19 August 2010: ISS Today article written by Muiruri John Kimani, Senior Researcher, Mifugo Project, ISS Nairobi Office

Cattle rustling in Eastern Africa appear to have become a truly murky business. One can say this of the politics, the money involved, the casualties and in many instances the attempted interventions. One may wonder: but haven’t we heard all this before? Why the apparent impotence of a seemingly sophisticated modern age that is contemplating space-tourism yet cannot find a lasting solution to a problem that should belong to a past era?

Unfortunately, cattle rustling, to the informed, would appear to embody all that is wrong with our systems of governance, politics, economics and sheer ineptitude that appear to be the hallmark in the region.

In the dirty business that is cattle rustling, none of our hands are clean. This is evidenced in a comprehensive study by the ISS, entitled the ‘Political Economy of Cattle Rustling’ that sought to establish the nexus between politics, economics and cattle rustling –referred to as the political economy of cattle rustling.

The study points to ‘emerging political complexes’ that fan cattle rustling and undermine any efforts at ending the menace. The political complexes are intertwined by an economic agenda not only of the actual perpetrators – raiders - but in all manner of subtle ways. All the stakeholders, be they in government, civil society, development agencies, community leaders, and, interestingly, researchers who are engaged and purport to be looking for solutions to the problem, are involved.

The study adopts the terms ‘conflict entrepreneurs’, ‘conflict exploiters’ and ‘conflict dependants’ to categorize the stakeholders benefitting from cattle rustling. The fundamental aspect of cattle rustling is the debilitating state of insecurity that characterise areas where cattle rustling is predominant namely pastoralist areas. Conflict creates barriers, most notably, selective forms of access to livestock and livestock products and their markets.

Limitations experienced by pastoralists facilitate exclusionary and predatory behaviours by those who see and exploit opportunities that are ‘mid-wifed’ by cattle rustling. Here economics - especially politically inclined ones - are significant. The study defines political economy of conflict as “the distribution of power, wealth and destitution during armed conflict, in order to expose the motives and responsibility of those involved within a historical context.”

Conflict entrepreneurs comprise of a category of beneficiaries, particularly young warriors who have graduated from the ‘community-warrior machine’ that socialises them to believe that being a man means having rustled thousands of livestock. These warriors derive their authority and status in society by their exploits on the battlefront and are therefore always the most daring in their raids to an extent where they sometimes send prior warning to their victims about an impending raid. Not only do these warriors want to proove their masculinity but they also near ‘worship’ their livestock - the more they have, the more satisfaction they derive from life.

It is the above category that initiates armed conflicts for the sole purpose of getting or rooting livestock from wherever and whomever they decide to attack. The warriors are heavily armed and believe that the gun was part of their culture and assume that as individuals they bear the primary responsibility to provide security to their communities and to themselves.

In simple words, ‘conflict entrepreneurs’ are basically criminals or outlaws who will sustain cattle rustling for as long as it remains the ‘viable’ option for them to sustain their ‘warrior-rustling-machinery’. To prosecute this, they strive to maintain a stranglehold on every resource necessary to propagate cattle rustling. They almost cannot envisage an environment without cattle rustling.

Unfortunately, elements in the above category are increasingly transforming cattle rustling into a commercial venture. The raided livestock is sold to generate cash income used to finance delinquent engagement and possibly, conspicuous consumption of luxury items.

‘Conflict exploiters’, on the hand, comprises those warriors, and non-warriors alike, who exploit the state of lawlessness, and largely, absence of state institutions, in the pastoralist areas to engage in criminal activities that include cattle rustling. Conflict exploiters take advantage of the lapses or weaknesses of the state in enforcing law and order and use the opportunity to mount opportunistic ‘surprise’ raids on their unsuspecting victims.

Indeed, this predatory group often looks for weaknesses not only of the state machinery but also in the defences of their victims and once found, mount ruthless raids. Lumped together with the raiders are the local administrations that equally take advantage of the general insecurity in their areas to generate benefits from directly or indirectly supporting cattle rustling.

There appears to be an alliance of sorts between the warriors and the politicians - a situation that makes it difficult for the political elite to disassociate itself from the interests of the raiders. For some, the payback is either direct support or condoning the menace by providing political cover and protection or, indirectly offer their sympathy by not supporting any interventions that is likely to end the vice. This partly could explain why the problem persists. For their own survival, conflict exploiters will continue to thrive in situations predisposed of lawlessness where conflict is a perfect bedrock.

The most disheartening aspect of this category is that it also includes some rogue elements in the security machinery that is primarily charged with the task of maintaining law and order and seize the opportunity offered by the insecurity for self enrichment. In some instances, they have been accused of selling recovered and confiscated livestock, selling arms, releasing criminals, offering or ignoring intelligence while they dilly-dally in the pursuit of raiders.

‘Conflict dependants’ are a more benign category of people who engage in cattle rustling and crimes associated with it, for the sole purpose of survival. Cattle rustling, for this category, is an opportunity or mechanism that is necessary to sustain or support livelihoods in an adverse environment. Naturally, this category is equally committing a crime, not any different from the other two categories albeit less frequent and violent.

To this category of people, irrespective of the composition of the related criminal activities involved, they believe that they either engage in livestock raids or suffer the adverse effects of hunger, famine and ultimate destitution. Fortunately, ‘conflict dependants’ are a category of people who are more amenable to dissuasion away from cattle rustling and related crimes. They would be dissuaded if alternative opportunities were provided to them where they can derive sources of livelihood.

During the period of the study, as well as in other engagements in the pastoralist areas, the communities continually ask whether they are also citizens of the various states in the region? This is in light of the sheer magnitude of neglect they suffer while the rest of the country continues to stride towards unparalleled development and improved overall human security.

The communities cry out for help from researchers focusing on this issue, from governments whose primary obligation is to secure their wellbeing and from some of their leaders who relish in continued ‘shackling’ of their communities.  As long as the communities remain ignorant, they guarantee the political survival of their leaders.

Certainly, there are many positive and commendable initiatives being undertaken by governments and a host of stakeholders – private and public. However, considering how inconsistent some of the interventions are and looking at the cross-section of beneficiaries of cattle rustling, one wonders whose hands are still sufficiently clean in this ‘game.’

The governments of Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda would do well by ratifying, domesticating and fully implementing the Protocol on the Prevention, Combating and Eradication of Cattle Rustling.  Benefits accrued by this Protocol would to a large extent address most of the issues affecting pastoralist communities and thus have the governments’ hands really clean.

18 August 2010: ISS Today article written by
Gladys Mirugi-Mukundi, research intern, Organised Crime and Money Laundering, ISS Cape Town

Addressing the AU Summit in Kampala in July 2010, Eric Holder, the US Attorney General reiterated that combating corruption generally and in the United States was his government’s top priority. It is in that vein that he announced that the US Department of Justice is launching a new Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative ‘aimed at combating large-scale foreign official corruption and recovering public funds for their intended – and proper –  use: for the people of our nations.’ He informed the gathering of Heads of State and Governments of the African Union that his office was ‘assembling a team of prosecutors who will focus exclusively on this work and build efforts already underway to deter corruption, hold offenders accountable, and protect public resources.’

