the largest party, with President Bashir returning to the presidency. If so, this outcome will also be due in part to President Bashir’s unexpectedly conciliatory stance on secession. He has said he would be the first to recognize its independence.

The AU does not, for example recognize Somaliland’s independence. What will be the AU position if Southern Sudan opts for secession?
Sources indicate that it could still all go wrong. Plenty of obstacles to successful elections remain. In Darfur, recent fighting in Jebel Marra between government forces and a rejectionist faction, the Sudan Liberation Army of Abdul Wahid al-Nur, has displaced tens of thousands of people. The clashes were a reminder how very fragile the situation there remains. Fire-starting north-south disagreements over sharing oil resources, citizenship, and census figures are unresolved.

Ethnic and tribal violence persists across the south. Opposition parties belonging to the National Consensus Alliance, also known as the Juba Conference, have said they may boycott the polls. And concerns persist about restrictions on campaigning, potential fraud, and bias allegedly exhibited by the National Elections Commission and national media.

The war has been costly, claiming more than 2 million lives, with many more dislocated and injured. There is no victor and no vanquished in Sudan’s long civil war. The AU has several challenges in Sudan. A case in point is the possible South Sudan government in 2011 after referendum. That is if all goes well with the elections and the southerners vote for independence in the referendum. What will be the key features and issues a future southern Sudan may face? All this notwithstanding, Sudan has come a long way and much further than many at the AU and member states would have expected. At long last, the direction of travel is positive. It deserves acknowledgement and encouragement by all peace loving nations.

Good luck Sudan

ISS Today, 30 Mar 2010 written by Otilia Anna Maunganidze, Consultant - International Crime in Africa Programme, ISS Pretoria

On Wednesday 16 March 2010, the increasingly influential Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Court of Justice announced that it would defer by a month its ruling on whether or not Senegal should try the former Chadian dictator Hissène Habré for crimes against humanity, torture, war crimes and other human rights violations. Habré’s lawyers brought the case before the ECOWAS court in 2008, alleging that Senegal should not be allowed to try their client as it had violated his human rights, most notably his right to a fair trial in Senegal. Senegal refutes these claims.

Habré is not the first former or sitting African head of state to be prosecuted or indicted for crimes committed while in office. Former Liberian president Charles Taylor and Sudanese president Omar Hassan al-Bashir are well known other examples that demonstrate the significant progress that has been made by international criminal justice in recent years. Efforts to end impunity for grave crimes in Africa are starting to bear fruit.

But efforts – locally, regionally and internationally – to bring Habré to justice have been ongoing since 1992. The matter has been riddled with delays, and for Habre’s victims, the wheels of justice have turned too slowly. It is therefore hoped that the ruling of the ECOWAS court will end the delays and pave the way for positive progress.

Habré’s rule of Chad in the 1980s was tainted by wide scale human rights violations that include allegations of torture and murder. In 1992, an official truth commission revealed that Habré’s regime committed up to 40 000 political murders. Moreover, it is estimated that hundreds of thousands more were directly affected, although the true scale of the alleged tortures is not known. Despite these damning findings, Habré has not been brought to trial. In fact Senegalese courts initially dismissed the case against him in 2001, but later agreed to have him detained under house arrest. It was only in 2003 that serious attempts to bring him to justice began when a group of Chadians, including some who had obtained Belgian citizenship, brought charges against Habré before Belgian courts. 

In 2005, following a decision by Belgium to try Habré domestically for crimes against humanity and request his extradition from Senegal, the international criminal justice community was abuzz with talks about the impending possibility of a former head of state being tried by a domestic court abroad. However, in 2006 the African Union (AU), following a recommendation by the Committee of Eminent African Jurists, called on Senegal to prosecute Habré “in the name of Africa’’. This was part of broader rhetoric at the time which called for African solutions to Africa’s problems.

Senegal responded with apparent political support for the recommendation, and in 2008 its parliament voted for a constitutional amendment to pave the way for commencement of the prosecution before a domestic court. However, there was little progress beyond the political bluster. The Senegalese government claims that the reason for the lack of progress is financial, and that they require a staggering $40 million to proceed with the trial. Many doubt this claim, pointing instead to the meddling hand of politics in the decision.

Pressure is however mounting on the Senegalese government to move the process along. Both the ECOWAS court and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) are set to make rulings that could potentially push Senegal to commence with the trial. The ICJ’s impending ruling on Senegal’s alleged foot-dragging stems from a Belgian request relating to Senegal’s duty to either prosecute or extradite Habré (a well-known obligation under international law), and the ECOWAS case turns on whether Senegal has jurisdiction to try the former president. These cases have yet again raised hopes that Habré will be brought to justice and have, at the very least, broken the silence about this important case.

Victims of Habré’s atrocities have much to be hopeful about. If the ECOWAS Court rules that Senegal should prosecute Habré, this will add much needed regional pressure on the county’s leadership to ensure that justice runs its course. Senegal has confirmed its commitment to international criminal justice and the rule of law in the past, and will hopefully remain proud of its stated commitment towards ending impunity for grave crimes. It should be recalled that it was the first African country to ratify the Rome Statute that created the International Criminal Court (ICC), and it is one of only four African states with implementing legislation on the ICC.