The significance of these words was not lost on curious observers across the continent that have become accustomed to rhetoric from political actors on ending corruption and recovery of stolen national coffers. Indeed, if Holder’s words were translated into real action, it will have an impact not only on governance and development in Africa but also on the numerous asset recovery initiatives on the continent. 

The seriousness of recovering assets stolen from public coffers in Africa, most of them stashed away in foreign bank vaults and off shore investments cannot be overemphasised. African policy makers and law enforcement agencies are indeed aware and concede that tracing and retrieving proceeds of crime, tax evasion and corruption is a monumental task. Apart from challenges of limited or total lack of cooperation by suspected culprits – the majority of whom still retain power and political sway in African governments – at a practical level, asset recovery efforts are stifled by money laundering schemes.

Numerous studies have attempted to estimate the sums of money laundered worldwide.  However, because money laundering is not restricted to assets corruptly acquired by state leaders, it is not always possible to have a complete estimate of sums of money laundered from Africa.

According to the U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, at least 25 percent of the GDP of African countries is lost annually to corruption. In such situations, the political and economic elites almost always elude the tax authorities. The joint Stolen Assets Recovery Initiative by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the World Bank summed up the challenges encountered in locating proceeds of corruption by political or economic elites, especially where they have been moved across borders. The challenges include:

• limited legal, investigative and judicial capacity
• inadequate financial resources to pursue complex cases; and
• non-responsive foreign jurisdictions where stolen assets are hidden, often in developed countries, to requests for legal assistance.

Experiences from Nigeria, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Kenya are a clear indication that countries embarking on asset recovery operations encounter legal and practical difficulties as they tread on the thin line between justice and repatriation.

The first challenge they encounter is the immunity from the process of criminal and civil law proceedings vested in sitting heads of states. Heads of states in Africa have a lot of leverage in determining the course that proceedings of such nature take and where political will is absent, recovery efforts amount to nought.

Second, and closely related to the first, is the failure to initiate domestic proceedings or conclude already initiated proceedings by the state. For instance, despite the findings of the Kroll report commissioned to investigate and trace assets obtained by former Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi and his close associates in the infamous Goldenberg scandal, no asset recovery proceedings have been brought to this day.

Third is the role of states to effectively recover assets. Such a role ultimately depends on capacity to support recovery measures, in terms of institutional and legal framework.  Asset recovery initiatives are additionally prone to subjective considerations, which can be used as a basis for refusing reparation of assets.

Fourth is the need to obtain and secure cooperation and collaboration among state agencies that have a bearing on asset recovery. Conflict and competition among agencies, perhaps for want of coherent application of the legal framework and procedures, can be a source of the problem pitting various agencies involved against one another. These include customs and taxation agencies, security intelligence agencies, asset forfeiture units and anti-corruption agencies.

Fifth is the need for bilateral and international cooperation and support to effectively trace and recover looted proceeds.  Such assets are often stashed away in foreign bank accounts and off shore investments. Accordingly effective tracing and recovery demands bilateral and international legal and political cooperation - the kind announced by the US Attorney General in Kampala.

As Daniel Scher puts it ‘recovery attempts are complicated within African countries, because those who are most implicated in public looting usually have the most power and influence. Yet the potential rewards in the form of the repatriation of money into development-starved countries, make asset recovery an attractive undertaking.’

The US message is that it will not be a safe haven for monies emanating from the plunder of African economies. The recent announcement that the British government will repatriate 43 million pounds siphoned by corrupt Nigerian government officials to offshore accounts is a welcome development. It is expected that the signals being relayed by the US and the UK will send a strong message to other countries in the West not to harbour proceeds of corruption from African states and will do something tangible to return the looted proceeds to where they belong for proper use by African peoples.

The bottom line of Attorney General Eric Holder’s message to African Heads of State and Governments is that they need to put their houses in order by setting up and strengthening legal and policy frameworks to deal with corruption and money laundering. Credible, effective institutions, including financial intelligence units and asset retrieval units have to be created without further delay. The ratification and domestication of the United Nations Convention against Corruption and the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption would be a useful beginning.

17 August 2010: ISS Today article written by Gareth Newham, Head of the Crime and Justice Programme, ISS, Pretoria

A professional police service can play an important role in reducing violent crime and improving community safety.  Clear evidence of the effectiveness of good policing has emerged from both resource-rich countries such as in New York City, USA and developing countries, such as the Columbian city of Bogota.  Good policing means professional policing.  In other words, the police must do their work in accordance to the law without fear or favour and be seen to do so. This strengthens the social contract that citizens have with the state, in which the state’s role is to act fairly and in the public interest. When the police are perceived to be biased and do not treat everyone equally or fairly, the general public  increasingly loses trust and respect for the police - and their ability to tackle crime becomes severely constrained.

South Africans should therefore pay close attention in instances when the South African Police Service (SAPS) appears to be misused in the interest of the elite.  Much has recently been written about the arrest of Sunday Times journalist, Mzilikazi wa Afrika, at his office on the morning of Wednesday, 4 August. From the information available, this appears to be yet another case where members of the SAPS have acted in a manner that seems to favour the interests of the ruling elite over those of ordinary citizens.

The journalist was arrested a few days after he wrote a story exposing the awarding of a R500 million lease to a politically connected businessman without proper procedures having been followed.  The story was particularly sensational as the newspaper claims that the National Commissioner of Police, Bheki Cele, signed the lease.  This emerged in the same week that the previous National Commissioner, Jackie Selebi received a sentence of 15 years in prison for corruption.

Since the publication of the story it has become increasingly difficult to follow the claims and counter claims about what actually resulted in the awarding of the lucrative deal, and who was responsible. What remains undisputed is that shortly after publication of the story wa Afrika was arrested at his workplace by eight police officers belonging to the Hawks, an elite unit within the SAPS. Following his arrest he was not allowed to contact his lawyer who did not know where he was until much later that evening.

The National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) initially dropped charges against wa Afrika, suggesting that the prosecutor did not believe there to be a case against the journalist. It was reported that the NPA only reinstated the charges after a long meeting with the police officials who arrested him. The journalist was held in police custody until High Court Judge, Johan Kruger, ordered his release stating that detaining the journalist was “not in the interest of the rule of law.”

Wa Afrika claims he was not read his rights until many hours after his arrest and that the police aggressively questioned him in the early hours of the morning about the newspaper articles he was working on. Although he has since been charged with fraud and ‘uttering’ it remains unclear whether the charges pertain to the story about the lease of the new police headquarters, or the much more convoluted story about political assassinations in Mpumalanga in which the provincial premier is alleged to have a role.

Whether or not wa Afrika is ultimately found guilty of the charges brought against him is not the most important fact in this saga. What is important is that the manner in which the arrest was affected. That it was carried out by a large contingent of Hawks at his place of work strongly suggests that the police sought to send a message to the media that stories alleging corruption of powerful politicians and civil servants will not be tolerated. This perception is reinforced by the fact that the Hawks seem to have made no progress in investigating allegations against senior ranking politicians who may be linked to far more serious crimes than ‘uttering’ and fraud.  

When the Hawks replaced the Directorate of Special Operations (DSO) known as the Scorpions, the South African public was told that the location of the new unit within the SAPS would address the problems that had allegedly arisen as a result of the close relationship between the Scorpions investigators and prosecutors. Yet, in several cases, most notably in the case against former police Commissioner, Jackie Selebi, the DSO showed that they could tackle serious corruption at the highest level of office without fear and favour.

The Hawks have yet to conclude an investigation against a senior ranking politician or government official for corruption. This despite the fact that the ruling party acknowledges that corruption by state officials and those holding public office is a serious problem facing the country.

The timing of the arrest, whether intentional or not, has contributed to growing unease that the interests of the ruling elite continue to ride roughshod over the rights of all citizens. In the two weeks preceding the arrest of wa Africa, parliament and civil society had acrimoniously debated two new Bills, that if passed, may stifle access to information and media freedom. This while the ANC announced its intention to establish a media tribunal to act against what it views as malicious reporting. It would be hard to disabuse observers of the notion that these events are not linked.

In addition, if the wa Africa case was the only case if its kind where it appears that the police have been misused for political purposes, it would be sufficient cause for concern. But it is not.  There are a growing number of examples of police acting in the interests of politicians.

• We remember that while on parole, convicted fraudster and ruling party heavy-weight Tony Yengeni was arrested after crashing his car while allegedly under the influence of alcohol. The charges against Yengeni were dropped after a police Station Commissioner interfered with the case docket and evidence. It emerged during Station Commissioner’s trial, that he had interfered with evidence and intimidated junior police officials to make false entries in the docket that resulted in Yengeni being protected from prosecution. 

• There were reports of traffic police officials in Limpopo being threatened by senior provincial politicians after attempting to fine the ANC Youth League President Julius Malema for speeding. More recently, Malema was able to instruct the police to remove delegates from a chaotic Youth League conference, who did not support his preferred candidate.

• Then there was the headline-grabbing case of Chumani Maxwele, the jogger who was who was arrested by the police, locked up for 24 hours and who had his home searched all for a perceived slight at the Presidential cavalcade. This is one of a long list of incidents where members of the SAPS VIP units also known as the “blue light brigade” have undermined the rights and safety of ordinary citizens on our roads.

It is not surprising that police officials across the country are hesitant to enforce the law against senior ruling party officials. Their boss, the National Commissioner is not a professional police officer, but until recently was a senior ruling party politician. Many police officials are therefore likely to be concerned that investigating or arresting a senior ruling party official, no mater how justifiably, could be a career-limiting move.  Unfortunately, this makes the ruling party inner circle an attractive place for the criminally inclined who wish to live above the law and contributes the problems corruption that the ANC acknowledges afflicts the party.

Democracy is threatened when the security forces are used, or are even perceived to be used, to achieve political ends and to stifle opposition. Good governance depends on the separation of powers and respect for human rights. The perception created by acts in which the police seem to favour the ruling elite undermines democracy and good governance and paints a bleak picture for the future. The Commissioner of Police has do his Constitutional duty and ensure that the police do act without fear or favour in terms of the law and that no one is perceived to be above it.

13 August 2010: ISS Today article written by David Zounmenou, senior researcher, African Conflict Prevention Programme, ISS Pretoria

Considered for many years to be a testcase for democracy in West Africa, Benin has entered into a socio-political turbulence that could be detrimental to the consolidation of its democratic experiment. The latent conflict between President Yayi Boni since his rise to power in 2006 and key institutions of the country exposes the vulnerability of the democratic process. Various political actors in the country accuse the president of wanting to weaken state institutions to his own benefit. They argue that while Yayi Boni has promised upon his election to fight corruption and promote economic growth, his administration has become mired in scandals that heighten social tensions. It was under his administration that Benin experienced for the first time the phenomenon of electoral violence, though of a minor importance.

Corruption has effectively taken its toll on the country’s resources. Last year, funds destined to prepare for the Community of Sahel‐Saharan States Conference in Benin were embezzled. More recently, it is another financial scam that threatens the survival of the regime. This financial scam was organised at the highest level of the state and involved the Minister of Interior, Armand Zinzindohoue, and Attorney General, Georges Amoussou. These authorities condoned the fraudulent activities of a financial institution known as ICC-Services.

The ICC‐Service was set up as a credit and financial structure that would provide returns of 200% on money deposited by citizens, mainly women who own small or big businesses. From this scheme and at the expenses of its vulnerable clients, the company made an estimated 100 Billion CFA (152 Million Euro). The scam was uncovered when people never received their returns. It appears from preliminary investigations that the money was used for political and religious activities at the behest of President Yayi Boni. Some went through money laundering schemes.

A commission of inquiry hurriedly set up by the government revealed the connection between government officials and the establishment of a fraudulent financial scheme, which bypassed all existing financial regulations. ICC-Services was provided a license by the Minister of Interior who prepared the ground for the financial institution to operate dishonestly with the protection of the government.  Although the President claims he has no knowledge of the scheme and the involvement of his cabinet, and has since dismissed the minister and the Attorney General, many in the country believe it is the responsibility of the government and the state to protect citizens from financial scams of such a scale.

For the main opposition leader, Andrien Houngbeji, the government and the President in particular, are to be held responsible for the scandal. He contends that the president only set up a commission of enquiry to ease popular discontent over a nation-wide financial fraud organised by ICC‐Services with the complicity of members of government; and for the president to possibly cover his own complicity. Houngbeji’s accusations were strongly rejected by Boni Yayi who has now come under increasing pressure to react.

With this scandal, it is the leadership provided by Yayi Boni over the past four years that has come under scrutiny. The president, who in 2006 won an overwhelming 75% of the votes during the presidential elections, has failed to deliver on his promise of good governance. For the majority of citizens, Yayi Boni not only failed on this, but has also contributed significantly to a deterioration of the democratic environment in Benin.

Some MPs have now called for his resignation and for the president to be tried before the High Court of Justice. As many as 50 out the 83 members of parliament issued a petition to the speaker to put the issue to vote. To pass, it will need a simple majority. The political configuration in the National Assembly is not favorable to the President. He has lost significant national support since he came to power. Most of his proposed budgets and other laws have been rejected by the parliament compelling him to resort to special presidential measures to implement them. And if the speaker submits the issue to vote, it is highly unlikely that Yayi Boni survives.