It should also be noted that a Chadian court has already sentenced Habré to death in absentia for crimes committed. This is commendable, but it is not enough. The Chadian officials have no way of enforcing the judgment of the court given that Habré remains exiled in Senegal. However the symbolism of this decision cannot go unmentioned. But the victims of the horrendous crimes committed in Chad need more than symbolic gestures. They need to see justice being done, if not by their country’s courts, then preferably by African ones at least.

The AU has made it clear that Senegal should step up to the plate to try Habré. Hopefully the ECOWAS Court will echo this call, and in so doing send a clear message to unscrupulous leaders in Africa and abroad that there is no room for impunity if they commit atrocities against their own people. Twenty years is indeed a long time for victims of Habré’s alleged crime to wait. For them, the more justice is delayed, the more it is denied.

ISS Today, 29 Mar 2010, written by Webster Whande, Senior Researcher, Climate Change Project, Corruption and Governance Programme, Cape Town Office, BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) have been vilified and praised for the role they played in brokering the Copenhagen Accord at the United Nations Climate Change Conference in 2009. They have been praised for saving climate talks that appeared destined for complete breakdown. They have equally been vilified for participating in a discredited and exclusionary process. Given the supposed central role in Copenhagen, it is important to reflect on what future potential role the BASIC countries can play in the ongoing climate change negotiations.

Despite misgivings about the process in Copenhagen, the BASIC countries are likely to continue playing a key role in the climate change negotiations. Such a role will involve participation in formal processes run under the auspices of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and informal negotiations with other countries such as the United States. They are also likely to intensify efforts to reach consensus within intergovernmental groups such as the African Union (AU) to placate concerns of sidelining developing countries.

From a process perspective, the lead up to the Copenhagen Accord lacked the multilateralist spirit that characterized previous negotiations. The few countries that drafted the accord circumvented the two-track negotiation process under the UNFCCC. The two-track system follows two negotiation processes under future commitments for industrialized countries or continuation of the Kyoto Protocol and long-term cooperative action to enable effective implementation of the convention. The formal and informal processes, however, are likely to result in a different two-track altogether, one premised on the power and influence of coalitions.

On the one hand are the BASIC countries and other countries involved in brokering the Copenhagen Accord. On the other hand are the rest of the countries under the aegis of the UNFCCC. BASIC countries are likely to continue participating in the informal processes as happened in Copenhagen. They will, however, deal with the criticism of pursuing individual agendas by aligning with other developing countries. They will use their newly found political platform to push both individual country interests and those of intergovernmental groups they belong to. The BASIC countries’ responses to the Accord are instructive in this regard.

While not disowning the Accord, the BASIC countries have continued to criticize its place in future negotiations for a climate change pact. They argue it is not a replacement for the UNFCCC two-track system. Committing industrialized countries to emissions reductions and agreeing on long-term cooperative action for effective implementation of the convention remain key objectives. Such pronouncements give and take from the role the BASIC countries played in Copenhagen. Firstly, they limit the weight of the Accord as preparation to continue calling for rich nations to lead global efforts to slow global warming. Secondly, they protect the continued role of the BASIC countries in future negotiations by disowning a supposedly flawed outcome but incorporating it as important for rejoining the two-track system.

A key aspect going to Copenhagen was a legally binding agreement with clear targets for emissions reduction and financing to developing countries for mitigation and adaptation. The Accord mentions commitments to providing US$30 billion from 2010-2012 per annum and to setting up a Copenhagen Climate Fund. The Accord does not, however, commit developed countries to specific targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The BASIC countries have continued to call for developed countries to commit to financing, set clear targets for emissions reduction and to the provision of technologies for mitigation. These calls resonate with the interests of other developing countries.

The immediate responses from civil society and developing countries were disappointment and rejection of the Accord. The question of the future role of the Accord, and by implication the BASIC countries, arises. Various countries have since spoken of the Accord in terms of building blocks for future negotiations. More than 100 countries have formally associated with the Accord. This indicates some softening of the first responses that greeted the announcement of the Accord. The reference to the Accord as building blocks but not replacing the two-track system resonates with the BASIC countries position. As well as maximizing on changing perceptions of the Accord, the BASIC countries are likely to continue to seek consensus on the actual issues.

Going to Copenhagen, the AU formulated a common position for the climate change negotiations. The Nairobi declaration provided the basis for cooperation among African countries. Key concerns for the AU are adaptation processes for the majority of citizens living in poverty. The BASIC countries have aligned with some of these issues by virtue of their own contexts. South Africa was party to the Nairobi declaration while China explored a common position with the African countries prior to Copenhagen. Coalescing on the basis of the issues is likely to continue.

As well as pursuing an individual agenda, it is clear from pervious pronouncements from the Brazilians, Chinese and Indians that there are certain issues that resonate among the group itself but also with other African countries. Such issues include reaching a compromise between development and reducing emissions. As a result, technology transfer for mitigation of green house gas emissions and meeting the social and economic needs of citizens is of paramount and common interest. Additionally, the issue of justice in a climate pact resonates for both the BASIC countries and the AU. There is commonality of perspective on developed countries meeting the costs of adaptation and contributing to mitigation technologies.

The participation of the BASIC countries in the formal process is largely driven by the fact that decisions made in this platform will inform a climate change regime from 2012 going on. The group’s political power to gain concessions from other countries such as the US is based on shifting power dynamics. It is for this power dimension that they will continue participating in informal processes while also seeking to build consensus with other developing countries for formal processes.

ISS Today, 26 Mar 2010, written by Dominique Dye, researcher, Arms Management Programme, ISS Pretoria, Hundreds of thousands of obsolete, surplus, surrendered and confiscated firearms have been destroyed in South Africa over the last two decades during various destruction processes. Several of these have been carried out by the South African Police Service (SAPS) in an effort to combat crime and reduce the number of legal and illegal firearms in circulation.

The most recent destructions took place at the start of the firearms amnesty process initiated in January this year. The four-month amnesty, which runs until 11 April, is an attempt to further reduce the number of illegal firearms in circulation, as well as provide an opportunity to firearm owners who did not meet the deadline last year for registering their firearms or to voluntarily hand them in.

During a national destruction that took place on the 15th January at Mittal Steel in Vereeniging, 80 611 firearms were destroyed.. The destroyed firearms included those that had been handed in during the amnesty process, obsolete police firearms, and firearms that had been recovered from criminal incidents. Firearms were transported to the metal recycling plant and melted in a furnace before being mixed in with more scrap metal to form steel bars.

Another two destructions followed the national destruction. On the 8th of February near Durban, KwaZulu-Natal more than 10 000 firearms were destroyed. These firearms were from the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal provinces. This was followed by another destruction on the 12th of February at Saldanha Bay in the Western Cape. These destructions received much support form civil society groups who were invited to attend the destructions along with the media.

A number of recently destroyed firearms have been redundant state-owned firearms as a result of an ongoing policy to standardise weapons used by state security departments. The standardisation process is aimed at reducing maintenance and training costs. While some governments are opposed to the destruction of serviceable firearms, for example the United States, the South African government has opted for destroying firearms rather than reselling them. This is to reduce the number of firearms in the country and to ensure that these weapons do not find a way into illicit hands where they might be used in criminal activities. 

As part of a broader strategy to combat the proliferation of firearms at a regional level, the SAPS has also carried out several cross-border operations to assist with destruction of firearms and ammunition in neighbouring countries. This is aimed at reducing the number of illegal firearms entering the country as well as those circulating in the region. The SAPS provides technical and logistical assistance, as well as expertise for these operations. Examples include Operation Rachel - a joint operation with the Mozambican government to reduce the number of arms caches in the country left over from the civil war, and Operation Mandume - a joint collaboration with the Namibian and Angolan police and military forces to destroy weapons along the Namibia/Angola border. 

The South African government has put in considerable effort in destroying firearms to significantly reduce the pool of both legal and illegal firearms. These efforts are ongoing and carried out in conjunction with other initiatives to strengthen controls over firearms. While it is difficult to assess the impact of these destructions and whether they have contributed to a reduction in the levels of armed violence, they demonstrate an ongoing commitment by the government in addressing the firearm situation in the country.

ISS Today written by Issaka K. Souaré, Senior Researcher, ISS, African Conflict Prevention Programme, Pretoria, Not a stranger to controversies, the Libyan leader Col. Muammar Gaddafi, has reportedly suggested partitioning Nigeria into a ‘Muslim North’ and a ‘Christian South’. To him, this would be the solution for what he called the recurrent ‘inter-religious’ clashes between adherents of these two religions. This comes after the tragic death of hundreds of people in the city of Jos and surrounding villages in the central Plateau state of Nigeria in January and March this year. Some commentators describe these clashes – as many previous ones – as clashes between Muslims and Christians.

Gaddafi’s comments have angered many people, and particularly the Nigerian authorities. The latter have reportedly rebuffed them and recalled their ambassador to Libya ‘for consultation’. The lack of a proper justification for these comments should have led us to ignore them. However, given the stature of the man (not least being the immediate former chairperson of the African Union and self-proclaimed champion of African unity), but also because some of the assumptions underpinning his comments have currency with many people, they merit a more substantial and scholarly treatment.

The first assumption in the comments is that the ‘partition’ of a country experiencing ‘inter-communal’ clashes is the solution for such crises. To illustrate his point, the Libyan leader cited the case of India that was split in 1947 into present-day India and Pakistan. True, India was split at the eve of independence into a predominantly Muslim Pakistan and Hindu India against the background of serious inter-religious clashes. Some ‘Indian’ leaders at the time thought that partitioning the country would be the solution. But the pitfall of this example is that, first, Pakistan split further into the present-day Pakistan and Bangladesh (1971). More importantly, India still witness bloody inter-religious clashes between its own Muslim and Hindu communities and Pakistan is not free from violence perpetrated by Muslims against Muslims.

There are many other examples of attempted or actual partition of political entities in order to supposedly solve ‘inter-communal’ crises, but they point to the fact that this measure has seldom been a viable long-term solution.

The second assumption underpinning Gaddafi’s comments, which seems to be espoused by many people, is that recurrent clashes being witnessed in Nigeria are due to religious animosity between Muslims and Christians. Without denying the salience of religion in Nigeria, this assumption is very simplistic and somehow erroneous. It is true that parties to most of the clashes can easily be classified according to religion or ethnicity, but it is in most cases fallacious to argue that the clashes are about religion. If that was the case, then why is it that clashes break out between adherents of the same religion, be they Muslim or Christian? And how can we account for the fact that some Nigerian states that have a mixture of religious communities don’t have such clashes? The fact of the matter is that most of the clashes break out on social-economic (mostly land) issues that pitch a farmer against a nomad, and then each one calls on his kith and kin. Because people from the same community generally adhere to the same religion and hail from the same ethnic group, some commentators describe the clashes as religious or ethnic.