Though the parliament has in the past voted for the trial of former ministers, it would be the first time that it will have to decide on the fate of a sitting president. While waiting for the decision of the speaker, the government is in a state of general panic.  Only a few months ahead of the next presidential elections in March 2011 and with a consolidated opposition movement called “United for the Nation” (Union fait la Nation) that has brought together all major political parties in Benin, President Yayi Boni faces tough times ahead. He is progressively loosing the battle over the voter registration process and his regional support base has seen the emergence of a potential candidate, Abdoulaye Bio Tchane, former Finances Minister and currently President of the West African Development Bank.

If the speaker of the parliament dismisses the petition, President Yayi Boni would have to win the next election to avoid the High Court of Justice, provided that he also obtains the majority in the parliament. But given the current domestic context, it is unlikely that both scenarios will happen. Does it mean that we are likely to see a president held accountable in court? If it happens, it is certainly going to introduce a new variable in the democratisation process in Benin and in Africa.  Even his strongest supporters are concerned.

In a report submitted at the end of July, the Mediator of the Republic, Prof. Albert Tevoedjre, who was instrumental in Yayi Boni’s election in 2006, highlighted the weak leadership of the president and the disintegration of national institutions. According to Tevoedjre,  Benin is in danger and urgently needs a national conference to re‐craft the political scenery, refine the social contract and bring back a sense of national consciousness based on republican values. The report raised concerns over politics, economy, education and other vital sectors of life that are becoming increasingly “informal” and that could lead to state collapse. Issued in these difficult times, the report could only compromise Yayi Boni’s chances of serving a second term in office.

12 August: ISS Today article written by Emmanuel Nibishaka, Intern, Security Sector Governance Programme

According to preliminary results released by Rwanda’s National Electoral Commission, the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) candidate President Paul Kagame is the winner of the 2010 Presidential elections, held on Monday 9 August, with 93% of the votes counted in 11 out of 30 districts. Kagame, who called the election democratic, had reported already begun planning his victory party before polls closed.

Critics contend that heavy-handed measures kept opposition candidates from running and clamped down on the media. His seven-year term will, if the constitution is respected, be his last. What is less clear is whether the ledger of his achievements will overall be positive. Mr. Kagame is determined to defend his record, especially in economic development, against a rising tide of criticism of his human-rights record, especially abroad.

The incumbent Paul Kagame, who has been president since 2000 and de facto leader since 1994, following RPF’s victory over the interim government, is entitled to serve for another 7 years term.  Kagame is widely praised for bringing peace to the country following the war and genocide, although he is also criticised by some opposition figures and human rights groups for being heavy-handed in dealing with dissents. Kagame’s past seven years in the office have seen impressive growth in the economy and infrastructure, and a rise in international investment and tourism.

The unofficial election campaign began in January 2010 when Victoire Ingabire, a Hutu who had been living abroad for some years, returned to Rwanda and announced her candidacy for the presidency. Ingabire caused some controversy in the country following her arrival, with comments relating to the genocide. The government accused her of breaking the country’s strict laws regarding Genocide denial, and she was arrested in April 2010, released later on bail, but was prohibited from running in the elections.

In May, President Kagame was officially endorsed as the RPF’s candidate for the election, at the party’s national congress. Kagame then became the first candidate to be accepted when he presented his papers in July. The next candidate to register was Vice-President of the Chamber of Deputies and former Minister of Health Jean Damascene Ntawukuriryayo, who won the nomination for the Social Democratic Party on 22 May. In June, the Liberal Party named its candidate, Vice-President of the Senate and former Minister of Commerce Prosper Higiro, who defeated Stephanie Mukantagara for the nomination, after the latter pulled out of the race at the last minute. The final candidate to successfully register was Senator Alvera Mukabaramba of the Party for Progress and Concord.

Two of three other contenders failed to get official documents through and this did not get accepted into the race; while the other party was said to have effectively disintegrated, leaving no real opposition to Kagame. The three candidates running against Kagame supported him in the 2003 presidential elections and are described by other parties as “RPF’s political satellites" - token opposition used to maintain a facade of pluralism.

Although the election campaign was mostly conducted peacefully, there have been a number of incidents, which attracted international attention. In February and March 2010 there were a series of small attacks in Kigali, killing one person and injuring several, which were linked to the upcoming elections. This, and other bombings in the country were blamed to the exiled former Rwandan ambassador to India, General Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa. Nywamwasa went into exile and was later the victim of an assassination attempt in South Africa two months ago, an incident which caused South Africa to recall its ambassador to Rwanda to discuss the situation. A journalist who claimed to have uncovered the regime’s responsibility in the attempted murder was shot dead days later and critics pointed the finger to the government; a charge that Rwanda denied. After South Africa arrested five men over the shooting and revealed their nationalities, Rwanda summoned the South African ambassador to express concern about the investigation. However, South Africa denied the recall was in "making any connections between the government of Rwanda and the shooting of the general."

Opposition parties also said more than 3 newspapers had been banned. Amnesty International also said opposition party figures had been intimidated, journalists had been targeted and killed, and several senior officers critical of the ruling party attacked and arrested. Foreign Minister, Louise Mushikiwabo, refuted the claims saying, "The international media and human rights groups are misrepresenting what is happening in the country. “My government does not stand to gain from any actions of insecurity. Paul Kagame happens to be a very popular candidate. I think to point a finger at this government is wrong. Anyone who is reading the situation from Rwanda would know that there is an atmosphere of excitement among the public."

Reports from various polling stations and international observers indicated that voters had cast their ballot way before the polls closed and that the entire process was peaceful. Anil K Gayan, a former foreign minister of Mauritius and the head of the AU monitoring delegation, said, "We have not received any evidence of intimidation." He also talked about the turnout for the elections saying that though political rallies may have been well attended "Crowds do not necessarily translate into votes." Kagame also refuted opposition claims and said the vote was "very democratic. The people of Rwanda were free to stand for election, those who wanted to, and to qualify, so I see no problem. "Some sections of the media seem to be reading from a different page."

Despite the likely emergence of a de facto one-party state in Rwanda following the large margin between him and other candidates, the president reportedly dislikes the sycophancy of some of his RPF disciples.
Now that he is re-elected, Mr Kagame will be only 59 when his second term ends in 2017. A true test of his sincerity as a democrat will be his willingness to surrender power, as the constitution demands. Meanwhile he will be a formidable if fearsome operator, at home and abroad.

 Following a campaign period, marked by bombing incidents in Rwanda and a couple of assassination attempts externally, the Rwandan people finally went to the polls on Wednesday.   

According to the preliminary results released by the National Electoral Commission, the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) candidate, Paul Kagame, is the winner of the 2010 Presidential elections with 93% of the votes counted in 11 out of 30 districts.