This leads to the last and the most fallacious assumption in Gaddafi’s comments, which is also espoused by many people. That is the assumption that Nigeria can be divided into a ‘Muslim North’ and a ‘Christian South’. First, not all Nigerians can be moulded into these two ‘imported’ religions. Before both these religions were brought to the region now called Nigeria, the inhabitants had other belief systems. And while the majority of the people have now been Islamised or Christianised, this is not true for everyone. The question here is therefore to ask where would non-Muslim and non-Christian Nigerians fit into this divide?

Secondly, granted that Nigerians could be reduced to these two religions, the ‘North’ is not monolithically Muslim nor is the ‘South’ singularly Christian. Of the three main ethnic families in Nigeria, the Hausa-Fulanis of the North are predominately Muslim, the Igbos of the East predominately Christian, while the Yorubas of the West are both Muslim and Christian. Should the equation thus be three rather than two? Also, apart from a very few states, the majority of Nigeria’s 36 states are multi-religious and multi-ethnic, that is why, according to the previous assumption, there are clashes. So what would happen to ‘Muslim island communities’ in the ‘Christian South’ and ‘Christian lake communities’ in the ‘Muslim North’? 

Clearly, if this is how Gaddafi wants to go about building his ‘United States of Africa,’ he must explain whether he intends to have a United States of Muslim Africa, and a separate one for Christian Africa. Or he must explain to us how the ‘religious clashes’ that could not be solved in the Nigerian federation would be solved, at an even bigger magnitude, in the ‘United States of Africa’.

Finally, and in order not to unduly minimise the ‘intents’ behind his comments, could one think of some ‘geostrategic’ reasons as to why the former Chairman of the AU Commission suggested this for Nigeria? The most logical and positive one would be a genuine hope that it would solve the problems, but the fallacy of that assumption has been made evident. The other one would be destructive, such as hoping to gain in standing from a weakened Nigeria through partition. But there is no direct rivalry between Abuja and Tripoli. Also, Nigeria is a bigger strategic player in Africa than Libya is and Tripoli cannot replace Abuja in some of the areas in which it gained its strategic importance, such as active conflict resolution on the continent through the commitment of both human and material resources. It will also be a far-fetched dream for Gaddafi to wish that Nigerians would buy such an idea and go about dismantling their country. Nigeria successfully overcame the test of the 1967-70 civil (Biafra) war despite the support lent to ‘Biafra’ by some foreign powers. This war posed a greater threat to Nigeria’s survival than isolated if tragic clashes here and there. In the final analysis therefore, it would appear that the comments made by Gaddafi were not thought through and that there may not be any particular strategic rationale behind them. 

ISS Today published by Chandre Gould, senior researcher, Crime Justice and Politics Programme of the ISS, Pretoria and Marlise Richter, visiting researcher at the Forced Migration Studies Programme of the University of the Witwatersrand

Several anti-trafficking campaigns have been initiated in South Africa ahead of the 2010 Fifa World Cup. These campaigns intend to prevent individuals from being trafficked by raising awareness about this exploitative practice and providing information about the danger it presents. Anti-trafficking initiatives are important, but it is equally important that the information presented in these campaigns is accurate and based on evidence, rather than merely aiming to instill fear and outrage.

According to the United Nations definition of trafficking, three conditions have to be met before a case of trafficking can be established:1

1. The person must be moved or transferred, harboured or received;
2. There must have been some form of coercion or deception involved; and
3. The actions should be for the purposes of exploitation.

If all three conditions are not met, the case is not one of trafficking.

The “Stop 2010 Human Trafficking” campaign recently released a web-based video clip2 aimed at raising awareness about trafficking in the run-up to the 2010 Soccer World Cup. In the clip, popular South African soap opera stars and musicians make exaggerated and inaccurate claims about trafficking and sex work in South Africa.

Amongst other things, the video states the following as fact:

• Legalisation of sex work makes trafficking worse
• Germany and Australia regret legalising sex work
• 100 000 people will fall victim to trafficking in South Africa before the World Cup; and
• Sex work and trafficking are the same thing

Experiences in Germany during the 2006 World Cup are informative to assess the risk of trafficking during this event in South Africa. Before the 2006 World Cup in Germany, media reports convinced the public that 40 000 women and children would be trafficked into Germany to meet the demand of an estimated 3 million soccer spectators. However researchers only find evidence of five cases of trafficking.3 While the research may not have identified all incidents that occurred during the 2006 World Cup, it highlights the substantial gulf that exists between reality and the fears that exist in relation to human trafficking. 

Fifa estimates that 450 000 international spectators will visit South Africa - that is six times fewer visitors than to the 2006 Germany World Cup. It is therefore highly unlikely that 100 000 people would be trafficked into South Africa. Indeed, were that to be the case there would be just less than one trafficked victim for every four spectators.

There is no evidence nationally or internationally to support the claim that legalising sex work makes trafficking worse. Proponents of legalisation and decriminalisation models of sex work in fact hold that by decriminalising sex work an otherwise murky industry will be opened to scrutiny. This, it is argued would assist police in locating traffic victims and prostituted children. A 5-year review of the effects decriminalising sex work in New Zealand found that cooperation between sex workers, police and other agencies provided useful information about criminal activity.4 There is also no evidence to support the claim that Germany and Australia regret the decision to legalise sex work.