Kagame, who called the election democratic, had already begun planning his victory party before polls closed. Critics contend that heavy-handed measures kept credible opposition candidates from running and clamped down on the media. Kagame’s seven-year term will, if the constitution is respected, be his last. What is less clear is whether the ledger of his achievements will overall be positive. Kagame is determined to defend his record, especially in economic development, against a rising tide of criticism of his human-rights record, especially abroad.

Kagame, who has been president since 2000 and de facto RPF leader since 1994, following RPF’s victory over the interim government, is entitled to serve for another seven-year term.  Kagame is widely credited with bringing peace to the country following the war and genocide.  However, he is also criticised by some opposition figures and human rights groups for his non-tolerance of dissent. Kagame’s past seven years in the office have seen impressive growth in the economy and infrastructure, and a rise in international investment and tourism.

The unofficial election campaign began in January 2010 when Victoire Ingabire, a Hutu who had been living abroad for some years, returned to Rwanda and announced her candidacy for the presidency. Ingabire caused some controversy in the country following her arrival, with comments relating to the genocide. The government accused her of breaking the country’s strict laws regarding genocide denial, and she was arrested in April 2010, released later on bail, but was prohibited from contesting in the presidential elections.

In May, President Kagame was officially endorsed as the RPF’s candidate for the election at the party’s national congress. Kagame then became the first candidate to be accepted when he presented his papers in July. The next candidate to register was Vice-President of the Chamber of Deputies and former Minister of Health Jean Damascene Ntawukuriryayo, who won the nomination for the Social Democratic Party on 22 May. In June, the Liberal Party named its candidate, Vice-President of the Senate and former Minister of Commerce Prosper Higiro, who defeated Stephanie Mukantagara for the nomination, after the latter pulled out of the race at the last minute. The final candidate to successfully register was Senator Alvera Mukabaramba of the Party for Progress and Concord.  Two other parties could not officially qualify to field presidential candidates.

Interestingly, the three candidates running against Kagame supported him in the 2003 presidential elections and are described by other parties as “RPF’s political satellites" - token opposition used to maintain a facade of pluralism.

Although the election campaign was mostly conducted peacefully, there have been a number of incidents, which attracted international attention. In February and March 2010 there were a series of small bomb attacks in Kigali, killing one person and injuring several, which were linked to the upcoming elections. This, and other bombings in the country were blamed on the exiled former Rwandan ambassador to India, General Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa. Nywamwasa went into exile and was later the victim of an assassination attempt in South Africa two months ago, an incident which caused South Africa to recall its ambassador to Rwanda to discuss the situation. A journalist who claimed to have uncovered the regime’s responsibility in the attempted murder was shot dead days later and critics pointed the finger to the government; a charge that Rwanda denied. After South Africa arrested five men over the shooting and revealed their nationalities, Rwanda summoned the South African ambassador to express concern about the investigation. However, South Africa denied the recall was in "making any connections between the government of Rwanda and the shooting of the general."

Opposition parties said more than three newspapers had been banned. Amnesty International also maintained that opposition party figures had been intimidated, journalists had been targeted and killed, and several senior officers critical of the ruling party attacked and arrested. Foreign Minister, Louise Mushikiwabo, refuted the claims saying, "the international media and human rights groups are misrepresenting what is happening in the country. My government does not stand to gain from any actions of insecurity. Paul Kagame happens to be a very popular candidate. I think to point a finger at this government is wrong. Anyone who is reading the situation from Rwanda would know that there is an atmosphere of excitement among the public."

Reports from various polling stations and international observers indicated that voters had cast their ballot way before the polls closed and that the entire process was peaceful. Anil K Gayan, a former foreign minister of Mauritius and the head of the AU monitoring delegation, said, "We have not received any evidence of intimidation." He also talked about the turnout for the elections saying that though political rallies may have been well attended "Crowds do not necessarily translate into votes."

For his part, Kagame refuted opposition claims of intimidation, maintaining the vote was "very democratic. The people of Rwanda were free to stand for election, those who wanted to, and to qualify, so I see no problem. Some sections of the media seem to be reading from a different page."

Despite the likely emergence of a de facto one-party state in Rwanda following the wide margin between him and other candidates, Kagame says he detests the sycophancy of some of his RPF disciples.
Now that he is re-elected, Kagame will be only 59 years old when his second term ends in 2017. A true test of his sincerity as a democrat will be his willingness to surrender power, as the constitution demands. Meanwhile he will continue to be a formidable if fearsome operator, at home and abroad.

10 August 2010: ISS Today article written by David Zounmenou, senior researcher, African Conflict Prevention Programme, ISS Pretoria,

On the 1st of August, Guinea Bissau’s President Malam Bacai Sanha called for the international community to send a stabilisation force to his country. The stabilisation force is to be provided by the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP).  This came after what could be termed a politico-military incident exposed once again the fragility of the country and principally the weakness of the President who promised to rid Guinea Bissau of its chronic instability caused mainly by the army. Some see in the President’s call an expression of his powerlessness and the inability of the political and the military elite to restore peace and stability in Guinea Bissau. Others believe it is about time the AU and ECOWAS reconsider their approach and take more concrete and robust responsibility in dealing with the crisis in the country. The form and the content of this intervention depend largely on the appreciation of the current national situation and the risk of insecurity posed by an abandoned and neglected Guinea Bissau for the citizens and the region.

The incident that sparked outrage and caused disappointment among donors and partners started with the arrest of General Zamora Induta, the Army Chief of Staff and the Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Junior. Both were detained and the Deputy Army Chief of Staff General Antonio Injai proclaimed himself the new leader of the army. The abduction of the Prime Minister and the former Army chief of staff on the 1st of April could have easily passed for an April’s fool joke. But this event could not be taken lightly as it occurred in Guinea Bissau.  At first sight, General Injai’s “mini-coup” was meant to disapprove of the ongoing reformist stance and the sidelining by the government of the former navy chief Bubo Na Tchuto. The latter was accused of plotting a coup in 2008, but had since returned to Guinea Bissau only to be subsequently cleared by a military tribunal. Seriously considered, it is the manifestation of the perennial unbalanced and difficult relations that exist between the army, the president and the Prime Minister - relations in which the army remains the potential source of power, resources and political violence.

General Indjai released Gomes Junior but Induta is still kept in custody without any clear possibility of fair trial. While pressure is mounting from regional leaders and the international community for the release of the former army chief of staff, recent developments took everyone by surprise. President Sanha appointed Antonio Indjai, the “army coup plotter” as the new chief of staff. President Sanha’s decision might well be in conformity with article 59 of the country’s constitution but raises a number of questions about the credibility of the President, the newly appointed army chief of staff, and the future of Guinea Bissau’s army and the post-conflict reconstruction process. The apparent indifference or weakness of the president to address vigorously the problems affecting the national army and this specific incident has led the international community to take action, and understandably so.