The systematic research conducted by the ISS/SWEAT resulted in a recommendation to decriminalise sex work in South Africa. This was motivated by the fact that for as long as sex work is criminalised it is very difficult for sex workers to report incidents of abuse, of trafficking or of child prostitution to the police as well as to access social, health and legal services. Sex workers, particularly those who work on the street, are the most likely witnesses of cases of child prostitution and other types of crime. They are more likely to report such cases if they didn’t fear the police and ran the real risk of being harmed or arrested in the process.

The ISS/SWEAT study found that 47% of street-based sex workers had been threatened with violence by the police, 63% had been sworn at by a police officer, 12% had been raped by a police officer and nearly a third had been asked for sex in exchange for being released from custody. While brothel-based sex workers did not experience this level of abuse at the hands of the police, 70% said that they did not trust the police or did not know if they could trust the police. For as long as sex workers mistrust and are fearful of the police it is unlikely that they will report cases of trafficking or other crime to the police.

The research found that most sex workers in Cape Town had chosen to take up sex work for financial reasons. The study showed that sex workers were able to earn more than they would, doing other jobs commensurate with their skills. While clearly there are severe constraints on the choices that women can make in relation to the work they do, labelling all women who choose to sell sex as “victims” or “sex slaves” is to ignore their rational choices. Victims of trafficking on the other hand have been forced or duped into a situation of exploitation. In this way they differ from sex workers who have chosen to engage in sex work (albeit a choice made from limited options). 

Conflating sex work and trafficking is detrimental to sex workers as it implies that they are sexual slaves without agency or choice. At the same time overestimating and sensationalising trafficking numbers diverts important resources away from services that could benefit more people.5

A number of countries have moved away from total criminalisation of sex work. However only one - New Zealand - has explicitly decriminalised sex work, choosing instead to adopt a human rights and public health framework.

The New Zealand Prostitution Reform Act was passed in 2003, after a campaign driven by sex workers, the public health community, women’s groups and human rights organisations. It was promoted on various grounds – gender justice, pragmatic law, and the preference of the people most damaged by criminalisation – the sex workers themselves. The effects of the legislative change were measured five years later. Contrary to public fears, no increase was found in the number of people entering sex work during this period.6 Sex workers reported improved working conditions and wellbeing, feeling safer under the new legal framework, and being able to negotiate safer sex and report abuse to police.7

Human trafficking is a heineous crime. However, our policies and actions must be guided by sound research and empirical evidence if this problem is to be effectively and efficiently addressed.

Notes:

1. United Nations. Protocol to prevent, suppress and punish Trafficking in persons, especially Women and Children - supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational organized crime; 2000.

2. See http://www.2010humantraffic.org/STOP.htm?utm_source=STOP+2010+Human+Traffic&utm_campaign=4496e51b3f-2010_Human_Traffic2_9_2010&utm_medium=email

3. The German Delegation to Multidisciplinary Group on Organised Crime / Article 36 Committee. Experience Report on Human Trafficking for the Purpose of Sexual Exploitation and Forced Prostitution in Connection with the 2006 Football World Cup in Germany. Council of the European Union, Brussels, 5006/1/07; REV 1; CRIMORG 1; MIGR 1; 19 January 2007.

4. Prostitution Law Reform Committee. Report of the Prostitution Law Reform Committee on the operation of the Prostitution Reform Act of 2003, Wellington; 2008 May 2008.

5. Cusick L, Kinnell H, Brooks-Gordon B, Campbell R. Wild guesses and conflated meanings? Estimating the size of the sex worker population in Britain. Critical Social Policy. 2009;29(4):703-19.

6. Abel, G., Fitzgerald, L. & Brunton, C. (2009) The Impact of Decriminalisation on the Number of Sex Workers in New Zealand. Journal of Social Policy, 38, pp. 515-531.

7. Prostitution Law Reform Committee. Report of the Prostitution Law Reform Committee on the operation of the Prostitution Reform Act of 2003, Wellington; 2008 May 2008.

ISS Today written by Henri Boshoff. Head Peace Missions Programme, ISS Pretoria

The plight of South Africa’s farming community again made headlines these last few weeks because of what seems to be a new spate of murders on farmers.

The remarks by ANC Youth League leader Julius Malema last week, when he repeated the anti-apartheid chant ‘kill the farmer, kill the Boer” also did not help to lift the mood in the farming community. The closing of the rural Commando’s, which played a key role in the rural protection plan, also worsened the situation. Meanwhile the promise of replacing the Commondo’s with Sector Policing and a strengthened police presence, in order not to leave a vacuum, did not materialise.

Already in 2006 the Policy Advisory Council announced that Sector Policing has failed to achieve the results envisaged by the police because of a lack of clear policy and resources. This meant that farmers in the rural areas became responsible for their own security.

Agricultural union Agri South Africa on 8 March 2010 hosted a rural safety workshop in Pretoria to find a way out of this crisis in consultation with all the role players. During the meeting the South African Police Service (SAPS) presented its new draft Rural Safety Strategy. It is important to understand that the previous Rural Protection Plan was focused on the farming community, while the new Rural Safety Strategy includes the broad rural community within South Africa and not only farmers.

Rural Areas are defined as “ sparsely populated areas in which people farm or depend on natural resources, including villages and small towns that are dispersed throughout these areas”. It includes “large settlements in former homelands, created by apartheid removals, which depend for their survival on migration labour and remittances”.

The strategy is based on six pillars:

Adopting a pro and re-active, responsive operational approach

Enhanced cooperation and coordination among all role players

Community safety awareness

Rural development

Effective communication

Effective investigation and prosecution

The strategy focuses on the concept of Sector Policing and Reservists. It is unfortunate that the strategy is based on plans that have failed in the past, not because of the strategy but because of the inability of the SAPS to implement it and a lack of resources. This is not unique to the rural areas but is also experienced in urban areas by Community Police Forums. Sector Policing often does not go any further than phase two: the identification of the sectors. The moment phase three is implemented, namely the allocation of resources, personnel and equipment, the strategy ends because of a lack of resources.

Relying on Reservists also raises questions because of inadequate budgets and a lack of funds at station level to call up Reservists. Reservists are often deployed in hotspots instead of being deployed in the areas for which they had been recruited. There is a problem of insufficient training and the prolonged process of joining the Reservists.

The biggest challenge for this new strategy to work is that it lacks two crucial capabilities; house and hearth protection and an area-bound dedicated reaction force. Although the strategy mentions house and heart protection, it does not empower the farmers (or, as per the new strategy, the rural inhabitants) with the means, knowledge and ability to protect themselves. This includes radio communications, weapons for self-defense, first aid and a link to a dedicated reaction force. The strategy also fails to address dedicated area-bound reaction forces in the rural communities.

The restructuring of the crime combating units is perhaps an indication of the shortcomings that have emerged after the Commando’s were phased out. A mere three years after the announcement that the crime combating units would be part of the new system to replace the Commando’s, these units were restructured and their numbers halved.

What are the practical implications on the ground? The tendency in both the rural and urban areas is that the communities have accepted the concept of Sector Policing as well as the fact that the police does not have the capacity to implement, man and resource Sector Policing. Communities are now using their own resources to impliment this by establishing sector operational centers, voluntarily manning it and equipping it with radio communication to mobile patrols and individual farms and houses. Community members are also identified and put on standby rosters to be called upon as a dedicated reaction capability, with the limitation of not having powers to arrest.

Communities overcome this limitation with good coordination between themselves and the local police stations. Evaluations of the crime situation in policing areas where these initiatives are in place clearly show a decline in crime.

In conclusions it is clear that the SAPS probably has to rethink its strategy and possibly consult with the rural communities, including the farming communities, because we are talking about addressing two different target groups with different needs. This is crucial given that the previous Rural Protection Plan was drawn up after extensive consultation in all the provinces.

18 March 2010: ISS Today written by Hallelujah Lulie, Junior Researcher, Peace and security Council Report Program, Addis Ababa, On February 2010, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) imposed sanctions on Niger following the military coup that overthrew President Mamadou Tandja. The sanctions included the suspension of Niger’s membership in keeping with the AU’s recent commitment made at its last Summit, in February 2010. The PSC Protocol does not define the term “sanctions” and it does not define the form of sanctions that could be imposed in different scenarios. However, the Lóme Declaration on the Unconstitutional Change of Government of 2000 list a potential range of sanctions from the suspension of membership; interruption of economic relations and communications and targeted flight restrictions on a political or military leadership.

International sanctions are often seen as the last resort to address acts that contravene pre-established principles and norms of political behaviour. The deployment of sanctions gained momentum at the end of the Cold War as a tool to bring governments to alter their behaviour and a particular choice of action. However, the effectiveness of the sanctions which have historically been imposed, especially on African countries, by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) have been questioned due to lack of a proper research and monitoring mechanisms to implement them, and their effects in terms of the humanitarian crises and collective punishment they generate. Subsequent to its institutional transformation from the Organization for African Unity (OAU) to African Union (AU) in 2002, the continental body has undergone structural and operational transformation. The AU has adopted a much more interventionist stance than the OAU in terms of how it addresses crises on the continent. Article 7(g) of the PSC Protocol, of 2002, based on the Lomé Declaration, mandates the Council to institute and impose sanctions whenever an unconstitutional change of Government takes place within a Member State.

The AU PSC has issued a series of sanctions against Togo, the Comoros, Mauritania and recently on Guinea and Niger. These sanctions have been met with mixed results in terms oversight, monitoring and the verification of implementation. For sanctions to be effective they require a robust pre-assessment and monitoring of their socio-political consequences and their potential effect on the concrete economic, political and social dynamics in the target country. The imprecise design of sanctions can fuel negative perceptions about the imposing entity and the lack of proper regular monitoring of sanctions could even entrench particular regimes.

The PSC is mandated by article 8(5) of the Protocol to establish subsidiary bodies when necessary for the performance of its functions which also includes structures like the sanctions committee. The AU has decided to create a Committee on Sanctions. Ideally, this should be buttressed by the creation of a permanent unit within the AU to support the work of all the sanctions committees and a monitoring body whose functions would include providing substantive advice and analysis, obtaining and collating information, or coordinating field visits. However, additional components need to be enumerated including the structure, composition membership and more of the proposed regime.

The proposed committee will carry out a pre-assessment study on the impact of proposed sanctions; seek information from AU Member States on assortment of actions taken by them to implement and enforce sanctions; conduct regular assessments and based on findings, recommend to the PSC, AU and other legitimate bodies the steps and strategies to be taken with a view to increase the effectiveness of sanctions and offer recommendations deemed appropriate in response to violations. It will also recommend to lift or harden sanctions. The regime will also brief new members of the committee and retain institutional memory.