The US halted its military cooperation with Guinea Bissau shortly after the appointment of Indjai as new Army Chief of Staff. For the US authorities, the fact that the civilian authorities in Guinea‐Bissau have promoted Gen. Antonio Indjai to lead the country’s armed forces weakens the principle of civilian control over armed forces, the rule of law and democracy. The US therefore threatened to withdraw from the post‐conflict reconstruction process. On the other hand, the EU expressed its intentions of cancelling its €102,8 million development aid allocated to the government of Guinea Bissau. Humanitarian aid however and funds intended for populations will remain available. The EU’s decision to reconsider the development funding is based on the same rationale as that of the US. This fund forms part of the 10th  European Development Fund estimated at a total € 22,7 billion, to be disbursed by the EU to its partners from Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific region. The timeline covered by this project is from 2008 to 2013, and the initiative falls under the Cotonou Agreement. The EU has even gone further by announcing that EU support for the security sector reform (SSR) will not be renewed when the current mandate expires in September 2010. Meanwhile ECOWAS threatened Guinea Bissau’s authorities with targeted sanctions.

It is a well-known historical fact that the army remains the most important factor of instability in Guinea Bissau, using violence with ease to effect control over other branches of the state for its own sake. It is the same old guerrilla force that fought the Portuguese colonial power since the 1950s under the leadership of Amical Cabral that constitutes the bulk of the armed forces, ill-disciplined and without any socio-economic survival alternative. While a number of reforms have been initiated, none has so far produced the expected outcomes. Bearing this in mind, one could argue that although the president of Guinea Bissau had strategic considerations in nominating the new chief of the army, that is to gain control of the army in order to reinforce his authority, his appreciation of the situation failed to anticipate the reaction of the international community. In fact, it clearly appears that the president does not have the necessary leverage to impose his authority on the army and the country. For, if he was not able to allow Indjai to take over from Zamora forcefully as the new army chief of staff, it is highly likely that Indjai’s next move could be to depose him if not to physically eliminate him.

This background is necessary in understanding the context in which President Sanha calls for help. President Malam Bacai Sanha found himself locked in a power game, which keeps the country and the reform process hostage. His call for the stabilization force acknowledges that the balance of power is not in his favour and this could be an impediment to the successful post-conflict reconstruction in spite of all his good political will. Perhaps, rather than pointing at the failure of the political and the military elite, or his inability to rule the country, this call should be taken seriously, its contours clearly defined, the mandate specifically crafted and the timeframe strategically assigned. The army has agreed to welcome that force provided that it is approved by parliament and that sufficient details are given to the military hierarchy on its structure and mandate.  However, this stabilisation force will be useless if it is not incorporated in a revised and adapted post-conflict reconstruction programme that creates the framework for the development of an effective state administrative capacity, a coherent socio-economic plan and an incentive for security sector reform. One of the contentious issues with regard to the latter is the absence of a plan to resolve the perennial problem of war veterans. The authorities in Guinea Bissau have identified nearly 6,000 military veterans, according to a recent census as part of a push for security reforms aimed at ending a cycle of coups by an overly-powerful army. According to the Defense Minister, Aristides Ocante Da Silva, the census will allow the country to have a reliable database to better manage the conditions of war veterans. Better conditions, it is hoped, will encourage veterans and older servicemen to leave the army, which many are reluctant to do, and help the country to meet its demobilisation targets. The goal is to reduce the size of armed forces from almost 4500 to 3440 men to be in conformity with the number set by donors in the context of reforms of the armed forces.

It is clear that if donors withdraw and the President’s call is not heeded, tensions are likely to be heightened within the army as government’s financial capacity will be reduced and salaries of army officers unpaid. And in this case, the possibility of having more military officers involved in drug trafficking just to make up the shortage in their salary, will be higher. This is an aspect that the EU and other partners should look at, before taking a final decision. The AU and ECOWAS will also need to come up with a plan that will not have adverse effects on the security of the country and the region. The success of reforming the security sector and the post‐conflict reconstruction, are long term processes, which can contribute in building long-lasting peace in Guinea Bissau. However, Guinea Bissau cannot do it alone, regardless of the negative reactions from some elements within the army.

Wafula Okumu, senior research fellow, African Conflict Prevention Programme, ISS Pretoria

Early this year, the Kenyan government was in a fix over the extradition of Abdullah al-Faisal, a controversial Jamaican-born Muslim cleric, back to his homeland. Besides the nightmare of transporting him back to Jamaica, the government was forced to react decisively to quell street riots of young Muslims using Al-Shabaab signs and symbols to protest against the deportation. Since no airline could accept al-Faisal to board their planes and no Western countries grant him a transit visa, due to being on an international terrorist watch list, the Kenyan government had to fork out $500,000 to fly him out of the country.

Currently, the government is embroiled in another controversy over its handling of three Kenyans suspected to be involved in terrorist bombings that killed over 80 people in Kampala on July 11 (now dubbed 711). Although Al-Shabaab has claimed responsibility for the 711 bombing, the three main suspects are Kenyans who were arrested in Nairobi last week and handed over to Ugandan authorities. The relatives of the Kenyan suspect Hussein Hassan Agade and Christopher Magondu, alias Idris Magondu, have now sued Police Commissioner Mathew Iteere, the Anti Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU), and the Attorney General for illegally arresting the trio and extraditing them to Uganda.
Saida Rosemary, Magondu’s wife, is claiming in an affidavit that more than 20 officers stormed and ransacked their home in Kawangware about 1.30am, handcuffed, blindfolded and drove off with her husband. She claims further that she was denied access to him and information about his arrest. In a hearing held in a Nairobi high court on 3 August, the ATPU told Judge Mohammed Warsame that the three Kenyans are beyond the jurisdiction of the Kenyan courts, as they have been handed over to Ugandan authorities.
These revelations are a serious blow to the rule of law and could severely undermine the prosecution’s case. In the past, there has been widespread opposition to Anti-terrorism bills in the region due to fears that human rights would be violated. The Kenyan government handling of the three suspects has confirmed the worst fears of the opponents of these legislations.
This is not the first time Kenya has been involved in a terrorist rendition controversy. In fact Kenya is now on record as being one of the first countries in the world to practice rendition in early 1976, when it arrested two Palestinian suspects in the vicinity of Nairobi airport planning to down an El-Al plane on a refueling stop from South Africa. The suspects were handed over to the Israeli authorities, and this incident could have gone unnoticed had the hijackers of French airliner that was commandeered to Entebbe in July 1976 not demanded the release of “their comrades” held in Kenyan jails. Kenya’s response was that the Palestinians were not in its custody, as they had been handed over to Israel.
This provoked anger among Palestinian terrorist groups that vowed to punish Kenya. Since the early 1980s Kenya has become a regular target of transnational terrorism. On the eve of the 1981 New Year, a member of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine bombed the historic and posh Norfolk Hotel. Thereafter, Kenya has been targeted by terrorist bombers, with the most tragic being the August 9, 1998, bombing of the American embassy in downtown Nairobi that claimed the lives of more than 200 Kenyans.
In the aftermath of the bombing, Kenya arrested some of the suspects in the 1998 embassy bombing and handed some of them to American authorities. Some of these extraditions were challenged in Kenyan courts, which ruled that they had violated the rights of the suspects.
There is concern among human rights activists that the latest extraditions have confirmed, once again, that Kenya is a violator of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), and other international frameworks that protect human rights. The government is particularly being criticized for violating the constitutional rights of the suspects to the due process. Besides denial of due process, the suspects were also subjected to arbitrary arrests, illegal searches and in communicado detention without access to legal representation and family members. It is not yet known whether the suspects were tortured while being held in in communicado. It seems the police were acting under the yet to be adopted anti-terrorism law that denies suspects legal advice on the grounds that the adviser will “interfere or harm evidence connected to a terrorist offence, or alert other persons suspected of having committed such an offence but not yet arrested for it; or will hinder the tracking of, search for or seizure of terrorist property.”