The regime mainly requires a technical preparedness and capacity to design the methodology of the sanctions committee and its infrastructure in addition to the political leverage and backing of such a committee to act quickly, evenhandedly and consistently by member states of the AU and other institutions. In the absence of these two conditions it will only be symbolic gestures. Existence of leverage of the AU will be a prominent factor in the proper functioning of the regime. The leverage is mainly manifested by the unflinching support of Member States for the values and institutional actions of the AU. The working relations between the PSC of the AU and the UNSC, the bigger international community and institutions like the EU, Interpo and the World Bank, as well as other international diplomatic, financial and intelligence institutions will also be vital. To get international support it is also believed that the AU should show support for and cooperate with sanctions imposed by the international community.

Sanctions should always strive to serve their intended purpose effectively. Understanding the importance of sanctions for the process of maintaining and upholding compliance of the decisions of the AU cannot be over-stated. The PSC therefore needs to further enumerate and discuss the rationale, structure, mandate, size, membership and selection procedures and operational and reporting frameworks of the sanctions regime that remains a work-in-progress.

ISS Today written by Andile Sokomani, Senior Researcher, Corruption and Governance Programme, ISS Cape Town, If there is any lesson to be learned from South Africa’s land reform experience, since the dawn of democracy in 1994, it is the fact that the success of the country’s land reform programme is contingent upon a complex mix of diverse but interrelated factors. These encompass issues such as the existence of an adequate budget to implement the programme’s three main goals namely the restitution of land to people who were dispossessed by the colonial and apartheid governments after 1913; redistribution of land in order to redress the skewed ownership patterns of land along racial lines and tenure reform to secure the land rights of people whose tenure is insecure as a result of discriminatory laws and practices. Building the technical capacity of land reform beneficiaries to ensure that restituted and redistributed land remains productive also constitutes an important dimension of success.

It is encouraging that government policy makers are largely taking note of these considerations and articulating them to the public via the media. There also seems to be an acute realisation that none of these conditions of land reform success can be met as long as the financial resources devoted to them are wasted through corruption. While much decried, this dead weight loss problem remains inadequately addressed possibly due to an insufficient understanding of its origin. The pressure to deliver on land reform targets may not have afforded adequate space for exploring the leakage in sufficient detail. What may have been overlooked as a result is the extent to which the institutional structures governing the land reform process contribute to the problem.

Let’s start with the Land Bank, which is entrusted with investing finances into the country’s agri-business sector with emphasis on bringing into the fold previously marginalised black farmers. The diversion of the bank’s agricultural development funds into the coffers of politically connected individuals has been a subject of extensive media coverage. Thankfully basic remedial measures have been instituted, including changing the bank’s dodgy leadership, placing the responsibilities for its oversight away from the problematic Land Affairs ministry to the relatively well-run Ministry of Finance, and recapitalisation of the bank as announced recently by Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan in his budget speech. However, as the Land Bank is only one among many beleaguered land reform structures, the net ought to perhaps be cast wider.

To be included in the broadened clean-up are community property associations (CPAs) and community trusts, the most common form in which the beneficiaries of land restitution and land redistribution hold land. These have proven to be a great conduit for the illicit self-enrichment of undemocratically appointed individuals who purport to be community representatives. Community trusts for instance invest property ownership in non-beneficiaries (the trustees) who are not democratically accountable to the beneficiaries. CPAs have been invented to counter this undemocratic tendency by placing emphasis on principles of fair and inclusive decision-making, equity of membership, democratic processes, fair access to property, accountability and transparency, security of tenure, sustainability and compliance with legislation and the Constitution.

As far as they save poor rural beneficiaries the costs associated with individual ownership, including conveyancing costs, fines for non-compliance with state-imposed land-use controls, and municipal land tax liabilities, CPAs would seem ideal for land reform projects. Unfortunately when it comes to transparency, accountability, definition of group membership, distribution of income generated from projects, land allocation and land use, CPAs continue to suffer many of the problems experienced by community trusts. The source of these problems may not be unrelated to how the CPA concept glosses over the fact that many of those who seek restitution had owned their properties on a freehold basis, but had not purchased them in ways that enshrined individual property rights. The popular perception of ‘African culture’ where land is presumably a jointly owned resource, to be used for the common good, is thus not exactly accurate. Consequently CPAs may not only need to be rid of unscrupulous elements. The communalist assumption on which they are founded may also need to be revised.

A variant of the community trust and CPA arrangement that also deserves highlighting is the practise of vesting ownership of restituted and redistributed land in tribal chiefs and kings who hold it in trust on behalf of their tribes or ‘subjects’. Founded on the assumption that it somehow corresponds to the historic principles of African tenure relationships, this mode of property ownership has also proven to be a major recipe for corruption with all the classic textbook examples associated with unilateral decision making and unfettered discretion. Taking into account the fact that the legitimacy of some chiefs is fiercely contested, and in that in some cases chieftaincy was invented to aid colonial and apartheid machinations, the founding assumption of this traditionalist mode of tenure may not be fully supported by historical evidence. Like the CPA concept it may need a serious rethink. Otherwise it will continue to afford chiefs easy access to kickbacks in dodgy mining deals and tourism ventures.

A systematic review and clean-up of the institutional structures meant to advance land reform objectives may not be a panacea for the country’s land reform woes, but will certainly go a long way in preventing loss, wastage and abuse of much needed funds.

ISS Today, 10 March 2010: Mongi Henda, Intern, Organised Crime and Money Laundering, ISS Cape Town

The 15th Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (Cites) is set to be held in Doha, Qatar from the 13th to the 25th of March. One contentious issue, which shall take up part of the proceedings, concerns the legitimate selling of ivory as a means of undercutting the illicit trade. Countries such as Tanzania and Zambia are keen to sell off their stockpiled ivory. These legitimate sales are expected to raise tens of millions of dollars to help countries to better protect vulnerable elephants. In addition, the controlled sale of ivory might dampen prices. There is some opposition to the proposal to offload stockpiles onto the market. Many environmentalists have expressed concern that the controlled sales will inevitably stimulate demand and create more opportunities for poachers. They cite the views of countries such as Kenya and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) that previous sales of ivory stockpiles in 2008 were responsible for the significant increase in poaching in recent years. It should therefore be quite interesting to see what concrete decisions will be taken at this year’s Cites convention given the divergent views surrounding the ivory trade.

One thing that can be almost unanimously agreed upon is the sharp increase in elephant poaching across Africa recently. For instance, the organisation Space for Elephants (SEF) has remarked on the illicit ivory trade, which they believe to have gradually increased since 2004, and to have escalated quite sharply in 2009. Research undertaken by the Elephant Trade Information System - managed by the international wildlife trade-monitoring network TRAFFIC has found that the volume of illegal ivory seized doubled between 2008 and 2009. Kenya and the DRC have been particularly hard hit by poachers belonging to well organized crime syndicates that supply the growing demand, particularly in Asia. According to the Kenyan government, in 2009, poachers killed 232 elephants - up from 145 in 2008 and 47 in 2007. In the DRC persistent conflict during 2009 has also contributed to elephant poaching. Anita Gossman’s article “Tusks and Trinkets: An overview of illicit ivory trafficking in Africa”, published in the ISS’s African Security Review last year, highlights how the Congolese military have been struggling to cope with poaching activity in the DRC’s Garamba National Park. In Garamba, rebels belonging to the Lord Resistance Army (LRA) are believed to be heavily involved in poaching and selling ivory for profit, more than 180 elephant tusks passed through Ariwara in 2009 alone.
Poaching in Africa is therefore reaching higher levels of severity than during the 1990’s. Scientists have even estimated that between 8 to 10% of Africa’s elephants are being killed per year to supply the growing demand for ivory. Such high levels of poaching have not been seen since the 1980’s before the implementation of the world ivory trading ban on the 18th January 1990.

What has not yet been properly established is whether or not the legitimate selling of ivory stockpiles is driving the illicit trade in ivory. During the 14th Cites conference in 2007, South Africa, Botswana, Zimbabwe and Namibia were given the go-ahead for a once-off sale of their ivory stocks of more than 100 tonnes which took place in 2008. This consignment was reportedly sold at a price of more than $20 million to Japan and China. As noted earlier, the years following the once-off sales in 2008 have seen an increase instead of a decrease in poaching activities. This however does not necessarily point to a causal relationship between legitimate and illicit ivory trade. To assume this would be to ignore other salient variables such as an increasing demand for ivory amongst China’s burgeoning affluent classes. As renowned expert on the ivory trade Daniel Stiles points out, “Ivory is a high prestige and auspicious material in Asia, used often for display, religious and gift-giving purposes”. This suggests deeper cultural reasons for ivory demand in Asia beyond the legitimate sale of ivory stockpiles by certain African countries. On the other hand poor law enforcement in countries such as Kenya and the DRC have left their respective conservation security structures quite vulnerable. Anita Gossmann notes the link between conflict and elephant poaching in Africa. In both the DRC and Kenya elephant poaching has been committed quite often by armed groups who use the proceeds of the illicit ivory to fund their war efforts. This leads to a vicious cycle whereby armed conflicts permit poaching and poaching in turn facilitates the continuation of armed conflict.

What can be observed from the current situation regarding the growing illicit trade in ivory is that history seems to be repeating itself. During the 1980’s demand for ivory was being led primarily by Japan’s emerging well-off citizens. Today it is China’s growing upper class that is driving the demand. During the 1980’s poaching in Africa was permitted by widespread conflict and poor governance. Today it is the continuation of these conditions that has allowed for such an increase in poaching. In addition organized crime groups have now taken advantage of these favorable conditions and established themselves as important suppliers. Disappointingly this point is being overlooked. As the Cites conference approaches, the debate seems to be centered on confirming an elusive link between legitimate sales of ivory stocks and the growing illicit trade. This unfortunately detracts from the important supply/demand factors that drive the illicit trade in ivory. It is these factors that need to be properly identified and understood in order to stem the growing illicit ivory trade. To this end more security is needed.

Countries enmeshed in conflict and corruption are in no position to enforce laws that can control the illicit trade in ivory. Secondly, cultural and economic factors particularly in Asia are likely to continue to feed high demand for ivory products. Customers should rather be sensitized of the risks inherent to the contemporary ivory trade, in the same way that the Kimberly Process informs customers about illicit diamonds. Lastly, all parties concerned with the preservation of elephants need to appreciate the trans-national nature of the problem, and adequately inform themselves of trends and routes. Poaching syndicates seem to operate across borders, creating complex routes that stretch across a number of countries. Role players from many sectors have to cooperate to find solutions. This is not too much to expect from this year’s Cites conference.