Critics of the Suppression of Terrorism Bill had raised a red flag that its extradition clause had no human rights guarantees for suspects or accused persons. It is ironic that Kenya extradited the “711” suspects to Uganda, a country with death penalty, on the eve of adopting a new constitution that abolishes it. Although Kenya is under obligation to cooperate with regional partners to prevent and combat terrorism and other crimes, it is also bound by international human rights law not to extradite its citizens without due process of the law, and to countries where they might be tortured. It would be a big blow to the efforts of preventing and combating terrorism if these suspects are release due to the flawed process of bringing them to justice.

8 August 2010: ISS Today article written by Solomon A Dersso, senior researcher, Peace and security support programme, ISS, Addis Ababa

On 4 August 2010, Kenya held a historic constitutional referendum in an attempt to endow the country with a democratic constitution. Kenyans went to polling stations as early as 5 am and stood in long queues that stretched for hundreds of meters. This is seen by many as an opportunity not only to address the flaws in the political structure of Kenya that underpinned the 2007/2008 post-election violence but also to meet the demand of Kenyans who clamoured for a democratic constitution for over twenty years.
In contrast to the 2007 elections, the referendum was conducted in an atmosphere free from allegations of rigging and fraud. The electoral commission was restructured. A new and coded voter-identification and transparent ballot boxes were also used. Except some reports of intimidation in some parts of the country, the voting process was peaceful and smooth.
It is predicted that the constitution will be approved by a majority of Kenyans. Speaking to the BBC, Kenya’s Foreign Minister Moses Wetangula expressed his hope that a minimum of 60 percent of the voters will approve the constitution.
The constitution, although far from complete, is expected to introduce some important changes. It cuts the power of the President, beefs up the oversight role of parliament, vests the judiciary with the power of judicial review and introduces important checks and balances. The constitution also seeks to devolve power away from the centre to the regions, creating two levels of government: national and county governments. Most importantly, it also promises to deal with the most contentious issue of land. The constitution also attempted to restructure various institutions of the State such as the Electoral Commission.
While Kenyans and their friends deservedly breath a sigh of relief with the holding of the referendum without major incidents, many rightly also feel that this is just the beginning. Indeed, despite the fact that Kenyans listened to the President’s call and held a peaceful referendum, the risk of violence is not yet over. In some of the hot spots, particularly the Rift Valley, issues surrounding vote counting and the results may trigger some violence. This is the first and immediate challenge for Kenya.
The other challenge for Kenya is the institutionalisation and full operationalisation of the various institutions and structures of government envisaged by the constitution.
The most important challenge that will take some time and a great deal of work from all sections of society is overcoming the entrenched culture of political corruption and lack of rule of law and constitutionalism.

Constitutionally speaking, this is as serious a problem as having a bad or weak constitution. Although the limitations in the current constitution can be said to have significantly contributed to the troubles that continue to afflict the country, the nature of politics practiced by Kenyan politicians is also to blame. The
Manipulation of ethnicity, disregard for the rule of law, the abuse of public office, corruption, and the socio-economic and political injustices inflicted on various sections of Kenyan society, are recurring issues that have been exacerbated by divisive domestic politics.

Clearly, while having a just and effective constitution is important, constitutional change, of itself, cannot be expected to serve as a panacea for all of Kenya’s social and political woes. As a prominent Kenyan constitutional scholar observed, the constitution does not have arms and legs of its own to be able to transform
Kenya. For the constitution to effect the required changes, it needs much more than a re-design of institutions and the re-structuring of political power. It also requires, equally if not more importantly, a culture of constitutionalism, a culture of respecting the rule of law and abiding by the dictates of the constitution and its values.

The potential approval of the draft constitution is therefore only the first step, albeit a necessary one. It is however inadequate to prevent the recurrence of violence or a crisis of governance in Kenya. The extent to which the constitution is made to transform political discourse in the country and the way state institutions operate and relate to citizens are crucially important. It seems clear that significant change is still required. Even after the 2007/2008 violence, old style politics have continued to dominate the political landscape of the country. Until now, nobody has been held accountable for the deaths of more than 1300 people and the displacement of many more as a result of the post-election violence. Many of the issues underlying the 2007/2008 violence such as the manipulation of identity for political ends, ethno-regional inequality, ethnic or political patronage or nepotism, abuse of public offices, the land question and corruption, have yet to be resolved.

Optimism about the outcome of the constitutional referendum should therefore be cautious. It is necessary to adopt a wait and see policy in order to assess how events will ultimately unfold, not only in terms of the constitutional referendum but also in the run up to, and during, the 2012 elections. 

In holding the referendum peacefully, Kenyans have taken the important first step towards achieving a true constitutional transformation in Kenya. This marks the beginning of the difficult chapter of translating the constitutional promise into reality. 

4 August 2010: ISS Today article written by Nanzelelo Mhlanga, Intern, Security Sector Governance Programme, ISS

This month South Africa celebrates Women’s Month. In October this year the UN will also be celebrating ten years of the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 that calls for more women to be engaged in peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

The chilling account of the death of Akhona Geveza, a 19-year-old South African cadet with a desire to serve her country, who was found floating at sea after allegedly reporting being raped by her senior officer, starkly brings home both how far South Africa has come with gender transformation of the security sector, but also the perils of sending women out in these environments where the disjuncture between legal frameworks and practices are relatively un-policed. As South Africa celebrates Women’s Month, let us unpack the achievements and challenges of women in the security sector. Their achievements are an inspiration to the rest of the SADC region and we should draw lessons from them.

Post-1994 South Africa has seen an opening up of the security sector for women. Women constitute 24% of the SANDF. South Africa has 25 brigadier generals, one woman major general, a woman as Secretary for Defence and a woman as the Minister of Defence. South Africa’s police force has equally undergone major gender representation transformation, namely, 21% of its force is comprised of women and women serve in the top and senior management of the services, as provincial and deputy commissioners and station commanders.  South Africa has one of the largest women peacekeeper contingents drawn from both the military and the police. Emphasis on getting the gender balance right has been accompanied by an equally vociferous attempt to create an enabling environment for women through gender mainstreaming policies. It is this security sector transformation process that has drawn more young women to the security sector. For example, there is the Transnet National Ports Authority’s Maritime Studies Programme, part of a campaign to encourage young women to become seafarers. Indeed, Geveza was one of 100 women enrolled in this course.

Geveza’s death at sea highlighted the challenges that women in the security sector, and beyond, still face, despite the marked progress that has been made. The bane of sexual harassment, stereotyping, and working environments that do not take into account the specific needs of women remain their realities. Women remain vulnerable!
South Africa, like most other countries has to answer the questions: How do we ensure that our legal frameworks and policies translate into changed behaviour and practice? How do we change mindsets? How can we protect women whom we send into these male-dominated environments?

The UN International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women contends that ‘the institutional costs of sexual harassment include loss of productivity, lowered morale, absence from work and increase in staff turnover. When personnel are gender-sensitive, the workplace becomes more productive, efficient and equitable.’ We therefore need to go beyond legal frameworks and engage in more effective gender awareness/sensitivity training and improve our monitoring and enforcement mechanisms in the security sector. When the attitudes begin to be transformed in the workplace, women will find it easier to work in these environments, thus including 50% of the human resources to create a more vibrant and productive security sector.

This National Women’s Day as we applaud the endeavours of women in South Africa we must also ensure that those women who have assumed the responsibility of protecting the nation are themselves safe enough to render protection to others. Geveza’s death highlights the dangers that women who enter these hyper-masculine environments in few numbers face. Therefore, as South Africa celebrates achievements we are alerted to the dire need to also examine the weaknesses in relation to the achievement of gender equality in the South African security sector institutions, so that we do not inadvertently promote women’s representation at the expense of their well-being. Representation, structures, processes, cultures and behaviour have to all change simultaneously to create environments for growth and prosperity for all.  As a young woman I am inspired by the steps that have been taken to promote woman’s advancement both in South Africa and in the region. But, I am also aware of the gaps and that we as young woman need to be vigilant in maintaining hard won victories in the fight for gender equality and continue the campaign to meaningfully exercise the rights that we now have.

3 August 2010: ISS Today article written by Rose Mwebaza, Senior Legal Advisor & Damaris E. Mateche, Intern Environmental Security Programme, Nairobi

The term ‘environmental refugees’ is defined by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), as “those people who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of a marked environmental disruption (natural and/or triggered by people) that jeopardized their existence and/ or seriously affected the quality of their life”. ‘Environmental disruption’ means any physical, chemical, biological changes in the ecosystem/resource base that render it temporarily/permanently, unsuitable to support human life.

Climate change is rapidly emerging as one of the most serious threats that humanity may ever face. The impact of climate change on livelihoods is creating a new kind of casualty: environmental refugees. Rising sea levels, desertification, weather-induced flooding, and frequent natural disasters have become a major cause of population displacement.  This is an issue of concern as it is a drawback in efforts of enhancing human security.

According to a report by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the number of refugees worldwide grew from 9.9 million in 2007 to 11.4 million in 2008. The same report identifies climate change as one of the leading causes of the global rise in refugees, along with conflict. The International Red Cross concurs that climate change disasters are now a bigger cause of population displacement than war.

According to yet another report by the United Nations University, in 2009, there were about 19.2 million people officially recognized as "persons of concern" - people who are likely to be displaced because of environmental disasters. This figure is projected to grow to about 50 million by the end of 2010. The fear by scholars at the United Nations University, “that the number of people fleeing untenable environmental conditions may grow exponentially as the world experiences the effects of climate change,” is now a reality in Africa. If the reports by the International Red Cross are taken into account, there are currently more environmental refugees than refugees displaced by war in Africa.

Failed and unpredictable rains are more regular as raining seasons shorten due to the influence of climate change. Droughts have increased from once a decade to one every two or three years. For pastoralist communities, forced migrations in search of water and pasture have exacerbated resource based conflicts.  

By 2009, a severe, persistent five year drought stretched across East Africa exerting a heavy human toll, made worse by violent conflict. The worst affected countries were Kenya, Ethiopia, Somalia and Uganda. Other countries hit were Sudan, Djibouti and Tanzania. Almost 20 million people in East Africa became dependent on food assistance. Somalia was struck by the double blow of escalating hunger and civil war. More than 4 million people were in need of humanitarian aid.

In 2000, south-eastern Africa was devasted by heavy rains that began in January. In February, cyclone Eline swept across Madagascar and south-eastern Africa, bringing the worst flooding in decades. Then came cyclone Gloria. By March, they had left at least 800 people dead and disrupted the lives of over 2.5 million people in Botswana, Namibia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Mozambique was hardest hit with almost 1 million loosing their homes.

In 2007, West Africa experienced some of its worst floods in ten years. According to UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 500,000 people were affected by heavy rains and floods in 18 countries. Togo, Ghana, Mauritania, Niger, and Mali were hardest hit. Floods devasted East and Central Africa around the same time too.

Landslides and mudslides have forced tens of thousands of people to leave their homes in Rwanda, Kenya, Burundi, Tanzania and Uganda since the beginning of the century. These occur mostly during the rainy season and are accelerated by flooding. In May this year, it was estimated that more than 50 people were killed and about 5,000 people affected by a landslide due to heavy rains on the slopes of the Nyiragongo volcano in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. Early this year, 600 people were displaced when a mudslide occurred in Kittony village in north western Kenya.

Climate change could trigger the growth of deserts in southern Africa, not to mention that desertification is likely to increase around the Sahara, causing populations to move. A report published in the Nature journal recently predicts that as greenhouse gases fuel global warming, the dunes of the Kalahari could begin to spread. By 2099, shifting sands could be blowing across huge tracts of land in Botswana, Angola, Zimbabwe and western Zambia.

It emerges that environmental refugees are caught up in a vicious circle in which all involved facets negatively reinforce one another. Taking into account the case of East Africa, the worst affected communities by floods are the same vulnerable ones that were previously worst hit by drought. Moreover, an expanding population in a drought-stricken area can further strain resources that may be monopolized under political turmoil, upon which refugees streaming out of a country may exert pressure on the host country that then creates international conflicts between sending and receiving nations.

It is of importance that this category of refugees finds a place in international agreements. Further, governments need to better anticipate support requirements, similar to those of people fleeing other unviable situations. This should be done taking into consideration the needs of women and children who are likely to be hardest hit by impacts of climate change.

As the climate change debate rages on, we should understand the fact that it affects livelihoods that depend on the natural environment, which, in Africa, means nearly everyone. There is therefore the need for African governments and the international community to join forces to create and carry out an effective strategy to curb the effects of climate change and manage natural resources more efficiently. If this is addressed, it may help to reverse population displacements and stem the rising tide of refugees.